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On this webpage you will find information on my research on the evolution of cooperation.
Evolution of Cooperation: Meta Study
- Risk and Temptation: A Meta-Study on Social Dilemma Games, Economic Journal 128 (2018), 3182-3209. [Online Appendix] [Replication Data]
Evolution of Cooperation: Learning and Strategies in Repeated Games
Match length realization and cooperation in indefinitely repeated games (joint with L. Orlandi and S. Weidenholzer), Journal of Economic Theory 200 (2022), 105416.
Abstract: Experimental studies of infinitely repeated games typically consist of several indefinitely repeated games (“matches”) played in sequence with different partners each time, whereby match length, i.e. the number of stages of each game is randomly determined. Using a large meta data set on indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018) we demonstrate that the realized length of early matches has a substantial impact on cooperation rates in subsequent matches. We estimate simple learning models displaying the “power law of practice” and show that participants do learn from match length realization. We then study three cases from the literature where realized match length has a strong impact on treatment comparisons, both in terms of the size and the direction of the treatment effect. These results have important implications for our understanding of how people learn in infinitely repeated games as well as for experimental design.
- Strategy Revision Opportunities and Collusion (joint with M. Embrey and R. Peeters), Experimental Economics 22(4), (2019),834-856.
- Learning by (limited) forward looking players, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 108 (2014), 59-77.
- Strategic Behavior in Repeated Voluntary Contribution Experiments, (joint with Ronald Peeters), Journal of Public Economics 95(1), (2011), 143-148. [Replication Data]
Evolution of Cooperation: Dynamic PGG and Inequality
- Redistribution, Growth and Inequality - Insights from Dynamic Experimental Public Good Games, joint with L. Xue, G. Horvath and E. Cartwright, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 185 (2026), 105283.
- Growth and Inequality in Public Good Provision, joint with S. Gaechter, E. Tsakas and A. Vostroknutov, Journal of Public Economics 150 (2017), 1-13. [Online Appendix] [Replication Data]
Evolution of Cooperation: Institutions
- Cooperation through collective punishment and participation, joint with D. Duell, E. Mohlin and S. Weidenholzer, Political Science and Research Methods 12(3) (2024), 494-520.
- Natural Disasters and Social Cohesion, joint with A. Calo-Blanco, J. Kovarik and J.G. Romero, Plos ONE 12(6) (2017), e0176885.
- Matching Technology and Choice of Institutions in a Prisoner's dilemma (joint with V. Grimm), Journal of Econ. Behavior and Organization 78 (2011), 333-348.
Evolution of Cooperation: Social Structure and Social Networks
Social Influence and Carbon Dioxide Mitigation (joint with J.V. Ganguli), Journal of Public Economics 253 (2026), 105558.
Abstract: We investigate the potential of social influence to increase people’s willingness to mitigate their carbon impact. In a large-scale online experiment consisting of two waves of data collection participants are given the choice to spend any share of a 10 GBP endowment on mitigation. If a wave-1 participant is told that their (anonymized) choice will be observed by a wave-2 participant before that participant makes their choice, then the wave-1 participant’s willingness to mitigate (WTM) increases by about . This is not the case if their choice is observed by the wave-2 participant after that participant has already made their choice, which demonstrates that it is indeed the possibility of influence and not only observability that matters. Increasing influence at the extensive margin, i.e. increasing the number of wave-2 participants observing the choice, does not increase WTM. We also elicit beliefs and find that most participants overestimate how much influence they have.
- Limited Memory can be Beneficial for the Evolution of Cooperation (joint with G. Horvath and J. Kovarik), Journal of Theoretical Biology 300, (2012), 193-205.
Abstract: In this study we analyze the effect of working memory capacity on the evolution of cooperation and show a case in which societies with strongly limited memory achieve higher levels of cooperation than societies with larger memory. Agents in our evolutionary model are arranged on a network and interact in a prisoner's dilemma with their neighbors. They learn from their own experience and that of their neighbors in the network about the past behavior of others and use this information when making their choices. Each agent can only process information from her last h interactions. We show that if memory (h) is too short, cooperation does not emerge in the long run. A slight increase of memory length to around 5–10 periods, though, can lead to largely cooperative societies. Longer memory, on the other hand, is detrimental to cooperation in our model.
- Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks (joint with Constanza Fosco), Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35 (2011), 641-658. [Online Material]
- Cooperation in Viscous Populations – Experimental Evidence, (joint with Veronika Grimm), Games and Economic Behavior 66(1) (2009), 202-220. [Replication Data]
- Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model, Journal of Evolutionary Economics 19 (3), (2009), 397-415.
- Matching Structure and the Cultural Transmission of Social Norms, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 67 (2008), 608-623.
- The Evolution of Function-Valued Traits for Conditional Cooperation, Journal of Theoretical Biology 245 (2007), 564-575.
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