A. In strategic interactions with asymmetric information, equilibria should be robust to the information revealed at equilibrium
Information at Equilibrium (with H. Polemarchakis),
Economic Theory, 21, 573 –584, 2003.
A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information (with F. Forges),
Games and Economic Behavior, 18, 159 - 175, 1997.
Self-fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations (with F.Forges),
Journal of Economic Theory, 75, 338 - 406, 1997.
Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games (with F. Forges),
Games and Economic Behavior, 25, 292 - 310, 1998.
Informational Smallness and Rational Expectations (with A. Heifetz),
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, 197 – 218, 2002.
Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: a survey (with F. Forges and R. Vohra),
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, 1-41, 2002
A note on the incentive compatible core (with F. Forges),
Journal of Economic Theory, 98, 179 - 188, 2001.
Two-person bargaining with Verifiable Information (with G. de Clippel),
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40, 799 – 813, 2004.
Two remarks on the Inner Core (with G. de Clippel),
Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 143 – 154, 2005.
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (with F. Forges and A. Heifetz),
Economic Theory, 18 , 349-365, 2001.
Rules transparency and political accountability (with M. Bordignon),
Journal of Public Economics, 80, 73 - 98, 2001.
B. In market interactions with asymmetric information, equilibria should be robust to non-exclusive trading
Information at a Competitive Equilibrium (with H. Polemarchakis)
CORE DP 9583, 1995.
Nash - Walras Equilibria of a Large Economy (with H. Polemarchakis),
Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences, 97, 5675 - 5678, 2000.
Markets and Contracts (with A. Bisin, J. Geanakoplos, P. Gottardi and H. Polemarchakis),
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47, 279-288, 2011.
Production and Financial Policy under Asymmetric Information (with J. Drèze and M. Tirelli),
Economic Theory, 35, 217–231, 2007.
Competitive Equilibria with Private Information on Both Sides (with M.Meier and H. Polemarchakis),
Economic Theory, 55, 257-289, 2014.
Credit Market Failures and Policies (with S. Modica),
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11, 363 – 382, 2009.
C. Big choices modify the self
An Economic Theorists' Reading of Simone Weil (with A. Heifetz)
Economics and Philosophy, 24, 191 – 204, 2008.
Aspiration Traps (with Aviad Heifetz),
Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics,issue 2, 125-142, 2015.
Overlapping Consensus Thin and Thick: John Rawls and Simone Weil (with A.Heifetz)
Philosophical Investigations, 39, 362-304, 2016.
Vitality (with Aviad Heifetz), mimeo.
D. Other
Merit and Rent in a Growing Economy
Economics Letters, 151, 107-110, 2017.
Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets (with F. Forges)
Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 135 – 145, 2009.
Consumer theory and Axiomatics: a note on an early contribution by Luigi Amoroso
(with A. Guccione),
History of Political Economy, 31, 587 - 589, 1999.
Ferrara's cost of reproduction doctrine (with A. Guccione and M. Guidi),
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 26, 107 – 114, 2004.
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Knowledge at equilibrium (with H.Polemarchakis),
in Y. Shoam (ed) Rationality and Knowledge, Morgan-Kaufman, New-York,
211-228, 1996.
Three Books on Knowledge and Rationality,
Research in Economics, 51, 69 - 82, 1997.
Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian Games (with F. Forges)
in d’Aspremont (ed) Social Organization and Mechanism Design, De Boek,
Bruxelles, 1999.
Efficienza delle regole e responsabilizzazione dei politici (con M.Bordignon),
in Dardanoni e Sobbrio (eds) Istituzioni Politiche e Finanza Pubblica, Milano,
1999.
Arbitrage and equilibrium with exchangeable risks (with A. Heifetz and H. Polemarchakis),
CORE DP 9946, 1999.
Shareholder-efficient production plans in a multiperiod economy (with J. Dreze and O. Lachiri)
CORE DP 2007/82, 2007.
Trade and Welfare (with T. Cordella and H. Polemarchakis),
in G. Chicchilnisky (ed) Markets, Information and Uncertainty, CUP, Cambridge,
322- 327, 1999.