I am Professor of Metaphysics and Epistemology at the University of Leeds.  I have several lines of research based around the question: ‘what should one believe?’

i) Self-location and self-doubt. Several of my papers discuss the importance of self-locating evidence, such as the way ‘I have evidence E’ differs from ‘someone has evidence E’ (8, 9, 13). This leads to the possibility that I might have made a mistake (27, 30).

ii) Theoretical virtues. Our beliefs cannot be based only on our evidence -  scientists regularly prefer simpler hypotheses. Why? I think this is one of the deep unsolved problems in philosophy. My approach has been to take a preference for simplicity as an epistemological primitive (29, 31). This also feeds into the question of what makes for a good explanation (15, 20, 26) which has implications for our theory of truth (32).

iii) The epistemology of metaphysics. How could we know the answer to metaphysical questions? (21, 22, 24, 33).

 I am interested in supervising Phd students working in a broad range of topics across epistemology and metaphysics.

In my spare time I paramotor and play the banjo.

Research

Books

A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology (2015) Bloomsbury Publishing

Chapter 1

Papers

37. How to Lose Your Memory Without Losing Your Money:

Shifty Epistemology and Dutch Strategies (forthcoming) Synthese

Forgetful agents are not susceptible to Dutch strategies but agents posited by shifty epistemology are.  That's a problem for shifty epistemology.

36. Normative Contextualism and Ought Implies Can (forthcoming) Ergo

Contextualism about 'ought' explains why ought-implies-can is sometimes true and sometimes false.

35. Can we Combine Epistemic and Practical Reason? (2023) Analytic Philosophy 65 (1): 53-69 

I offer a framework for combining epistemic and practical reasons for belief. (Although in 'Reasons for Belief in Context' I argue that we shouldn't.)

34. Reasons for Belief in Context (forthcoming) Episteme

Normative contextualism explains how there can be both epistemic reasons for belief and practical reasons for belief.

33. Can we have Justified Beliefs About Fundamental Properties? (2023) Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1): 46-67  

Yes, because the same metaphysically fundamental properties are likely to cause the same epistemically fundamental properties.

32.  The Explanatory Power of Deflationary Truth (2023) Erkenntnis 88(8): 3439-3456

The deflationary concept of truth is often defined in terms of being non-explanatory. I argue that the deflationary concept of truth is explanatory, and offer an account of the deflationary/substantive divide in terms of grounding.

31. Material Composition and Probabilistic Arguments for Parsimony (forthcoming in an edited collection)

Why prefer simpler theories? I offer a couple of reasons then investigate what happens when they are applied to the debate about material composition. Nihilism is favoured, but not as clearly or conclusively as we might have expected.

30. Bayesianism and Self-Doubt (draft) (2021) Synthese 199 (1), 2225-2243 

How should we respond to evidence when our evidence indicates that we are rationally impaired? I will defend a novel answer based on the analogy between self-doubt and memory loss. To believe that one is now impaired and previously was not is to believe that one’s epistemic position has deteriorated. Memory loss is also a form of epistemic deterioration. I argue that agents who suffer from epistemic deterioration should return to the priors they had at an earlier time. I develop this argument regarding memory loss then extend it to cases of self-doubt.

29. Objective Bayesianism and the Abductivist Response to Scepticism (penultimate draft) (2021) Episteme  doi:10.1017/epi.2020.54

An important line of response to scepticism appeals to the best explanation (abductivism). But do plausible assumptions about best explanations really favour anti-scepticism? I argue that there are ways of constructing sceptical hypotheses in which the assumptions do favour anti-scepticism, but the size of the support for anti-scepticism is small, so the overall verdict is mixed.

28. Ought-Contextualism and Reasoning (2021) Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999. 

What does logic tells us how about we ought to reason? If P entails Q, and you believe P, should you believe Q? I argue that we should embed the question in an independently motivated contextualist semantics for ‘ought’. With the contextualist machinery in hand we can give a theory of when inferences should be made and when not.

27. Uniqueness and Modesty: How Permissivists can Live on the Edge (2021) Mind 130 (520), 1087-1098 

Schultheis (2018) offers a potentially devastating objection to Permissivism, on the grounds that Permissivism permits dominated credences. I will argue that Permissivists can plausibly block Schultheis’ argument. The issue turns on getting clear about whether we should be certain whether our credences are rational.

26. Should Explanations Omit the Details?  (2020) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71:827–853 

There is a widely shared belief that the higher level sciences provide better explanations than lower level sciences because they omit details. I argue instead that the preference for higher level explanations is just a special case of our general preference for informative, logically strong, beliefs. 

25. Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning (2020) Mind 129 (514): 579-584 

Self-locating beliefs cause a problem for Bayesianism. Miriam Schoenfield (2016) offers a solution - that on learning x, agents should update on the fact that they learned x (not just on x). I will argue that Schoenfield's suggestion does not solve the problem.

24. Naturalness as a Constraint on Priors (2020) Mind 129 (513): 179-203 

I argue that epistemologists should borrow the metaphysicians' concept of naturalness and assign higher priors to more natural hypotheses.

23. Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? (2019) Philosopher's Imprint 19 (3).

What if your peers tell you that you should disregard your perceptions? Worse, what if your peers tell you to disregard the testimony of your peers? How should we respond if we get evidence that seems to undermine our epistemic rules? I argue that all epistemic rules are defeasible. The result is a kind of epistemic particularism, according to which there are no simple rules connecting descriptive and normative facts.

22. Philosophers Should Prefer Simpler Theories (2018) Philosophical Studies 175 (12): 3049-3067

Huemer (2009) argues that a number of reasons for preferring simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I argue that they do apply to various philosophical debates.

21. Carnap's Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics (2018) Synthese 195 (5): 2247-2265.

I argue that Carnap's criticism of metaphysics is not based on verificationism, but on the absence of any evidence that could confirm metaphysical theories.

20. What is Bayesian Confirmation for? (2017) International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3): 229-241

Brossel and Huber (2015) ask: What is the purpose of the Bayesian conception of confirmation? They consider and reject two possible answers. I will argue that the Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for both the purposes they suggest.

19. Deutsch on Confirmation in Everettian Quantum Theory (2017) Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 57: 111-114 (2017)

I raise some problems for David Deutsch's (2016) attempt to develop a confirmation theory for branching worlds.

18. A Priori Causal Laws (2017) Inquiry 60 (4): 358-370 

Sober (2011) and Elgin & Sober (2014) defend the claim that there are a priori causal laws in biology. I argue that Sober and Elgin don’t go far enough. I locate their position in a broader framework and argue that there are a priori causal laws in many sciences. Furthermore, I argue that this thesis is compatible with a Humean metaphysics and an empiricist epistemology.

17. Everett and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson (2015) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):683-693.

I reply to Alastair Wilson's criticism of my 'Confirmation in a Branching World'.

Response by Wilson

16. A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self- Knowledge Problems (2014) Journal of Philosophy  111 (7):379-393.

I argue that any form of the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge (e.g. contextualism, contrasivism...) can solve the bootstrapping problem (Vogel 2000) and the problem that semantic externalists seem to have armchair knowledge of the world. Along the way, I argue that many seemingly opposed theories of knowledge, such as skepticism and Mooreanism, can be embedded in a relevant alternatives framework.

15. Functionalism and the Independence Problems Nous (2013) 47 (1):545-557.

The independence problems for functionalism stem from the worry that if functional properties are defined in terms of their causes and effects then such functional properties seem to be too intimately connected to these purported causes and effects. I distinguish three different ways the independence problems can be filled out – in terms of necessary connections, analytic connections and vacuous explanations. I argue that none of these present serious problems. Instead, they bring out some important and over-looked features of functionalism.

Reply by Robert Rupert 'Necessity Is Unnecessary: A Response to Bradley' (2014) Noûs 48 (3):558-564.  

14.  Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time (2013) In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago

I offer two arguments for two-dimensionalism (which says there are eternal and temporal objects of belief) over one-dimensionalism (which says there are only temporal objects of belief). First, two-dimensionalism gives us a more natural account of belief retention and changing our mind. Second, the extra complexity of two-dimensionalism turns out to be independently motivated by confirmation theory.

13. Four Problems About Self-Locating Belief Philosophical Review (2012) 121.2 

I argue that four problems that appear to be very different have the same structure. I give a unified treatment of the Doomsday Argument, Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-tuning Argument and confirmation in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. All these cases involve self-locating evidence. However, the confusing feature of all these cases is not self-location, but observation selection effects. I explain how observation selection effects operate, why they affect the four problem cases, and how they can be incorporated into confirmation theory. I defend the Doomsday Argument, the halfer position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-tuning Argument and the applicability of confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. 

12. Weisberg on Design: What Fine-Tuning's Got to do With it (2012) Erkenntnis  77 (3):435-438.

I respond to Jonathan Weisberg's (2010) claim that fine-tuning has nothing to do with design arguments.

Reply by Weisberg The Argument From Divine Indifference (2012) Analysis 72 (4):707-714

11. Justified Concepts and the Limits of the Conceptual Approach to the A Priori (2011) Croatian Journal of Philosophy Vol. XI, No. 33 p. 267-274 

Jenkins (2005, 2008) argues that if a belief is justified a priori then it contains justified concepts. I offer a counter-example: 'aether, if it exists, conducts heat'. I then argue that this kind of counter-example demonstrates a limit to the conceptual approach to the a priori. 

10. Functionalist Response-Dependence Avoids Missing Explanations Analysis (2011) 71(2): 297-300

I argue that there is a flaw in the way that response-dependence has been formulated in the literature, and this flawed formulation has been correctly attacked by Mark Johnston’s Missing Explanation Argument. Moving to a better formulation, which is analogous to the move from behaviourism to functionalism, avoids the Missing Explanation Argument. 

9.  Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty (2011) British Journal for Philosophy of Science  62 (2):323-342 (penultimate draft)

I argue that the Everett interpretation and Sleeping Beauty are strongly analogous. Once we take account of the observation selection effects, conditionalization vindicates the Everett interpretation and the halfer position in Sleeping Beauty.

    Response by Alastair Wilson 'Everttian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty' (2014) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3): 573-598 (to which I reply above)

8. Self-Location is No Problem for Conditionalization Synthese (2011) 182(3) 393-411 (penultimate draft)

How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and draw some general conclusions about their impact on eternal beliefs.

 Discussion by Miriam Schoenfield 'An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence' (section 5) (2016) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3)

 7. Conditionalization and Belief De Se (2010) Dialectica Vol. 64, N° 2, pp. 247–250

I argue that a failure to note the distinction between 'E' and 'I learn E' is the real problem with Howson's (1995) purported counterexample to conditionalization.

 6. Multiple Universes and Observation Selection Effects (2009) American Philosophical Quarterly 46, 61-72

The fine-tuning argument can be used to support the Many Universe hypothesis. The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy objection seeks to undercut the support for the Many Universe hypothesis. The objection is that although the evidence that there is life somewhere confirms Many Universes, the specific evidence that there is life in this universe does not. I will argue that the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy is not committed by the fine-tuning argument. The key issue is the procedure by which the universe with life is selected for observation. Once we take account of the procedure, we find that the support for the Many Universe hypothesis remains.

5. Philosophical Perspectives on Decision Theory (forthcoming) in The Encyclopedia of the Mind, ed. Hal Pashler, Sage

4. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments (with Hannes Leitgeb), Analysis 66.2 (2006), 119–127

We argue that there is a constraint on when being Dutch-booked is a symptom of irrationality that has been over-looked in the literature. The constraint is that the size of the bet mustn't be correlated with the outcome of the event that the bet it on. This undermines Chris Hitchcock's (2004) argument for the 1/3 position in Sleeping Beauty.

Re-printed in Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings (2011) ed. A.Eagle, Routledge

    Response by Draper and Pust 'Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty' Synthese 164 (2):281 - 287

3. No Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank Synthese 144 (2005), 91-100

Brad Monton (2003) tried to construct an a priori Doomsday Argument that could be used without knowledge of your birth rank. This would be an uncomfortable result for Doomsayers. I argue that Monton has failed to construct such an argument, and that the Doomsday Argument requires knowlege of birth rank.

2. Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation (with Branden Fitelson), Analysis 63 (2003), 23-31

We give an analysis of the Monty Hall problem purely in terms of confirmation, without making any lottery assumptions about priors. Along the way, we show the Monty Hall problem is structurally identical to the Doomsday Argument.

1. Sleeping Beauty: A Note on Dorr's Argument for 1/3 Analysis 63 (2003), 266-268

Cian Dorr (2002) gives an argument for the 1/3 position in Sleeping Beauty. I argue this is based on a mistake about Sleeping Beauty's epistemic position.

Book Reviews

'Ontology After Carnap' Ed.s Blatti and Lapointe (forthcoming) Analysis

 Here's my dissertation from 2007.

I'm the probabilistic puzzles editor of Phil Papers.

Here is the link to my PhilPapers profile.