(617) 699-1942 fuhitokojima1979@gmail.com
Employment
Postdoctoral Associate, Cowles Foundation, Yale University 2008 { 2009
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University 2009 {
Education
Ph.D. in Economics, Harvard University June 2008
B.A. in Economics, Summa cum Laude, University of Tokyo, Ouchi Hyoe Best Thesis
Prize March 2003
Research Interests
Game Theory (matching/assignment problems, auction, evolution/learning),
Market Design,
Political Economics.
Publications
1. \Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," 2008, joint with Parag A.
Pathak, American Economic Review, forthcoming.
2. \Matching with Contracts: Comment," 2008, joint with John William Hateld, American
Economic Review, forthcoming.
3. \Random Assignment of Multiple Indivisible Objects," 2008, Mathematical Social Sciences,
forthcoming.
4. \Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism with General Priority Structures,"
2007, Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
5. \The Law of Aggregate Demand and Welfare in the Two-Sided Matching Market," 2007,
Economics Letters, forthcoming.
6. \When can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? Maximal Domain
Results," 2007, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (contribution), Article 32
7. \Matching and Price Competition: Comment," 2007, forthcoming in American Economic
Review
8. \Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on
Market Equilibration," 2006, joint with M. Utku Unver, forthcoming in International Journal
of Game Theory
9. \Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets," 2006,
Social Choice and Welfare 27, pp 25{28.