Job Market Paper
Import Competition, Innovation, and the Cost of Protectionism (link)
How does import protectionism affect catch-up innovation and welfare? I develop a small open-economy model in which trade costs shape buyer–supplier relationships, and suppliers’ incentives to innovate. When trade costs rise, domestic buyers become more inclined to shift sourcing from foreign to domestic suppliers. The possibility of this shift triggers heterogeneous innovation responses among domestic suppliers: those suppliers that are less technologically advanced than their foreign competitors increase their innovation, while other, more advanced suppliers reduce it. I verify and quantify the buyers’ shift in sourcing as well as the suppliers’ heterogeneous innovation responses to this shift using novel Turkish firm–product-level data on firm-to-firm transactions, imports, production, and innovation expenditures. I build on these firm level responses to assess the impact of import protectionism on welfare. If domestic suppliers in the aggregate respond to a rise in trade costs by increasing innovation, the welfare losses of such a policy are partially mitigated. If, on the other hand, they respond by decreasing innovation, the welfare losses are amplified. Calibrating the model to Turkish microdata, I find that a 10 percent rise in trade costs in Turkiye triggers an increase in aggregate innovation, which mitigates roughly one-quarter of the welfare loss relative to a no-innovation benchmark.