The role of information in collective decisions (joint with Nicolás Figueroa and José-Alberto Guerra) (conditionally accepted at the Journal of the European Economic Association)
Abstract: We study how members of a group vote for public information. We argue, both theoretically and experimentally, that voters are more likely to vote for information to be acquired relative to their own individual willingness to pay for information when ex-ante disagreement is higher and ex-post disagreement is lower. Ex-ante and ex-post disagreement refer to the disagreement among group members over the best policy for the group to follow before and after information is acquired respectively. We discuss how the results inform the debate over the role of the State in fostering progress, and the value of the wisdom of the crowd.
How redundant information can overcome bias (joint with Nicolás Figueroa and Rubén Jara) (previously circulated as "Communication through biased intermediators")
Abstract: An organization with access to data delegates its empirical analysis on a possibly biased expert. We find that, by adding redundant information and privately manipulating the data (e.g., by secretly switching data entries), the organization is able to completely neutralize the bias of the expert; it is as if the expert is unbiased. We discuss how our results can be used to increase the transparency of empirical research with particular emphasis on the medical research over the effects of certain drugs.
Assignment mechanisms with state-independent preferences and independent types (online appendix)
Abstract: I study a general mechanism design problem without transfers under two assumptions: that agents have state-independent preferences and statistically independent types. I characterize optimal mechanisms for the one-agent and multiple-agent cases, discuss the value of commitment power for the decision maker and prove a comparative statics' result. As an application, I consider the optimal design of peer-review contests when jurors are biased. I argue that quotas, where each academic field is assigned a fixed number of prizes, are not optimal, and that asking reviewers to review applications from other fields may actually increase the expected quality of the prize recipients.
Can impartial peer-review mechanisms replace external reviewers?
Abstract: The increase in the number of academic competitors for grants and conferences makes it unfeasible to continue to rely exclusively on external reviewers for peer evaluation. An alternative is to ask applicants to rate each other using impartial mechanisms which eliminate the incentives to misreport of self-interested applicants. I introduce the reliable subset mechanism and argue that, for most academic contests, this impartial mechanism performs similarly to using external reviewers, provided the applicants are as capable of generating accurate reviews. I then show that external reviewers are rendered unnecessary altogether whenever evaluations of the same applicant are strongly correlated.