Publications and forthcoming papers
The Role of Risky Debt and Safe Assets in Unregulated Financial Intermediaries with Costly State Verification (with Pedro Gomis-Porqueras). Economic Theory 80, 203–239 (2025).
E-Money, Risk Sharing, and Welfare (with Burak Uras), European Economic Review, Volume 169 (2024), 104832.
Imperfect Competition in the Banking Sector and Macroeconomic Instability (with Leonor Modesto and Teresa Loyd-Braga) Journal of Mathematical Economics 112 (2024),102968.
Sovereign default, fiscal policy, and macroeconomic instability (with Leonor Modesto), Journal of Public Economic Theory, 24 (2022), 1386-1412.
Transparency and Collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing (with Gaetano Antinolfi and Francesca Carapella), Theoretical Economics, 17 (2022), 185-217.
Real consequences of open market operations: The role of limited commitment (with Pedro Gomis-Porqueras), European Economic Review, Volume 132 (2021).
Endogenous Credit and Investment Cycles with Asset Price Volatility (with Leonor Modesto), Macroeconomic Dynamics, 22.7 (2018): 1859-1874.
Joint Liability with Endogenously Asymmetric Group Loan Contracts (with Burak Uras), Journal of Development Economics, Volume 127 (2017), pp.72-90
Costly Monitoring, Dynamic Incentives, and Default (with Gaetano Antinolfi), Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 159, Part A (2015), pp. 105-119
Working Papers
Asymmetric Group Loan Contracts: Experimental Evidence (with Burak Uras, Sigrid Suetens, and Philine Visser). R&R at the Journal of the Economic Science Association
We design an experiment to study the role of (a)symmetry in the context of group lending with joint liability. The performance of joint-liability contracts crucially hinges on borrowers engaging in peer monitoring. We find that asymmetric contracts, in which monitoring is a dominant strategy for one borrower, increase the monitoring rate, and thus the repayment rate and performance. Moreover, asymmetric contracting also increases expected profits of the lending institution. Overall, our results suggest that asymmetric joint-liability contracts are worth considering as part of a policy to maintain financial stability.
Selected Work in Progress
Social Norms and Excess of Transfer Progressivity in the Village (with Albert Rodriguez Sala and Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis)
Optimal Monetary Policy Under Incomplete Financial Markets when Money is Essential, (with Gaetano Antinolfi and Enrique Kawamura)