Department of Economics
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
E-mail: galindoh@javeriana.edu.co
PAPERS
Abstract. In many democracies, increasing political competition has changed the traditional party system and brought new parties into the political arena. This study examines whether the presence of politicians from new parties affects the size of government (measured by public spending and tax revenue). The study focuses on Colombian municipalities, where new parties have been numerous and successful in recent years. Regression discontinuity estimates show that public spending and tax revenues are significantly higher in municipalities governed by a mayor from a new party. Using information about local politics and the features of the new parties, I argue that this result is not associated with new party ideology, but instead relates to new parties having lower probability of reelection which raises the incentives to increase short-term rent seeking.
Abstract. In most of the recent literature on state capacity, the significance of wars in state-building assumes that threats from foreign countries generate common interests among domestic groups, leading to larger investments in state capacity. However, many countries that have suffered external conflicts do not experience increased unity. Instead, they face factional politics that often lead to destructive civil wars. This paper develops a theory of the impact of interstate conflicts on fiscal capacity in which fighting an external threat is not always a common-interest public good, and in which interstate conflicts can lead to civil wars. The theory identifies conditions under which an increased risk of external conflict decreases the chance of civil war, which in turn results in a government with a longer political life and with more incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. These conditions depend on the cohesiveness of institutions, but in a non-trivial and novel way: A higher risk of an external conflict that results in lower political turnover, but that also makes a foreign invasion more likely, contributes to state-building only if institutions are sufficiently incohesive.
Conflict Externalization and The Quest for Peace. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. 2021. [arXiv].
Abstract. I study the relationship between the likelihood of a violent domestic conflict and the risk that such a conflict “externalizes” (i.e. spreads to another country by creating an international dispute). I consider a situation in which a domestic conflict between a government and a rebel group has the potential to externalize. I show that the risk of externalization increases the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, but only if the government is sufficiently powerful relative to the rebels, the risk of externalization is sufficiently high, and the foreign actor who can intervene in the domestic conflict is sufficiently uninterested in material costs and benefits. I show how this model helps to understand the recent and successful peace process between the Colombian government and the country’s most powerful rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
Abstract. In this paper, I empirically investigate how the openness of political institutions to diverse representation can impact conflict-related violence. Regression discontinuity estimates that exploit plausibly exogenous variations in the number of councillors in Colombian municipalities show that political openness substantially decreases conflict-related violence, namely the killing of civilian non-combatants. Empirical evidence suggests that the lower level of political violence stems from parties with close links to armed groups having greater representation on larger municipal councils. Using data about the types of violence employed by these groups, and government representation, I argue that armed violence has decreased not because of power-sharing arrangements involving armed groups linked to the parties with more political representation, but rather because armed groups with more political power deter other groups from initiating certain types of violence.
The Role of Religious Competition in Secular Conflicts. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2021. With G. Tchuente. [arXiv].
Abstract. Many countries embroiled in non-religious civil conflicts have experienced a dramatic increase in religious competition in recent years. This study examines whether increasing competition between religions affects violence in non-religious or secular conflicts. The study focuses on Colombia, a deeply Catholic country that has suffered one of the world’s longest-running internal conflicts and, in the last few decades, has witnessed an intense increase in religious competition between the Catholic Church and new non-Catholic churches. The estimation of a dynamic treatment effect model shows that establishing the first non-Catholic church in a municipality substantially increases the probability of conflict-related violence. The effect is larger for violence by guerrilla groups, and is concentrated on municipalities where the establishment of the first non-Catholic church leads to more intense religious competition. Further analysis suggests that the increase in guerrilla violence is associated with an expectation among guerrilla groups that their membership will decline as a consequence of more intense competition with religious groups for followers.
Abstract. This study examines the relationship between ambiguity and the ideological positioning of political parties across the political spectrum. We identify a strong non-monotonic (inverted U-shaped) relationship between party ideology and ambiguity within a sample of 202 European political parties. This pattern is observed across all ideological dimensions covered in the data. To explain this pattern, we argue that centrist parties are perceived as less risky by voters compared to extremist parties, giving them an advantage in employing ambiguity to attract more voters at a lower cost. We support our explanation with additional evidence from electoral outcomes and economic indicators in the respective party countries.
Constitutions, Education and Gender Norms Change. Journal of Comparative Economics. 2026. With P. Herrera-Idarraga. [arXiv]
Abstract. How do gender norms change? This paper provides evidence that exposure to mandatory high school courses on the 1991 Colombian Constitution—which incorporated principles of gender equality—significantly influenced attitudes toward gender roles. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we compare individuals who were exposed to these courses with those who were not. The results show that constitutional education increased support for gender equality, particularly among men. The effect is stronger when a younger woman is present in the household, suggesting a possible motivation to support the empowerment of younger female relatives. We also document important gender differences in how these shifts manifest within households: women exposed to the courses were more likely to reject the idea that men should be the head of the household, whereas men’s views on intra-household roles remained largely unchanged. This contrast points to persistent resistance to gender norm change within the private sphere, even as broader attitudes become more egalitarian. Taken together, the findings underscore the role of institutional and cultural change—through constitutional reform and civic education—in fostering more egalitarian gender norms, while also highlighting the complexity of such transformations.
Religious Competition, Cultural Change, and Domestic Violence. Journal of Population Economics. 2026. With G. Tchuente. [arXiv].
Abstract. We study how religious competition-defined as the entry of a religious organization with innovative worship practices into a predominantly Catholic municipality-affects domestic violence. Using municipality-level data from Colombia and a two-way fixed effects design, we find that the arrival of the first non-Catholic church leads to a significant reduction in reported cases of domestic violence. We argue that religious competition incentivizes churches to adopt and diffuse norms and practices that more effectively discourage such violence. Effects are largest in municipalities with smaller, younger, and more homogeneous populations-contexts that facilitate both intense competition and norm diffusion. Consistent with this mechanism, areas with more new non-Catholic churches exhibit greater rejection of domestic violence-particularly among the religiously observant-and higher female labor force participation. These findings contribute to the literature on the cultural determinants of domestic violence by identifying religious competition as a catalyst for cultural change.
The Centripetal Pull of Climate: Evidence from European Parliament Elections. 2025. With M. Dueñas & A. Mandel. [arXiv].
Abstract. This paper examines the impact of temperature shocks on European Parliament elections. We combine high-resolution climate data with results from parliamentary elections between 1989 and 2019, aggregated at the NUTS-2 regional level. Exploiting exogenous variation in unusually warm and hot days during the months preceding elections, we identify the effect of short-run temperature shocks on voting behaviour. We find that temperature shocks reduce ideological polarisation and increase vote concentration, as voters consolidate around larger, more moderate parties. This aggregated pattern is explained by a gain in support of liberal and, to a lesser extent, social democratic parties, while right-wing parties lose vote share. Consistent with a salience mechanism, complementary analysis of party manifestos shows greater emphasis on climate-related issues in warmer pre-electoral contexts. Overall, our findings indicate that climate shocks can shift party systems toward the centre and weaken political extremes.
Institutions, Education, and Religious Change: Evidence from Colombia. 2026. With P. Herrera-Idarraga. [arXiv].
Abstract. How do religious identities change? We study the effects of civic education reforms on religious identification using Colombia's 1991 Constitution, which dismantled the country's confessional regime and mandated constitutional instruction in high schools. Exploiting cohort-based variation in exposure to the reform and nationally representative survey data, we implement a difference-in-differences design. We find that exposure to the constitutional curriculum reduced Catholic self-identification by about three percentage points. This decline reflects a reallocation of religious identities rather than a generalized decline in religiosity. In regions where Catholic institutional presence was historically weaker, Catholic losses translate into switching toward non-Catholic Christian denominations and higher religious attendance. In contrast, in regions where Catholic dominance was stronger, the decline is associated with increased secular identification and lower attendance. These patterns hold across ethnic and non-ethnic groups and are shaped primarily by regional religious supply rather than ethnicity per se. Overall, the results show that civic education can reconfigure religious identities by reshaping the relative legitimacy of competing affiliations.
Armed Conflict and Early Human Capital Accumulation: Evidence from Cameroon's Anglophone Conflict. 2023. With G. Tchuente. [arXiv].
Abstract. This paper estimates the impact of Cameroon’s Anglophone conflict on human capital accumulation. Using pupil-level data from the 2014 and 2019 PASEC waves combined with geocoded conflict fatalities from ACLED and UCDP, we apply a difference-in-differences design to identify the causal effect of armed violence on learning outcomes. Conflict-related fatalities involving Ambazonian separatists significantly reduced pupils’ language and mathematics scores. The conflict also increased teacher absenteeism and reduced access to electricity in both schools and households, indicating deterioration in school functioning and local living conditions. These findings suggest that linguistic segregation enabled the targeted violence against the Anglophone subsystem, amplifying the unequal educational costs of conflict.
Fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities. 2021. With G. Tchuente & H. Somé. [arXiv].
Abstract. This paper develops the identification theory for fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities (FDIDc) designs, extending the regression discontinuity framework to settings with multiple, overlapping treatments. We derive conditions under which a local average treatment effect (LATE) can be isolated when assignment at the cutoff is imperfect. Identification is shown to hold under either a Local Independence assumption or a weaker Local Smoothness condition, with point identification achieved in three empirically relevant scenarios: (i) equal discontinuities in treatment probabilities across policies; (ii) strict inclusion of a pre-existing treatment within a new one; or (iii) additivity of treatment effects, which rules out interactions such as super- or sub-additivity. We illustrate the empirical relevance of the framework by examining the Affordable Care Act at the Medicare eligibility threshold, where overlapping policies generate complex discontinuities. The analysis reveals an initial transitional increase in cost-related barriers to care that diminished in later years, underscoring the role of both coverage expansion and provider capacity. Our framework provides applied researchers with transparent conditions under which FDIDc yields credible causal estimates, offering guidance for policy evaluation in multi-treatment environments.
Ethnic Group's Access to State Power and Group Size. 2019. [arXiv].
Abstract. Ethnic-based political inequality is widespread despite the prevalence of ethnically diverse societies. This paper shows that an ethnic group’s relative size is a key determinant of its access to political power. Using data on 575 ethnic groups in 181 countries from 1946 to 2021, I document a robust inverted-U-shaped relationship between group size and access to power. This pattern is stable across numerous specifications and robustness checks. To interpret these findings, the paper develops a simple model based on initial political inequality and elite incentives to restrict power sharing. The model predicts that the inverted-U relationship should be weaker in countries with historically less open political institutions. Consistent with this prediction, the data show that the non-monotonic relationship emerges primarily in countries with more open institutional histories.
Using Big Data and Network Theory to Inform Decision-making on COVID-19 in Bogotá. 2022. With 20 co-authors. [RS]
Inequality, Immigration and Party Strategies. 2018. With C. Amat. [link]