Research

Game instruction (consent taken) 

Published Papers 

1) Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management,  with Stefanie Engel and Michael Kosfeld.  

Science, 2010. Vol. 330, pp. 961-965.  Lead author, Highly Cited Paper (Web of Science)   


2) Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopiawith Michael Kosfeld.  

American Economic Review, 2015, Vol. 105, pp 747-783.  


3) Measuring Honesty and Explaining Adulteration in Naturally Occurring Markets,  with Markus Kroell.

 Journal of Development Economics, 2022, Vol. 156, pp. 1-16.    


4) Historical Self Governance and Norms of Cooperation2023, conditionally accepted, Econometrica 


Submitted Papers


5) The Interdependence of Formal Rules and Civic Capital in Commons Management 

Formal rules and civic capital interact with each other, but we know little about the effect of this interaction on economic outcomes. I fill this gap using the context of a forest commons management program in Ethiopia. The program was launched to mitigate high deforestation from browsing of young trees by livestock. I measure civic capital as the propensity to cooperate if others do the same even though defection would yield a higher payoff. Formal rules are measured as written down regulations on grazing inside the forest. I find that groups achieve best forest outcomes when they have both rules and civic capital, but not when the have only one of these. Insights from fixed effects, neighboring pairs, and forest ecology show that these effects are not due to omitted variables. Specifically, the effects are observed only for young broadleaf trees prone to browsing, but not for coniferous trees that the cattle avoid. Among the young broadleaf trees, the largest effect is observed for species highly susceptible to browsing. Survey and experimental data reveal that these results are due to the enforcement of rules by the civic minded, which deters free riding, fosters optimistic beliefs about others’ contributions, eventually resulting in higher cooperation. These findings imply that both rules and civic capital are required for successful cooperation outcomes.


6) Market Exposure, Civic Values, and Rules 

Does markets exposure foster or erode civic values and rules necessary to con- strain opportunistic behavior? Using a natural experiment on market location from Ethiopia, I compare individuals who are from the same clan and attend the same market but vary in their exposure to that market. I find a positive effect of market exposure on civic values and rule formation. This result arises because individuals trade primarily in livestock, which is prone to cooperation problem from asymmetric information and weak state capacity. I use vignette studies to show that societies develop different types of exchange structures to mitigate this problem, which then shapes civic values and rules. In societies far from markets, there is no need for civic values and rules, as individuals rarely attend markets and sell livestock eponymously within their social network. In societies near markets, ephemeral and impersonal nature of market exchange creates a demand for civic values and community sanc- tioning as lubricants to conclude exchange, otherwise individuals end up losing gains from trade. Exposure to markets without asymmetric information has no effect on civic values and rules, suggesting that prosperity and contact hypothesis are not the channels.


Ongoing Projects

7) Discrimination and Human Capital Formation among Children in India  (with R. Ramachandran and E. Soldani)  (draft coming soon)

8) Anticipation of Discrimination and Misperceptions in Cooperation Dilemmas (with M. Schief, write-up stage

9) Group Selection on Culture and the Evolution of Cooperation (write-up stage)

10) Reciprocity, Beliefs, and Voluntary Contribution (draft coming soon)

11) Diffuse and Leader-Based Punishment Institutions (write-up stage)

12) Memorials and Inclusive Decision-Making (with Hans Joachim Voth, data collection)

13) Updating the social norm: the case of hate crime after the Brexit referendum (with Facundo Albornoz, Jake Bradley, and Silvia Sonderegger, and Jesus Rodriguez)