Working papers

Gender, Motivation, and Self-selection into Teaching (2024), with Jaai Parasnis (Monash University) and Massimiliano Tani (University of New South Wales), IZA DP No. 15532.

Social Norms: Personal Beliefs versus Normative Expectations (2024), with Natalia Montinari (University of Bologna). Working Paper DSE N°1182, ISSN 2282-6483.  R&R Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 

Perceptions of Gender Norms: Framing Effects and Double Standard (new version 2025), with Caterina Gaggini (Aarhus University) and Natalia Montinari (University of Bologna), Working Paper DSE N°1198, ISSN 2282-6483.

A Tax is a Signal: Theory and Evidence with Laura Cornelsen (London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine) and Mario Mazzocchi (University of Bologna), in preparation.
Abstract: We compare the signaling power of a tax policy and an information campaign targeting the consumption of unhealthy goods when the side effects are not observable to consumers. The tax policy is modeled as a costly signal, while the information campaign is seen as a costless one.  While the information campaign transmits partial information, we show that the tax policy can convey accurate information through a fully-revealing equilibrium. Using home scanner data from over 7,000 households purchasing sugar-sweetened beverages, we examine the UK soft drink tax announcement and find that the tax policy is an effective signaling device. The consumption of soft drinks subject to the higher tax rate decreased more than those subject to the lower rate, while sugar-added soft drinks exempted from the tax showed no response. A prior information campaign led by chef Jamie Oliver had a similar impact on all sugar-sweetened beverages, regardless of their sugar content. These empirical findings support our theoretical predictions.