papers
[still partially under construction: need to add links to some papers]
Language and the Border Between Perception and Cognition. In Analysis (symposium on Ned Block's The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, with his reply), forthcoming.
Is There an Empirical Argument for Semantic Perception? In Inquiry (special issue on Linguistic Understanding: Perception and Inference), forthcoming.
Representation of Pure Magnitudes in ANS (with W. Kowalsky and T. Burge). In Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44, 2021.
“Impossible” Somatosensation and the (Ir)rationality of Perception (with I. Won and C. Firestone). In Open Mind. 2021.
Linguistic Judgments As Evidence. In Blackwell Companion to Chomsky, eds. Nick Allott, Terje Lohndal, and Georges Rey. 2021.
Probabilistic Representations in Perception: Are There Any, and What Would They Be? In Mind & Language 35. 2020.
Comments on Peter Carruthers' Human and Animal Minds. Central APA 2020.
Can resources save rationality? “Anti-Bayesian” updating in cognition and perception (with E. Mandelbaum, I Won, and C. Firestone). In Behavioral and Brain Sciences 143. 2020.
Linguistic Intuitions: Error Signals and the Voice of Competence. In Linguistic Intuitions, eds. S. Schindler, A. Drożdżowicz, and K. Brøcker (OUP, 2020).
Perceptual Consciousness and Cognitive Access from the Perspective of Capacity-Unlimited Working Memory. In Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373, 2018.
-Part of a symposium on our "Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access?" (see below). For the whole symposium, including commentaries (downloadable) by Beck, Orlandi and Franklin, and Phillips, click this link.
Cognitive Penetration and Attention. In Frontiers in Psychology, 2017.(ResearchTopic “Pre-cueing Effects on Perception and Cognitive Penetrability,” eds. Athanassios Raftopoulos and Gary Lupyan)
Perception and the Origins of Temporal Representation. In Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98, 2017, pp. 275-92.
Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes (with Jonathan Flombaum). In Mind & Language 32, 2017, 358-91.
Review of J. Zeimbekis and A. Raftopoulos (eds.) The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2016).
Review of E. J. Lowe, Forms of Thought. Analysis 75 (2015), pp. 165-7.
Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed Mechanism (with T. Chaisilprungraung, E. Kaplan, J. A. Menendez, and J. Flombaum). In Perception and Concepts, eds. E. Machery and J. Prinz (New Prairie Press, 2014).
(Descriptive) Externalism in Semantics. In The Routledge Handbook of Semantics, ed. N. Riemer (Routledge, 2015).
The Metaphysics of Meaning: Hopkins on Wittgenstein. In International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23, 2015, pp. 518-38.
Is the Liar Meaningless?
Does ‘True’s Expressive Role Preclude Deflationary Davidsonian Semantics? In Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism, eds. S. Gross, N. Tebben, and M. Williams (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 47-63.
Linguistic Intuitions (with Jeffrey Maynes). Philosophy Compass 8, 2013, 714-30.
What is a Context? In Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, eds. A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, and M. Carapezza (Springer, 2013), pp. 113-32. (Reprints a chapter from my dissertation.)
Davidson, First Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics. In Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental, ed. G. Preyer (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 228-48.
Innateness (with Georges Rey). In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, eds. E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 318-60.
Revisited Linguistic Intuitions (with Jennifer Culbertson). In British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62, 2011, pp. 639-56.
Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious. In Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge, eds. B. Armour-Garb, D. Patterson, and J. Woodbridge. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, Vol. 5. (New Prairie Press, 2009 -- actually appeared 2010).
Review of Michael Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication, in Mind & Language 25 (April 2010), pp. 237-46.
Review of Ray Jackendoff, Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2009).
Are Linguists Better Subjects? (with Jennifer Culbertson). In British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60, 2009, pp. 721-36.
Review of Stewart Shapiro, Vagueness in Context, in The Philosophical Review 118 (April, 2009).
Sincerely Saying What You Don’t Believe Again. In Dialectica 62, 2008, pp. 349-54.
Vagueness, Indeterminacy, and Uncertainty. In Indeterminacy, ed. J. Ciprut (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 129-49.
(Written in 1999-2000 for an interdisciplinary workshop; the publication of the proceedings was delayed. A much longer version circulated under the title An Invitation to Vagueness.)
Reply to Jackendoff. In The Linguistic Review 24, 2007, pp. 423-9.
Relating Conscious and Unconscious Semantic Knowledge. In Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7, 2007, pp. 427-45.
Trivalent Semantics and the Vaguely Vague. In Synthese 156, 2007, pp. 97-117.
Can One Sincerely Say What One Doesn't Believe? In Mind & Language, Symposium on Cappelen and Lepore, 21, 2006, pp. 11-20.
Can Empirical Theories of Semantic Competence Really Help Limn the Structure of Reality? In Nous 40, 2006, pp. 43-81.
Normativity. Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed., 2006, vol. 8, pp. 698-701.
Natural Kind Terms. Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed., 2006, vol. 8, pp. 492-6.
The Biconditional Doctrine: Contra Kölbel on a 'Dogma' of Davidsonian Semantics. In Erkenntnis 62, 2005, pp. 189-210.
The Nature of Semantics: On Jackendoff's Arguments. In The Linguistic Review 22, 2005, pp. 249-270.
Context-Sensitive Truth-Theoretic Accounts of Semantic Competence. In Mind & Language 20, 2005, pp. 68-102.
Linguistic Understanding and Belief. In Mind 114, 2005, pp. 61-6.
Putnam, Context, and Ontology. In Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, 2004, pp. 507-54.
Vagueness, Indirect Speech Reports, and the World. In Protosociology (Special Issue on Semantic Theory and Reported Speech) 17, 2002, pp. 153-68.
Review of Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons, in The Philosophical Review 111 (April, 2002), pp. 284-7.
Is Context-Sensitivity Eliminable? Some Remarks. In The Dialogue (Yearbook of Philosophical Hermeneutics: The Legitimacy of Truth, Proceedings of the Third Meeting, Italian-American Philosophy) 2, 2002, pp. 21-38.
Putnam, Kontext und Ontologie. In Hilary Putnam und die Tradition des Pragmatismus, eds. Marie-Luise Raters and Marcus Willaschek (Suhrkamp, 2002), pp. 404-36.
Review of Jerry Fodor, Concepts, in Mind 110 (April 2001), pp. 469-75.
Review of Fiona Cowie, What's Within? Nativism Reconsidered, in The Philosophical Review 110 (January 2001), pp. 94-7.
Vagueness in Context. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, eds. Lila Gleitman and Avarind Joshi (Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000), pp. 208-13.
Essays on Linguistic Context-Sensitivity and its Philosophical Significance. Studies in Philosophy: Outstanding Dissertations (Routledge, 2001).
Contents: Introduction; I. The Pervasiveness and Utility of Context-Sensitivity; II. What is a Context?; III. Context-Sensitivity and Truth-Theoretic Accounts of Semantic Competence; IV. Context, Vagueness, and the Sorites Paradox; V. Context and Ontology (Some Initial Considerations).