Research

Recent Published/Working Papers

• • Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication, with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite,  Economic Theory, [arXiv], [Published]

  • Comparison of Information Structures in Stochastic Games, with D. Kim, under revision, [arXiv]

  • Dynamic Games with General Time Preferences, with J. Park 

Work in Progress

• • Controlling Cultivation of Taste

  • Repeated Games with Recursive Utility, with J. Park

  • The Belief-Based Approach with Private Monitoring, with M. Kandori, M. Iwasaki, and M. Yokoo (draft available soon).

  • Misperception and Evolution of Cooperation, with A. Iwasaki, M. Kandori, M. Yokoo

  • Reputation and Information Lag, with V. Bhaskar (slide).

Published Papers

• • Repeated Games with General Discounting, with J. Park, Journal of Economic Theory, 172 (2017): 348-375 (link, pdf).

  • Collusion and Heterogeneity of Firms, with F. Zincenko, RAND Journal of Economics 48 (2017), 230-249 (link, pdf).

  • Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition, with S. Bikhchandani, Economic Theory, 63(3) (2017), 783-812 (link, pdf).

  • Robustness of Public Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (joint with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite), Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014), 191-212 (link). 

  • Mediated Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman), Econometrica 78 (2010), 285-308 (link).

  • Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration (joint with H. Cai), RAND Journal of Economics 40 (2009), 340-363 (link).

  • Folk Theorem with Communication, Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009), 122-1 (link).

  • The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics : Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 (Advances), (2008) (link).

  • Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (joint with M. Kandori) , International Journal of Game Theory, 34 (2006), 475-493 (link).

  • Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: the Role of Private Strategies (joint with M. Kandori) , Econometrica, 74 (2006), 499-519 (link).

  • The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (joint with G. Mailath and T. Sekiguchi), Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002), 99-122 (link).

  • Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring (joint with V. Bhaskar), Journal of Economic Theory 102 (2002), 40-69 (link).