Research

Published or Forthcoming (Abstracts below)

“Plato on Pure Pleasure and the Best Life,” Phronesis 59 (2014), 113-142. pdf

“Aisthēsis, Reason and Appetite in the Timaeus,” Phronesis 61 (2016), 397-434. pdf

“The Divine Method and the Disunity of Pleasure in the Philebus,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 55.2 (2017), 179-208. pdf

“Plato on Incorrect and Deceptive Pleasures,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100(4) (2018), 379-410. pdf

“Two Platonic Criticisms of Pleasure,” in Pleasure: A History ed. Lisa Shapiro, (OUP, 2018), 15-41.

“Women and Childrearing in Plato’s Republic,” (2021), Feminist Perspectives in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Springer, 2021), 91-9. pdf

“Pleasure, Judgment and the Function of the Painter-Scribe Analogy,” (2022), Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. pdf

“Cosmology and Human Nature in the Timaeus,” (2022), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd edition. pdf

Works in Progress

The Philosopher and the Tyrant: Socrates’ Defense of Justice in the Republic (book project).

“How Philosophers Value Justice in the Republic.”

“Dualism in the Timaeus.”

Abstracts

Plato on Pure Pleasure and the Best Life

Phronesis 59.2 (2014), 113-142.

Abstract: In the Philebus, Socrates maintains two theses about the relationship between pleasure and the good life: (1) the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is better than the unmixed life of intelligence, and: (2) the unmixed life of intelligence is the most divine. Taken together, these two claims lead to the paradoxical conclusion that the best human life is better than the life of a god. A popular strategy for avoiding this conclusion is to distinguish human from divine goods; on such a reading, pleasure has merely instrumental value, and it benefits human beings only as a result of their imperfect nature. I argue that certain ‘pure’ pleasures are full-fledged, intrinsic goods in the Philebus, which are even worthy of the gods (thus Socrates ultimately rejects thesis 2). This positive evaluation of pure pleasure results from a detailed examination of pleasure, which reveals that different types of pleasures have fundamentally different natures.

Aisthēsis, Reason and Appetite in the Timaeus

Phronesis 61.4 (2016), 397-434.

Abstract: There are two types of aisthēsis in the Timaeus, which involve distinct physiological processes and different kinds of soul, appetite and reason respectively. This distinction explains Timaeus’ ambivalent attitude towards aisthēsis: on the one hand, it is one of the main causes of the disruption of the orbits of the immortal soul upon embodiment; on the other hand, it plays a central role in restoring the immortal soul to its original, god-like condition.

The Divine Method and the Disunity of Pleasure in the Philebus

Journal of the History of Philosophy 55.2 (2017), 179-208.

Abstract: Scholars frequently complain that the Philebus lacks unity. One of the most puzzling passages in the dialogue is the introduction of the so-called ‘divine method,’ which is described in detail (Philebus 16c–20a) only to be set aside as unnecessary shortly afterwards (Philebus 20c). I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, the divine method plays a vital role in the dialogue’s lengthy examination of pleasure. The application of the divine method does not result in a systematic and complete division of pleasure into sub-kinds, as one would expect, because Socrates fails to identify a common feature that unifies all pleasures. This negative outcome does not indicate a failure of the divine method, for the method successfully exposes the heterogeneity of pleasure.

Plato on Incorrect and Deceptive Pleasures

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100.4 (2018), 379-410.

Abstract: In the Philebus, Socrates argues that pleasure, like judgment, can be “false” (pseudēs). Most scholars who discuss this claim restrict their interpretation to Socrates’ first argument that pleasure can be “false”, where Socrates uses pseudēs as a synonym of “incorrect” (ouk orthēs) (37a-40e). As a result, scholars have failed to recognize that in the next argument (41a-42c) Socrates uses pseudēs to pick out a different problem with pleasure: in certain circumstances, a pleasure can deceptively appear to a subject to be larger or smaller than it really is. Since Socrates explicitly distinguishes between these two problems with pleasure, he is guilty of neither confusion nor intentional equivocation in his application of the predicate pseudēs. The distinction also resolves many long-standing interpretive puzzles, including the relationship between mixed and “false” pleasures and why Socrates describes the pleasures of sight, hearing, smell and learning as both pure and “true” (alētheis).

Two Platonic Criticisms of Pleasure

In Pleasure: A History, ed. Lisa Shapiro, (OUP, 2018), 15-41.

Abstract: Does Plato have a consistent view about the nature and value of pleasure? In the Phaedo, pleasure is the primary obstacle to a philosopher’s pursuit of wisdom, while the Republic presents the philosopher’s life as both the happiest and the most pleasant. In the Gorgias, Plato’s character Socrates rejects hedonism by showing that the ceaseless pursuit of pleasure is incoherent and foolish, but in the Philebus Socrates argues that the best human life requires some pleasures. There is more continuity in Plato’s views about pleasure than one might think from these conflicting assessments. In particular, there are two distinctively Platonic criticisms of pleasure: (1) that pleasure is essentially linked with pain, and (2) that pleasure produces false beliefs. These criticisms recur throughout the corpus, but they do not apply uniformly to all pleasures. Plato eventually recognizes a special class of pleasures that are immune to these criticisms and play an important role in the best life.

Pleasure, Judgment and the Function of the Painter-Scribe Analogy

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (published onilne, 2021)

Abstract: This paper puts forward a new interpretation of the argument at Philebus 36c-40d that pleasures can be false. Protarchus raises an objection at 37e-38a, and in response Socrates presents the elaborate painter-scribe analogy (38e-40c). I argue that the common interpretations cannot explain how the analogy answers Protarchus’ objection. On my account, Protarchus’ objection relies on the sympathetic idea that pleasure is simply not in the business of assessing the world, and so it cannot be charged with doing so incorrectly. Socrates responds by demonstrating that pleasure can be mistaken about the world, despite not making an independent assessment of it. A pleasure comes to be mistaken about the world by reproducing the mistake of a judgment. Socrates persuades Protarchus that pleasure can be mistaken in part by preserving his intuition that pleasure itself does not make the mistake.

Cosmology and Human Nature in the Timaeus

In The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd edition (forthcoming 2022).

Abstract: This chapter highlights the close interconnection between cosmology and human nature in the Timaeus. According to Timaeus, human beings are not merely part of the cosmos; they play a crucial role in explaining how the cosmos came to be. The cosmos must contain three kinds of mortal beings in order to be complete, and all three derive from human beings, as a result of varying degrees of moral and cognitive failure. Recognizing the distinctive role human beings play in completing the cosmos complicates the standard picture of Timaeus’ cosmology, as well as his account of human nature. While in large part the cosmos is a product of divine craft, in some part it is the product of the inevitable disturbance of immortal souls due to mortal embodiment. Human beings have a special status as the first generation of mortal beings, as well as the only ones produced solely by divine craft. However, this distinction does not extend beyond the first generation, nor does it include any women. Ultimately, Timaeus’ account of human nature blurs the lines between humans and gods, as well as between humans and other mortal beings.

How Philosophers Value Justice in the Republic

Abstract: In the Republic, Socrates identifies justice as the sort of good we value both for itself and for what comes from it (Book II, 357e-358a). Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates to defend the first part of this claim by praising justice for itself, leaving aside what comes from it (358b, 367b), and this restriction provides a framework for Socrates’ defense of justice for much of the dialogue. One complication for understanding Socrates’ argument in the Republic is that Socrates and his interlocutors apply the terms “justice” and “just” to a wide range of things in the course of their discussion, including individuals, cities and actions, which raises an immediate interpretive question: Is Socrates defending a claim about the value justice wherever it appears, whether in ourselves, our actions, our city, or another person? Or is Socrates making a narrower claim about the value of justice as a kind of personal possession, or in other words, the value of being just? In order to understand and evaluate Socrates’ defense of “justice,” we must get clear on its scope. I argue that we should adopt the narrow-scope interpretation, whereby Socrates defends the claim that it is better for an individual to be just than to be unjust.

I draw support for my thesis from Socrates’ analogy between justice in the soul and health in the body, which he develops in some detail at the end of Book IV. The narrow-scope interpretation of Socrates’ argument helps to resolve a classic puzzle about the depiction of philosopher rulers in Books V-VII. According to Socrates, justice in a city requires that philosophers take up the task of ruling (473c-d), and ruling is a just action for a philosopher. At the same time, Socrates says that it will be necessary to compel philosophers to rule (519c-520a). This need for compulsion has led many scholars to worry that philosophers do not value justice in the right way, i.e. as a good that is valued both for itself and for what comes from it. Socrates seems to be providing a counterexample to his own argument, for surely philosophers of all people should recognize that justice is not a burden to be endured, but something to be welcomed in its own right. This puzzle depends on a broad-scope interpretation of Socrates’ thesis about the value of justice. On this interpretation, Socrates’ argument requires philosophers to value justice in the city and just actions in the same way that they value the presence of justice in their own souls. By contrast, the narrow-scope interpretation leaves open the possibility that philosophers value justice in their own soul as good both for itself and for what comes from it, while at the same time regarding the activity of ruling as onerous and valuable solely for what comes from it.

Dualism in the Timaeus

Abstract: There are many ways one could frame an investigation into the nature of the soul and its relationship to the body in the Timaeus. The central question I ask here is whether Timaeus presents human beings as composites of two things that have fundamentally different natures. Notice that I am not asking whether Plato subscribes to mind-body dualism, or even soul-body dualism, because I do not think either of these divisions capture the sort of dualism we find in the Timaeus. The Timaeus does not distinguish the mind from the body, the soul from the body, or even the physical from the non-physical, in the relevant way, and yet the dialogue still presents a form of dualism. The crucial distinction in the Timaeus is between the immortal part of human beings and the mortal parts, which include both the body and the mortal kind of soul.