Man versus Machine Learning in Market Timing Portfolios (in progress)
By reconciling ex post and ex ante market timing behaviour of a portfolio manager, relative to a benchmark, we derive a market timing matrix operator (MTMO) that classifies and ranks market timing portfolios in large dimensional asset returns. This behaviour driven result is in contrast to data mining classifiers in machine learning. In fact, our MTMO is useful as a pretest estimator in penalized regression and machine learning classification schemes because it admits statistical tests. We applied the MTMO to 13,720 daily returns for the 52 stock price anomalies portfolios from Haddad,Kozak & Santosh (2020) (HKS) to capture cross-sectional variation in expected returns, and 332 intraday overnight stock returns from Pelger (2020). We find that the annualized cumulative returns for timers versus non timers over the sample period are 787.7% vs. 49.4% for anomalies; and 11.6% vs. 1.8% for intraday overnight returns. Fama-French size and value portfolios are included among significant market timers for anomalies, and we show how a transformed MTMO matrix (G) doubles the active returns from Fama-French 5-factors (Z-matrix).
Growing interest in market timing
Separating intraday overnight timers
Anomalies portfolios
Intraday overnight portfolios
"Peacock portfolio" PCA factors
Intraday overnight market augmented
Factor Pricing and Market Timing with benchmark perturbation (in progress)
Assuming that stock returns are predictable, and that there are tradeable factors that help explain equity risk premia, what is the limiting distribution of the empirical alpha process generated by a portfolio manager (PM) in that milieu, and how can we test whether the PM has market timing ability? We answer those questions with a new econometric test and market timing classifier for PMs' factor pricing and market timing ability, based on identifying restrictions on the core of active returns strategies, for an active portfolio and a benchmark. The test is based on a novel application of Tracy-Widom law to an endogenous covariance shrinkage estimator (call a G-matrix) decomposed into parts due to active portfolio timing, and benchmark perturbation. The shrinkage parameter is based on the spectrum of a transformed benchmark perturbation. We applied the test to 13,720 daily returns for the 52 stock price anomalies portfolios in Haddad, Kozak & Santosh (RFS, 2020) (HKS) to capture cross-sectional variation in expected returns, and 332 intraday overnight stock returns from Pelger (2020). The test separates statistically significant market timing portfolios from non timers. And the annualized cumulative returns for anomalies timers is 787.7% vs. 49.4% for non-timers; and 11.6% vs. 1.8% for intraday overnight returns. Fama-French size and value portfolios are included among significant market timers for HKS data, and we show how the G-matrix doubles the active returns from Fama-French 5-factors (Z-matrix). The likelihood ratio function for G versus Z matrices has an empirical Bayes feature that allows for a simple computation of the shrinkage constant between hedge factors covariance and benchmark covariance matrices compared to extant optimization approaches. The shrinkage matrix is useful as a pretest estimator in LASSO and machine learning classification schemes.
Simulated Good, Medium and bad states
Log likelihod function for matrix allocation
Daily alphas for Fama-French Z-matrix
Daily alphas for Fama-French G-matrix transform
Fama-French Market Factor returns over states
Fama-French HML Factor returns over states
Fama-French SMB Factor returns over states
Fama-French RMW Factor returns over states
Fama-French CMA Factor returns over states
Daily exposure of Fama-French five factors
Market Instability, Investor Sentiment, and The Probability Weighting Functions Implied by Index Option Prices
How do financial markets switch from states of optimism to pessimism and vice versa? How does a seemingly stable financial market become unstable and crash? The answers lie in a natural experiment with risk based sources of probability weighting functions (pwfs), i.e., source functions, implied by S\&P 500 index option prices. Source functions reflect a ranking of assets and the weight investors place on each rank. We derive a novel behavioural process (hereinafter BELLE), from noise in decision making in the presence of risk, which describes switching behavior and (in)stability of the risk based source functions over time. The BELLE process characterizes critical tipping points for investor sentiment, probabilistic risk attitudes about tail events, and early warning signals of market instability and crash. Those critical values predict (1) state transitions in sentiment, (2) the degree of investors' optimism and pessimism in the market, and (3) mania, panic and crash for the market's irrational exuberance or high uncertainty about asset quality. The model is robust to different sources of risk. SLIDES
Credit risk sources, investor psychology and probabilistic risk attitudes
Stable pwf implied by option prices
Unstable pwf implied by option prices
Probabilistic risk aversion in option market: Beta(p) curvature instability for 1997 Asia currency crisis and 2005 US real estate and CDO risk sources respectively
Probabilistic risk aversion in option market: Beta(p) curvature instability for 1997 Asia currency crisis and 2005 US real estate and CDO risk sources respectively
Monthly probability weighting functions implied by index option prices between 1996 and 2008 measures market sentiment. Curvature discriminates between optimism and pessimism while elevation reflects attractiveness of bet
Monthly probability weighting functions implied by index options prices for market crash. The limit shape for likelihood insensitivity is a tent map over 50-50 outcomes popularized by chaos theory.
American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey predicts imminent recession when bulls and bears agree
BELLE process signals markets crash when the shape of probability weighting functions is a tent map 2-months before Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008
Simulation results for time dependent probability for seemingly stable probability weighting function becoming unstable assuming volatility uniformly distributed in (0.01,0.05)
BELLE process for high P-rank S&P 500 index returns, i.e. high quality securities, is killed and absorbed into a coffin state. For low P-ranks, i.e. low quality or toxic assets, the BELLE process is explosive and the market crashes.
Asset Pricing With Myopic Loss Aversion To Credit Default (in progress)
Information flows in bond markets follow a Cauchy bridge process. We prove that positive jumps in the bridge process mimic a proxy for myopic loss aversion to credit default. Joint work with Sure Mataramvura.
4. Smart Beta and Alpha Representation Theorem
According to Kahn and Lemmon (FAJ, 2016) disruptive innovations often do not come from focus groups or client interviews, because clients are not asking for these types of innovations (e.g., no one was demanding personal computers when they first came out). Rather, they result from understanding current practice and having a vision of how to advance that practice. In the case of smart beta, the investment outcome is higher returns and/or lower risk after fees and costs. Thus, smart beta portfolio strategies, i.e., periodic revision of asset allocation or readjustment of portfolio weights within an asset class different from a benchmark index, are disruptive innovations that are revolutionizing active portfolio management. This project’s contribution is a representation theorem for the pure alpha (a portfolio’s risk-adjusted returns in excess of a certain benchmark or index) generated by such strategies when a benchmark index is augmented with active portfolio management. We find that the alpha process generated by smart beta is a local semimartingale with a background driving bridge process that mimics portfolio manager price reversal strategies. The path properties of alpha are such that it is positive between suitably chosen stopping times for active management. We demonstrate why econometric tests of portfolio performance are biased against positive alpha, and explain why alpha may be significant in backtested hedge factor portfolios like Fama-French and Cahart, but become insignificant when the portfolios go live because of mean reversion . This explains why momentum factors are the most robust factors in backtested and live portfolios. slides
Consumption-based Asset Pricing with Rare Disasters and α-Stable Mimicking Myopic Loss Aversion (in progress)
We allow for rare disasters in a consumption based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) with a novel singular single factor pricing kernel, based on a mimicking myopic loss aversion (MMLA) process derived from a method of moments estimator applied to consumption growth. We prove that the MMLA index factor is a sufficient statistic for habit formation in consumption. It is a-stable, exhibits loss aversion clustering, and it becomes explosive during rare disasters. The implied risk aversion (IRA) index derived from that factor jumped by 518% at the height of the Great Recession disaster in 2008, and it triggered background risk that lingered in the economy for about 5-years. We estimate the IRA index for the S&P 500 at 0.41 $(p<0.001)$. For each Fama-French hedge factor (MKT, SMB, HML) it is also 0.4 (p<0.001). The model predicts an equity premium 10-times larger than that predicted by neoclassical models like the CAPM. We establish external validity of the IRA index by showing how it tracks the CBOE VIX over time. We find that the IRA index is persistent, counter cyclical to consumer sentiment (p<0.001), highly correlated with the VIX (p<0.001) and insensitive to unemployment claims (p=0.12). It identifies periods of excessive risk taking, and onset recession, when the VIX is outside a time varying IRA index confidence band. Robustness checks with Monte Carlo simulations of the model consistently produce IRA index values in the narrow range [0.38, 0.46]. Those estimates are consistent with predictions of economic theory, coincide with estimates obtained from controlled incentivized experiments, and they are much smaller than the high single, double and even triple digit numbers reported for IRA index estimates in published CCAPM studies with non-experimental data.Our risk aversion index estimates are much smaller that for example, Campbell & Cochrane (1999) who predict RA estimates in excess of 41, and Nagel & Singleton (2011) report RA index in the [0,100] range. Our direct and simulated risk aversion index estimates are consisted with numbers obtained in controlled inventivized experiments by Holt & Laury (2002) . The distribution of intertemporal substitution of consumption (IMRS) in our sample of monthly US data over the last 20-years is bimodal with median value 3.37. So consumption is very sensitive to interest rates. IMRS peaks with high volatility during market bubbles but falls precipitously and remains flat after rare disasters as agents hold more cash. The distribution of IRA index is right skewed with clustering in the tail around IRA index =1 for rare disasters as predicted by Arrow's theory. SLIDES
Rare disaster shows up in the seemingly thin tail. However, loss aversion is clustered in the 1 to 5 range and to a much lesser extent for rare disasters. About 25% of MMLA index values exceed 5.
MMLA index for monthly real personal consumption in US is mostly gain seeking. The MMLA index increases when unemployment increases and fear of decline in standard of living looms large.
Direct estimate of IRA index is 0.37. However, model simulation produces a narrow range [0.37, 0.47]. The rare but explosive countercyclical covariance between the singular pricing kernel and returns is accompanied by explosive risk aversion index. IRA index is consistent with Holt-Laury range
The implied risk aversion (IRA) index tracks the VIX. Starting around the NBER recession date for the Great Recession of 2008, background risk which lasted for at least 5-years where IRA index hovers over the VIX. Our estimates show that investors risk attitudes are now at pre-disaster levels.
Range of risk aversion and risk seeking index values directly estimated by Holt & Laury (2002) from their controlled estimates.
Simulated risk premium based on sample average risk premium and 10,000 bootstrapped betas. The model's rules based bootstrap betas from cross sectional pricing equation are used to construct bootstrap prediction.
Simulated mixture distribution for consumption growth in Plot (d) is almost identical to observed distribution
Simulation of equity premium distribution versus distribution predicted by model.
IMRS peaked around 2000 and fell precipitously when the dot.com bubble burst soon thereafter. IMRS also peaked at the height of the real estate bubble around 2004, and it was relatively volatile as DMs engaged in excessive consumption. It started to decline thereafter, and when the bubble burst during the Great Recession of 2008, IMRS fell dramatically by roughly 800\% from its peak in 2004 and volatility was relatively low. That state lasted for about 5-years as household consumption reached a low ebb. IMRS did not return to 2004 levels until about 2016. So it took the market 12-years before its started to exhibit signs of a new bubble. Several anecdotal stories bear this out. See e.g., Janna Herron, 'Prada to nada' and back: Has America really recovered from the Great Recession?, USA Today, June 26, 2019
the IRA index shows a bump between 0.8 and 1.4 which reflects rare disasters. The quartile distribution is: $Q1=0.2466, Q2=0.2966, Q3=0.7965, Q4=1.1401$. Note that the algorithm for kernel density stretches the horizontal axis slightly.
Linear specification for explanatory factors for IRA index show persistence of risk aversion in upper left plot. Consumer sentiment in upper right appears to be countercyclical.atory factors for the IRA index
Nonlinear specification of factor retain persistent feature for IRA index in upper left plot. However, it appears that consumer sentiment is a harmonic explanatory factor. Additionally, US unemployment claims and the VIX are highly nonlinear explanatory factors for the IRA index.
Arbitrage with Betas Of Hope and Fear (in progress)
We introduce a confidence representation theorem that splits the CBOE VIX with Gallup Daily Economic Confidence Index (GDECI) into distinct confidence sets of hope and fear, and then use the beta for each confidence set to identify arbitrage opportunities between the portfolios constructed in each of the two sets. Data show that daily returns on the Wilshire 5000 is enclosed in a convex [concave] envelope for VIX in over [under] confident regimes. Thereby upholding convex risk-return tradeoffs, and inducing a pseudo put-call parity decomposition of returns. Moreover, we find that returns on VIX are uncorrelated with the Fama-French hedge factors. This paves the way for constructing risk parity portfolios and augmenting the Fama-French model with a hedge factor tail risk strategy that is long variance futures and short spot variance when there is market fear, and short variance futures and long spot variance when confidence is high.