PUBLICATIONS:
"Political Budget Cycle and the Alignment Effect: Evidence from South Korea," (with Sangwon Park and Sujin Min), European Journal of Political Economy 81, 2024, 102485.
"Tax Incidence for Menthol Cigarettes by Race: Evidence from Nielsen Homescan Data," (with Hyunchul Kim), Journal of Health Economics 92, 2023, 102829.
"Participatory Budgeting and the Pattern of Local Government Spending: Evidence from South Korea," (with Sujin Min), European Journal of Political Economy 76, 2023, 102235.
"Defective Democracy and the Political Budget Cycle," (with Sujin Min), Journal of Comparative Economics 49(4), 2021, pp. 947-961.
"Immigration and the Pattern of Public Spending: Evidence from OECD Countries," (with Dowon Kim), International Tax and Public Finance 28(4), 2021, pp. 1014-1034.
"Racial Demographics and Cigarette Tax Shifting: Evidence from Scanner Data," (with Hyunchul Kim), Empirical Economics 61(2), 2021, pp. 1011-1037.
"Budget Committee and Intergovernmental Transfer: Evidence from South Korea," (with Hyun-A Kim and Sangwon Park), Economic Inquiry 58(4), 2020, pp. 1894-1906.
"Court-ordered Redistricting and the Law of 1/n," (with Sangwon Park), Public Choice 176, 2018, pp. 507-528.
"Delegative Democratic Attitudes: Theory and Evidence from the Asian Barometer Survey," (with Youngho Kang). International Political Science Review 39(4), 2018, pp. 455-472.
"A New Approach to Measuring a Multidimensional Productivity Index: An Application for 60 Selected Countries," (with Donghun Kim and Kap-Young Jeong), Global Economic Review 47, 2018, pp. 270-288.
"Protest and Property Crime: Political Use of Police Resources and the Deterrence of Crime," (with Jaewook Byeon and Iljoong Kim), Public Choice 175, 2018, pp. 181-196.
"Violent Crime and Female Victimization: Evidence from Metropolitan Areas in South Korea," (with Iljoong Kim and Jaewook Byeon). Applied Economics 49(46), 2017, pp. 4601-4616.
"Supermajority Rule and Bicameral Bargaining," Public Choice 169(1), 2016, pp. 53-75.
"Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods: Evidence from American Cities and School Districts," (with Soomi Lee and Thomas E. Borcherding), Urban Affairs Review 52(5), 2016, pp. 685-713.
"Supermajority Rule and the Law of 1/n," Public Choice 164(3), 2015, pp. 251-274.
"Hidden Saving and In-kind Transfers," (with Joon Song), Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics 25(3), 2014, pp. 63-80.
"Public Spending and the Paradox of Supermajority Rule," (with Thomas E. Borcherding and Youngho Kang), Southern Economic Journal 80(3), 2014, pp. 614-632.
"Tax Structure and Government Spending: Does the Value-Added Tax Increase the Size of Government?" (with Dongil Kim and Thomas E. Borcherding), National Tax Journal 66(3), 2013, pp. 541-570.
"How Does Social Capital Reduce the Size of the Shadow Economy?" Global Economic Review 42(3), 2013, pp. 251-268.
"Measuring Social Capital in East Asia and Other World Regions: Index of Social Capital for 72 Countries," (with Kap-Young Jeong and Sean Chae), Global Economic Review 40(4), 2011, pp. 385-407.
"Public Choice of Tax and Regulatory Instruments—the Role of Heterogeneity: Evidence from U.S. State Environmental Policy, 1980-94," (with Thomas E. Borcherding), Public Finance Review, 34(5), 2006, pp. 607-636.
"The Supply Side of Democratic Government: A Brief Survey," (with Thomas E. Borcherding), in Attiat Ott and Richard Sebula (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Public Economics: Empirical Public Economics. (London: Edward Elgar, 2006).
"The Growth of the Relative Size of Government," (with Thomas E. Borcherding), in C.K. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003).
소유권 보호와 정치적 예산순환 (박상원, 민수진 공저), 경제발전연구 28, 2022, pp. 33-70.
재정준칙과 분식회계: OECD 패널분석. 재정학연구 9(2). 2016, pp. 143-170.
재정준칙, 인구구조 및 장기 성장률 변화의 거시경제 효과: 중첩세대 동태적 일반균형모형의 전이경로 (문외솔 공저). 재정학연구 6(2). 2013, pp. 41-87.
WORKING PAPERS:
"Ideology, intergovernmental transfers, and public health spending: Evidence from South Korea" (with Youngho Kang and Sujin Min)
abstract: This study examines the effect of government ideology on intergovernmental transfers for public health. When local governments depend on intergovernmental transfers, and the upper-tier grantor government has a limited ability to target resources at the local level, the grantor government may use transfers to indirectly promote local public goods that reflect its political ideology. Using data from 226 Korean municipalities within 15 regions, we show that municipalities located in left-wing regions receive significantly more health subsidies from the regional government than those located in right-wing regions. The increase in health subsidies leads to greater municipal health spending. In addition, we show that municipalities located in left-wing regions also receive more regional subsidies for public education.
"Political polarization and economic growth" (with Youngho Kang and Byung-Yeon Kim)
abstract: This study examines the effect of political polarization, measured by the dispersion of self-reported political ideologies, on economic growth. Using a panel of 75 countries from 1990 to 2019, we find that political polarization has a negative effect on economic growth through its effect on private investment, human capital investment, and total factor productivity. We reveal that state capacity—the government’s ability to achieve intended policy goals—mitigates the adverse effect of polarization.
"Hometown favoritism and intergovernmental transfers" (with Min-Young Hwang)
abstract: We study whether regional governors favor their birthplaces with additional transfers in South Korea. We find that birth towns of incumbent governors receive roughly 20% more discretionary grants if the birth towns are located within the governors’ regions of election. By contrast, hometown favoritism is not present for the birth towns of incumbent governors who were born outside their region of election. In addition, we show that hometown status of municipalities, whether they are located in the governors’ regions or not, has no influence on the allocation of the rules-based grants. Our findings indicate that hometown favoritism depends on whether discretionary politicians allocate discretionary transfers. Our finding thus highlights the argument for rules over discretionary policies. Finally, we show that school alma mater ties—whether a governor has a school connection with the municipal mayor—does not explain the hometown favoritism.