This version: September 1, 2026
I introduce switching adverse selection, a class of contracting environments in which the privately informed party changes during the contractual relationship. A seller privately knows her valuation of an asset, while the buyer later privately learns its realised performance. I show that this switch creates a strictly positive switching premium for the seller and that the optimal contract elicits truthful buyer reports, pools seller types below a threshold, and screens those above it. Applications include acquisitions.
Fraud and Capital Allocation: A Theory of Issuer Choice
This version: July 30, 2026
Issuers in nascent capital markets choose between pursuing legitimate entrepreneurship and scamming investors. I show that this choice induces issuer self-selection by venture quality. Low-quality issuers scam, while high-quality issuers pursue entrepreneurship. This self-selection can improve capital allocation efficiency, contrary to the conventional view that fraud unambiguously reduces it.
Expert-Algorithm Competition: Mimicry and Differentiation
Where Bias Matters
Crisis Warnings under Memory-Driven Trust
Economics Letters, 2026, Vol. 260, 112832.
I study expert crisis communication when public trust evolves through memorable outcomes (correct warnings, false alarms, and missed crises). Memory-driven trust leads low-trust experts to remain silent even when observing crisis signals (trust trap) and high-trust experts to issue warnings even when observing no-crisis signals (trust cushion). Applications include financial, climate, and health crises.
Can Optimism Solve the Entrepreneurial Earnings Puzzle? (with Luca David Opromolla and Luís Santos-Pinto)
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2023, Vol. 125, 139-169. Online Appendix
We develop a general-equilibrium model of occupational choice where optimists and realists choose entrepreneurship or employment. We show theoretically and empirically that optimism accounts for the low mean returns to entrepreneurship relative to average wages.
Financial Transaction Taxes and Expert Advice
Economics Bulletin, 2022, Vol. 42(4), 2024-2033.
Financial transaction taxes are often discussed and occasionally implemented at national and international levels. I show that such taxes can reduce market efficiency by degrading the quality of expert advice to investors.
Economics Letters, 2020, Vol. 192, 109190.
I study expert advice when clients value influential experts—those whose recommendations change clients’ decisions. I show that when experts benefit from being considered influential, their advice becomes less accurate in order to influence clients' decisions.
Entrepreneurial Optimism and the Market for New Issues (with Luís Santos-Pinto)
International Economic Review, 2017, Vol. 58, No. 2, 383-419.
We study the market for new equity issues and show that the presence of optimistic entrepreneurs creates a rationale for entrepreneurs to retain equity in their firms. Optimism also explains why some new equity issues are underpriced while others are overpriced.
What is an Initial Coin Offering?
FNEGE MEDIAS, 16.04.2025.
This video presentation explains the fundamentals of initial coin offerings in an accessible format for a general audience.
Shaping the Future of Financial Services (with Ales Marsal)
BIATEC-Banking Journal, 2018, Vol. 26, No. 3, 9-11.
This article explores the evolving landscape of financial services amid technological innovations highlighting key trends that may reshape the future of banking.