In progress

This paper investigates the interplay between interoperability and the incentives to invest in cybersecurity in digital markets.  We develop a two-sided symmetric duopoly model in which cyberattacks create a congestion-like externality, and interoperability amplifies hackers’ incentives to target connected platforms.  We show that interoperability affects cybersecurity investment through multiple channels, potentially producing a non-linear relationship: low interoperability promotes risk-mitigation efforts, whereas high interoperability may discourage investment due to a public good effect.  We then compare private and social incentives for interoperability, identifying potential sources of misalignment. Finally, we extend the baseline model to account for additional factors shaping the desirability of interoperability,  including platforms’ business models, users’ awareness of cyber risk, market expansion effects, and asymmetries in %firms' installed user bases.

We extend the analysis developed by Manenti and Sandrini (2025) to account for technology licensing. We show that fixed-fee licensing reshapes firms’ incentives to differentiate the direction of their R&D efforts: depending on the structure of the licensing contract, firms may either converge on the same technological trajectory or find it optimal to diversify. The analysis also allows us to discuss a potential inefficiency of ex-ante licensing contracts.

We study a dominant platform that ties its core service with a specialised platform service, where it faces a rival whose users might access it through the dominant platform or a direct channel. Firms invest in quality to attract consumers. Tying lowers access costs for users of the integrated firm, and diverts demand for the specialised services away from the independent firm. This is pro-competitive given investment levels. However, it raises the integrated platform's incentives to invest but reduces those of the rival,  negatively impacting its users in the direct channel. If the direct channel has sufficient weight, tying can decrease both aggregate consumer surplus and welfare. By reducing the rival's profitability, tying might also deter its entry. Finally, we analyse the effects of demotion, which increases the access costs of rivals, and show it is always detrimental.

This paper investigates how cyberattacks affect the market valuation of European financial institutions. Using an event study methodology on 31 cyber incidents between 2016 and 2024, we document a clear and statistically significant negative market reaction concentrated around the announcement day; we found no evidence of declines prior to the announcement, so we rejected the hypothesis of insider trading. A time‐trend analysis reveals diverging patterns: while the impact of non‐confidential attacks has intensified, the market response to confidentiality breaches has weakened, consistent with improved disclosure and crisis management practices.

This paper provides an analysis of multihoming in the online food delivery market, focusing on riders and customers, while accounting for restaurants. Using two cross-sectional surveys from the Philippines, we examine multihoming patterns and apply a random forest method to identify the main factors associated with multihoming on both sides. We then embed these factors into classical econometric models alongside proxies for prices, indirect network effects, and platform loyalty strategies. Our results show that for riders, multihoming is strongly influenced by network size and platform loyalty: higher demand density leads riders to use multiple platforms, certain demographics, while uniforms, pay schemes, and tipping encourage them to specialize. For customers, multihoming depends less on demographics or spending and more on economic incentives: larger rider networks and more competing apps increase multihoming, whereas higher delivery fees and in-house delivery availability reduce it.