Outputs

Core project outputs

Lisa Bortolotti (2020). The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.

Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2018). The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions. Mind & Language.

Lisa Bortolotti (2015). The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions. Consciousness & Cognition 33, 490-499.

Lisa Bortolotti (2015). The epistemic innocence of elaborated and systematised delusions in schizophrenia. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2015). Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence. Consciousness & Cognition 33, 648-560.

Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono (2015). The ethics of delusional belief. Erkenntnis.

Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2015). Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions. Consciousness & Cognition 33, 487-489.

Jill Craigie & Lisa Bortolotti. Rationality, Diagnosis, and Patient Autonomy in Psychiatry. In J. Sadler et al. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford University Press.

Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Lisa Bortolotti, Matthew Broome & Matteo Mameli. Moral and Legal Implications of the Continuity between Delusional and Non-delusional Beliefs. Chapter forthcoming in G. Keil et al. (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.

Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti (2014/2015). The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about Delusions. Avant V (3): 30-50.

Bill Fulford, Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2014). Taking the Long View: an Emerging Framework for Translational Psychiatric Science. World Psychiatry 13 (2): 110-117.

Chapter 4: Lisa Bortolotti (2014). Irrationality. Polity Press.

Talks by project team

Lisa Bortolotti, Epistemic Shortfalls and Benefits of Delusions, keynote talk at the Seventh Meeting of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (SEFA), Madrid (12 September 2013).

Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Epistemic Innocence: Grist to the One-Stager's Mill, Mind & Reason Group, Philosophy Department, University of York (27 November 2013).

Lisa Bortolotti, The Epistemic Status of Delusions, staff research seminar at the University of Birmingham (13 January 2014).

Lisa Bortolotti, The Epistemic Innocence Project: The Case of Delusions, CamPoS seminar (research seminar at the Department of History and Philosophy of Science), University of Cambridge (29 January 2014).

Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Epistemically Innocent Delusions: Support for the One-Stage Account, Epistemology Seminar, University of Edinburgh (29 January 2014).

Lisa Bortolotti, Are Distorted Memories Epistemically Innocent?, History and Philosophy of Medicine Seminar, University of Bristol (11 March 2014).

Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Are Beliefs Based on Implicit Bias against Women in Philosophy Epistemically Innocent?, SWIP conference Feminism in/and Philosophy, All Souls College, University of Oxford (28 March 2014).

Lisa Bortolotti, Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematised Delusions in Schizophrenia, Workshop on Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions, University of Birmingham (8 May 2014).

Ema Sullivan-Bissett, The Epistemic Status of Confabulatory Explanations, Workshop on Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions, University of Birmingham (8 May 2014).

Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Epistemic Innocence and Delusion Formation, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Cambridge (12 July 2014) and at the Belief Formation Research Group at Macquarie University (29 August 2014).

Lisa Bortolotti and Kengo Miyazono, The Epistemic Value of Delusions, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of Cambridge (13 July 2014).

Project-related outputs

Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono. Are alien thoughts beliefs? Commentary on Jordi Fernandez’s Transparent Minds. Teorema 4 (1): 135-148.

Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2014). Review of New Essays on Belief edited by Nicolaj Nottelmann (Palgrave 2013). Dialectica 68 (1): 141-146.

Kengo Miyazono, Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2015). Prediction-error and Two-factor Theories of Delusion Formation: Competitors or Allies? In N. Galbraith (ed.) Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning. Psychology Press.