Publications
Rent seeking and the excess burden of taxation (with Nava Kahana), European Journal of Political Economy 35 (2014) 158-167.
A note on Poisson contests (with Nava Kahana), Public Choice 165 (2015) 97-102.
Complete rent dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain (with Nava Kahana), Economics Letters 141 (2016) 8-10.
Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice (with Nava Kahana), Social Choice and Welfare (2016) 1-8.
Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants (with Nava Kahana), Economics Letters 163 (2018) 126-129.
A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests, Economics Letters 168 (2018) 90-93.
When does the private provision of a public good prevent conflict? (with Artyom Jelnov), Economics Letters 192 (2020)
Contests with a constrained choice set of effort (with John Morgan), Economics Letters 196 (2020)
When sabotage fails, Mathemathical Social Sciences 113 (2021) 164-168.
Speed Limits (with Artyom Jelnov), Economics Letters 213 (2022), p.110368
Asymmetric technologies in contests, European Journal of Political Economy 78 (2023) p.102337.
Punishment for sabotage in dynamic tournaments, Journal of Mathematical Economics 106 (2023) p.102841.
Don’t blame me: A Theory of Politicians Choosing Policy Advisors (with Arthur Fishman), Journal of Government and Economics 10 (2023) p. 100076
Bureaucracy and labor market inefficiency: A contest model, European Journal of Political Economy 80 (2023) p. 102472
Costly Expressive Voting (with Arthur Fishman), Mathemathical Social Sciences, 127 (2024), 99-104.
Gig work: Does it get you more happiness? (with Galit Klein and Tal Shavit), Managerial and Decision Economics, 45 (2024), pp.1633-1641.
First-price auction with a stochastic head start, Review of Economic Design, (2024)1-9
To Act or not to Act? Political competition under different types of backward-looking voters (with Arthur Fishman) European Journal of Political Economy (2025), p.102723
Lobbying as a Signal (with Artyom Jelnov) Accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economic Theory
Strategic behavior in contests with sabotage. Accepted for publication in Mathematical Social Sciences
Surprise in contests. Accepted for publication in Public Choice
Endogenous technology choice in contests. Accepted for publication in Mathematical Social Sciences
Working papers
Lobbying under conflicting interests (with Artyom Jelnov)
Collective punishment for collective action
Perefrences over shares in contests
Resting papers
A model of presidential debates (with John Morgan)
PhD Thesis