Note: the following review was published in Full Context, February 1992. In retrospect, I now
think I was being too generous to the book; but it is clear that all my criticisms of it, and
my identifications of its misrepresentations of Rand's philosophy, were completely to the point.
The history since then, of the way Objectivism has been treated by the Ayn Rand Institute, has
completely vindicated my predictions about OPAR's effects.
In all the years since I published this review, followers of Peikoff have attacked me vehemently
many times, but not once have any of them made any attempt to answer any of my points. I don't
think there is any room for honest doubt any more that OPAR does seriously misrepresent Rand's
philosophy on several important issues. In view of the way the Ayn Rand Institute continues to
promote OPAR, and to pretend it is an accurate exposition of Objectivism, it seems my review
remains relevant today.
Update March 4 2020: The above two paragraphs were written in 2008. In late February 2020, a Facebook Leonard Peikoff study/appreciation group linked to this page and started a discussion of my review. So far, at least, after slightly over a week, they've failed to provide an actual challenge to any of my demonstrations of the problems in the book. Still, some of the members of this group should be congratulated for discussing the actual content of my points; they're the only Peikoff supporters to ever show enough courage to do so, rather than just condemn my heresy. I stand by all but one of the statements on this page; but I am very glad that, 28 years after publishing my review, I at last can retract my statement that no Peikoff supporters have ever made any attempt to answer any of my points.
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Since the bulk of this review will be harshly critical, let me start by
stressing that the book is very much worth reading, and well worth its
price. Peikoff's book (henceforth OPAR) covers Rand's ideas
systematically, is usually clear and accurate in presenting them (the
exceptions to that are discussed below), and makes many valuable points
that have not previously been covered in print. Of all the books
published so far about Rand and her ideas, OPAR is definitely the
best.
I have not yet had the opportunity to read Harry Binswanger's review of
OPAR in The Intellectual Activist, but I'm sure it discusses the
book's virtues at length, and probably exaggerates them. I expect that
a few other reviews with a similar attutude will soon be published.
Here, I would like to concentrate on those aspects of OPAR that most
other reviews are likely to neglect.
OPAR has several significant weak points, both in epistemology and
in ethics:
1. My overall criticism of the epistemology sections is that they are
far too brief, many of them offering few or no examples.
Epistemological issues are hard to understand because they are very
abstract. If the book is intended for a general audience, including
people with no previous background in epistemology, then much more
space and effort should have been devoted to concretization.
2. The brevity of epistemological discussions is most evident, and most
clearly inappropriate, in the discussion of integration (pp. 125-126).
The need to systematically integrate every conclusion with the rest of
one's knowledge is a crucial methodological consequence of Rand's
epistemology, and a central aspect of the revolutionary Objectivist
view of the nature of objectivity. This subject, so far, has not been
discussed in print in any officially-endorsed source (though it has
been discussed to some extent in David Kelley's Truth and
Toleration). But OPAR devotes less than two pages, including one
very schematic example, to integration and how to achieve it.
Why doesn't Peikoff provide a more adequate discussion of this subject?
I think the evidence points quite strongly to an explanation. In his
lecture course Understanding Objectivism, Peikoff provides a much
more detailed discussion of the method of integration; and as a central
aspect of the discussion, Peikoff stresses the crucial importance of
confronting counter-arguments and considering them rationally - i.e.,
in the terms used five years later during the Peikoff-Kelley break, of
tolerance - as a necessary means for ensuring that you haven't missed
important integrations. This amounts to an endorsement of Kelley's
position, on the central issue of the Peikoff-Kelley break; providing
any detailed discussion of integration in OPAR would have required
making such an endorsement in print - which Peikoff, for reasons that
are easy to understand but hard to excuse, was unwilling to do.
3. The discussion of hierarchy (pp. 129-141) is quite confused. Peikoff
never makes clear the distinction between logical hierarchy - the
relation of one concept that is defined in terms of another, in the
context of the fullest available understanding of the concept (in that
sense, for example, the concept of "man" hierarchically depends on the
concept of "rationality", and the concept of "light" depends on the
concept of "electromagnetism") - and chronological hierarchy - the
relation of a concept which depends on some other concept in order to
be validly formed, i.e. even for an initial understanding (in that
sense, in the two above examples, the hierarchy clearly doesn't hold).
The central example of the discussion - the concept "friend" -
highlights the confusion. Does the concept "friend" hierarchically
depend on "value" in the chronological sense? Observation of how
children actually form these concepts clearly refutes any such claim.
Or is Peikoff only saying that, *in the context of a full, Objectivist
understanding of friendship*, the concept logically depends on the
concept "value"? If so, it is a non-sequitur to conclude that those who
advocate friendship while denying values are committing the fallacy of
the stolen concept; they may have an understanding of friendship that
is false, and different from the Objectivist understanding, but still
compatible with the necessary base for validly forming and using the
concept (Peikoff's claim is then equivalent to claiming that anyone who
denies electromagnetism, and offers an alternative theory of light, is
committing the fallacy of the stolen concept).
Peikoff's discussion of the example shifts between these two meanings,
and his entire discussion of hierarchy conflates them. It is clear that
Peikoff's idea of hierarchy is a vague notion somewhere between the
two, and that he has not formed a clear, integrated understanding of
this issue.
4. The discussion of contextual certainty (pp. 171-181) contains
further fundamental confusions. Peikoff fails to distinguish between
two possible interpretations of the contextual nature of truth: a. that
the truth of a statement is subject to some, perhaps not fully known,
conditions in reality (e.g. , the A-B classification of blood types
is true under the condition of having the same Rh factor); or b. that
the truth of a statement is relative to a person's internal state of
knowledge at a given time. (This distinction was pointed out by David
Kelley, at the first IOS advanced seminar, summer 1990). Under a
correspondence theory of truth, only a. makes sense; and Peikoff's
statement of the principle seems closer to a.; but his discussion
indicates that he really holds b.
Peikoff states (p. 173) that "knowledge at one stage is not
contradicted by later discoveries", and that "the appearance of a
contradiction between new knowledge and old derives from a single
source: context-dropping". Under interpretation a., this applies to
inductive generalizations, such as the classification of blood types,
Newtonian mechanics, etc.; but it does not apply to specific
conclusions about concretes. However, Peikoff makes this statement
without qualification, as if it is true for all rational conclusions -
which implies b.
This error becomes clearer when looking at Peikoff's own examples. He
devotes a lot of space to the example of deciding a suspect's guilt of
a crime. Suppose, then, that (as has in fact happened in many cases)
the evidence against the suspect is strong enough that a jury,
considering it rationally, finds him guilty; but further evidence,
discovered later, establishes his innocence. The jury's previous
conclusion was rational, in its context; they were certain of it,
justifiably in that context; but was the conclusion true in its
context? Was it not contradicted by the new evidence? On interpretation
a., and on the correspondence theory of truth, such a claim makes no
sense; it only makes sense if you define "truth" as "whatever validly
follows from one's current knowledge" - i.e. if you adopt
interpretation b.. Peikoff says nothing to qualify his statement on p.
173, or to indicate that it does not apply in this example.
Near the end of the section, Peikoff discusses another example -
observing a speaker known to you, observing gradually increasing
evidence that something about him is wrong, and finally seeing a mask
falling off his face revealing Boris Karloff. Here, again, before the
evidence that something is wrong starts appearing, when you believe
that you're really seeing the speaker known to you and have no basis
for doubting it - would this conclusion be true in its context, and not
contradicted later? At TJS '87, during Peikoff's Q&A period (now
available in the Objectivism: state of the art cassette set), I
submitted a question on this example, and Peikoff, in answer,
acknowledged that in this example the initial conclusion, while
rational and certain, would an error and would be contradicted by
later knowledge; but apparently, he later forgot his own answer, and
says nothing in OPAR, in the discussion of this example, to indicate
that the initial conclusion is later contradicted - which, again,
implies interpretation b. rather than a.
I think this is a clear indication of Peikoff's Hegelian tendencies,
which have been becoming increasingly apparent since the Peikoff-Kelley
break. The Objectivist view of context rests on the correspondence
theory of truth, accepts interpretation a., and does allow for rational
errors which are then contradicted by later knowledge (though I think
this is only possible in specific conclusions about concretes, not in
inductive generalizations). But Peikoff conflates this with his own
Hegelian view, based on the coherence theory of truth, which accepts
interpretation b., and which is not compatible with the correspondence
theory of truth or with Objectivism.
5. Peikoff's Hegelianism also appears in a very glaring form at the
start of the book (p. 4): "The True, said Hegel, is the whole. At the
end of our discussion, to borrow these terms, you will see a unique
Whole, the Whole which is Ayn Rand's philosophic achievement. You may
then judge for yourself whether it is an important achievement - and
whether it is True". This statement presents a very Hegelian
epistemological view. As I understand him here, Peikoff is claiming
that a reader can't judge the validity of any Objectivist argument, or
the truth of any principle of Objectivism, without first learning the
whole system. This is totally incompatible with Objectivist
epistemology (or, if that's not what Peikoff meant, is is a very
unclear, sloppily formulated statement).
6. In discussing the intellectual opposition to capitalism (p. 407),
Peikoff says: "The opposition to capitalism often involves an element
of evasion. But often it does not; the opponents are sincere; they are,
one must say, honestly stupid - and it is a self-made,
epistemologically induced stupidity. Intellectuals of this kind are
deaf to facts ...; they come to political conclusions ... by whim".
Peikoff's claim, that the intellectuals he describes are honest and not
guilty of any element of evasion, is totally incompatible with the
Objectivist view of volition, of rationality and of honesty.
Peikoff's problem here is directly related to his position in the
Peikoff-Kelley break. Peikoff's statement here may seem to be the opposite of
his views in Fact and Value; but, similarly to so many cases pointed
out by Rand, views that seem to be opposites are really manifestations
of the same basic fallacy. Peikoff rejects objectivity in judging
whether an error is honest or the result of evasion; and he then
proceeds to alternate between intrinsicism - as in his insistence,
in Fact and Value, that all errors are the result of evasion, except
those made by retards, illiterates and teenagers - and subjectivism -
as in his claim here that intellectuals who ignore facts and reach
conclusions by whim might still be honest.
7. In ethics, the most important weakness of OPAR is the very brief,
totally inadequate discussion of the principle that there are no
conflicts of interest among rational men. This principle is Rand's most
revolutionary contribution to interpersonal ethics. It integrates
Rand's unique view of social relations; it is the basis of her total
rejection of the common view of a choice between sacrificing oneself to
others or others to oneself; and it is one of the principles that
readers of Rand have had the most trouble understanding. And yet, the
only available discussion of this principle is in one short article
("The `conflicts' of men's interests", in The Virtue of Selfishness).
A much more detailed discussion is clearly needed, and a book
purporting to be a full presentation of Objectivism is clearly the
place for it.
The only place in OPAR that comes close to such a discussion, is in
the section on honesty, in the discussion of why a dishonest man has to
destroy himself. That discussion is valid and clear as far as it goes;
but for a complete presentation, the section on initiation of force
should include a parallel discussion, demonstrating on a similar level
of detail and examples why a man who tries to live by force also has to
destroy himself (the lack of such a discussion is particularly
disappointing, because Peikoff does provide an excellent discussion of
this point in his lectures Understanding Objectivism); and these two
points should then be integrated, together with the sort of examples
discussed by Rand in "The `conflicts' of man's interests", into a full
validation of the non-conflicts-of-interests principle. OPAR does
not provide such discussions.
8. At the end of ch. 7, Peikoff discusses the choice to live as the
base of morality, and then discusses the evaluation of someone who does
not make this choice. His statement on this point is (p. 248): "A man
who would throw away his life without cause, who would reject the
universe on principle and embrace a zero for its own sake - such a man,
according to Objectivism, would belong on the lowest rung of hell. His
action would indicate so profound a hatred - of himself, of values, of
reality - that he would have to be condemned by any human being as a
monster".
Many Objectivists hold this view; in fact, I held a similar view
myself, up to about a year ago (though I would never have expressed it
in this sort of religious language). But this is a serious mistake, and
is not consistent with the Objectivist approach, or with Peikoff's own
discussion in the previous pages. If the choice to live is the base of
ethics, and if all objective "musts" are conditional, ultimately, on
this choice, then someone who does not make this choice has left any
grounds on which he can be morally evaluated. If this person acts in
the only way consistent with his choice - i.e. does not act at all,
lapsing into catatonia - then he has, so to speak, opted out of the
moral game; moral evaluations, such as condemnation, don't apply to him
(the best discussion of this issue, on which the above is based, is,
unfortunately, unpublished; it was given by Allan Gotthelf, in his
paper presented at the 3rd meeting of the Ayn Rand Society, December
1990).
9. In his discussion of the role of government (p. 363), Peikoff again
fails to make a crucial distinction: between use of force in
self-defense, and use of force in retaliation. It is only the use
of force in retaliation - acting after an act of force is over, for
achieving restitution of what was forcibly taken and for punishing the
initiator of force - that can't be left to the judgment of each
individual, and must be delegated to a central agency bound by
objective rules, to avoid the consequences of anarchy as Peikoff
describes them. Self-defense - using force to protect oneself when
attacked - is directly necessary for survival, and therefore must
remain the right of each individual. Peikoff's statement, that "in a
rational society, individuals ... renounce the private use of physical
force even in self-protection", is completely untenable and
inconsistent with the Objectivist view (he then tries to avoid some of
the more obvious consequences of his statement, by adding in
parentheses: "except during those emergencies that require action at
once, before the police can be summoned"; but that is just an ad hoc
qualification, not integrated with any principle).
I think all of the above are serious problems, and they are a very sad
result of the Peikoff-Kelley break. I have already shown why 2 and 6
are direct results of the positions Peikoff took in the break, and why
4 and 5 are results of his Hegelianism, which was at the root of the
break. And there is one further aspect of the break, that can be seen
as a cause of all the above problems: Peikoff's policies since the
break; his demand, in "Fact and Value", that all those who would
question any of his statements "get out of the movement, we don't want
you"; and the actions taken as a result by ARI and related
organizations; all inevitably resulted in isolating Peikoff from any
potential constructive criticism.
In the past two summers, I attended the advanced seminars held by the
Institute for Objectivist Studies, and I consider myself very fortunate
for having had this opportunity. These were two of the most
intellectually intense weeks I have ever experienced, with
philosophical discussions going on at almost all times; with the
speakers always available, answering penetrating questions from the
brightest young Objectivist minds; and where every statement, made by a
speaker, that was unclear or not fully thought out, resulted in his
being questioned aggressively and at length by many students at every
subsequent opportunity (including, in some cases, by continuing
correspondence after the seminar). Had Peikoff wanted to present the
advance manuscript of OPAR at these seminars, he probably would have
been welcome; alternatively, he could, and should, have arranged for
similar seminars to be organized for this purpose; and then certainly
many, if not all, of the above problems would have been raised,
before publication; and OPAR would have ended up a much better
book. Instead, Peikoff chose to present the advanced manuscript at The
Power of Objectivity '90 and TJS '91 - conferences in which most of the
speakers, notably including Peikoff, were not available for any
discussion outside the scheduled times of their lectures; people likely
to raise penetrating questions were, as part of the post-break policy,
prevented from attending the conferences (this was generally done by
pricing the conferences beyond the means of students, who often have
the most active minds, and giving out scholarships only to those
students known to be safe; and, in some cases of people who were known
to be bright, independent and assertive, and who did have the money to
afford these conferences, the organizers directly refused to register
them); and the conferences were characterized by an atmosphere of
intellectual blandness, conformity and uncritical adulation (which the
conference organizers, and some of the attendees, referred to as "a
benevolent atmosphere"). The current problems in OPAR are the
result.
Finally, let me address the question: what is the proper overall
evaluation of OPAR? Should we praise the book for all the valuable
points it contains, and admire and thank its author, regarding the
book's flaws as insignificant in comparison? Or, conversely, should we
evaluate the book negatively overall, because of the errors it
contains, and condemn its author, regarding the book's virtues as
insignificant in comparison? If the author were anyone other than
Peikoff, the proper answer would clearly, without question, be the
former; but in this case, I think the proper answer is the latter.
OPAR, whatever its flaws, is certainly a highly valuable addition to
the literature of Objectivism, and highly useful for a serious study.
If anyone else wrote such a book, he would have given a great value to
the Objectivist movement; the book's errors would not have done any
damage, since those who notice them could publicly point them out; and
other writers could supplement those important issues that the book
does not adequately address (i.e. points 2 and 7 above). However,
because the author is Peikoff, the effects of this book will be
completely different. Because of his position as Rand's intellectual
heir, many readers will accept all his statements without question as
the final authority on the meaning of Objectivism; since the book is
supposed to be a full presentation of Objectivism, those subjects that
it does not discuss at length will from now on be regarded as minor
issues; non-Objectivists interested in studying Objectivism will be
told that this book is the authorised, full presentation of the
philosophy; the book's errors will thus become entrenched, distorting
the understanding of Objectivism both inside and outside the movement.
Peikoff, having agreed to accept the position of "intellectual heir",
must also accept the responsibility that comes with this authority, and
be held to higher standards than anyone else. To prevent entrenching
errors like those I point out above, it was his responsibility to do
everything im his power to avoid them - including, above all, working
to expose himself to as much constructive criticism as possible, rather
than purging anyone who could offer it to him. Peikoff's actions,
therefore, must be judged as morally inexcusable, and OPAR judged as
the climax of Peikoff's betrayal of the trust that Rand placed in him.
Those who want to help the advance of Objectivism, will now face the
long, difficult task of counteracting the damage done by OPAR.
Reading OPAR, and learning from the valuable points in it, will be
one of the most important tools for this task.