Week 1: The role of intuitions in ethical theory

Key readings

• Michael DePaul, Intuitions in moral inquiry, in David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 695-723.
• Michael Huemer, Revisionary intuitionism, Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 25, no. 1 (January, 2008), pp. 368-392.

Further reading

• Matthew S. Bedke, Intuitional epistemology in ethics, Philosophy Compass, vol. 5, no.12, (December, 2010), pp. 1069-1083.
• Sarah McGrath & Tom Kelly, Is reflective equilibrium enough? Philosophical Perspectives 24, no. 1, (December 2010), pp. 325-359.
• Sharon Street, A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value, Philosophical Studies, vol. 127, no. 1 (January, 2006), pp. 109-166.
• Joshua Greene, The secret joke of Kant’s soul, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2008, pp. 35-80.
• Selim Berker, The normative insignificance of neuroscience, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 37, no. 4 (Fall, 2009), pp. 293-329.
• Tristram MacPherson, The methodological irrelevance of reflective equilibrium, in Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, Bastingstoke, Palgrave, 2015, pp. 652-73.
• Guy Kahane, The armchair and the trolley: an argument for experimental ethics, Philosophical Studies, vol. 162, no. 2 (January, 2013), pp. 421-45.