Papers

Market Design and Mechanism Design:

• Assignment with Limited Complementarities (2016) Journal of Economic Theory

with Thanh Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra

• Instability of Centralized Markets (2017) revise and resubmit, Econometrica

with Rakesh Vohra

• Advantages of CDS settlement Mechanisms (2018)

The previous version: Participation and Unbiased Pricing in CDS Settlement Mechanisms (2014)

Extended Abstract is Published at 2015 AMMA Conference Proceedings and ACM DL

• Parallel Running: Effects of Information Transmission by High Frequency Traders on Market Quality (2018)

with Mohammad A Rezaei

• Rewarding Disagreement for Optimal Contracts

with Naveen Khana and Mark Schroder

• Capacity Allocation in Vertically Integrated Rail Systems: A Bargaining Approach (2018) Transportation Research Part B

with Ahmadreza Talebian and Bo Zou

Risk Management:

• Aggregate Risk, Bank Competition and Regulation in General Equilibrium (2017)

with Mohammad A Rezaei and Ajay Subramanian