Epistemology Digest 2019
Analysis
Normative Decision Theory.
Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772
The Transparency Method and Knowing Our Reasons.
Sophie Keeling - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):613-621
Perceptual Capacities: Questions for Schellenberg.
Matthew McGrath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):730-739.
Extended Epistemology.
Robin McKenna - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):790-799
Chancy Modus Ponens.
Sven Neth - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):632-638
Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646
Accuracy Conditions, Functions, Perceptual Discrimination.
Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):739-754
Fictionalism, the Safety Result and Counterpossibles.
Lukas Skiba - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):647-658.
Accuracy and Epistemic Conservatism.
Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):658-669
P-Curving X-Phi: Does Experimental Philosophy Have Evidential Value?
Michael T. Stuart, David Colaço & Edouard Machery - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):669-684
Epistemic Consequentialism and its Aftermath.
Kurt Sylvan - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):773-783.
Knowledge Exclusion and the Rationality of Belief.
Sean Donahue - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):402-410
Amodal Completion and Knowledge.
Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):415-423
The Epistemology of Folk Epistemology.
Richard F. Kitchener - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):521-53
Matthew Mandelkern & Justin Khoo - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):424-436
Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense By Peter Baumann.
Jason Bridges - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):378-381
Explaining Knowledge
Philip P. Hanson - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):350-358
Norm-Reasons and Evidentialism
Frank Hofmann & Christian Piller - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):202-206
Beyond the Comparative Test for Discrimination.
Julian Jonker - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):206-214
Graham Oppy - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):381-384
Epistemic Friction.
Anil Gupta - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):164-169
Outline of a Logic of Knowledge of Acquaintance.
Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):52-61
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
The Toxin and the Dogmatist.
Bob Beddor - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):727-740
Inferring by Attaching Force.
Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714
Imprecise Epistemic Values and Imprecise Credences.
B. A. Levinstein - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):741-760
Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem.
Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):761-774
No Justificatory Closure Without Truth
Francesco Praolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):715-726
Idealizations and Understanding: Much Ado About Nothing?
Emily Sullivan & Kareem Khalifa - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):673-689
‘Know-How as Competence: A Rylean Responsibilist Account’, by David Löwenstein. [REVIEW]
Yuri Cath
Stephen Hetherington - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):211-211.
Heart of DARCness.Yang Liu & Huw Price - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):136-150
Bence Nanay - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):202-204
Weng Hong Tang - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):209-209
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Aiding Self-Knowledge.
Casey Doyle - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1104-1121
The Puzzle of Transparency and How to Solve It.
Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):916-935
Matthew Boyle - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):1012-1039
Thomas Khurana - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):956-979
Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge.
Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):873-889
Kant and the Transparency of the Mind.
Alexandra M. Newton - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):890-915
Kant’s “I Think” and the Agential Approach to Self-Knowledge.
Houston Smit - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):980-1011
Is Knowledge of Causes Sufficient for Understanding?
Xingming Hu - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):291-313
A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.
Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291
Inferential Seemings and the Problem of Reflective Awareness
Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271
Confirmation Based on Analogical Inference: Bayes Meets Jeffrey.
Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla & Alexander Gebharter - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Erkenntnis
On the Ramsey Test Analysis of ‘Because’.
Holger Andreas & Mario Günther - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1229-1262
An Automatic Ockham’s Razor for Bayesians?
Gordon Belot - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1361-1367
Transcendental Arguments in Scientific Reasoning.
Michael H. G. Hoffmann - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1387-1407
On the Pareto Condition on Permissible Belief.
Jakob Koscholke - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1183-1188
Epistemic Self-Trust and Doxastic Disagreements.
Fabienne Peter - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1189-1205
Logical Principles of Agnosticism.
Luis Rosa - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1263-1283
Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.
Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386
Evolutionary Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism.
Jessica Isserow - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1025-1045
The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation.
Anne Meylan - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):877-893
Andrew Peet - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):895-912
Reuben Stern - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):783-804
Failures of Warrant Transmission: The Role of Presupposition.
Thomas Lockhart - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):535-557
Wayne C. Myrvold - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):577-584
Maura Priest - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):703-726
Kitcher, Mathematics, and Apriority.
Jeffrey W. Roland - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):687-702
Two Approaches to Belief Revision.
Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518
Method Coherence and Epistemic Circularity.
Will Fleisher - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):455-480
Agent-Awareness in Reflective Knowledge.
Sharon Mason - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):239-255
Chance, Resiliency, and Humean Supervenience.
Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):1-19
Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.
Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75
Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.
J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-21
Counterexamples to Some Characterizations of Dilation.
Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-12
Concepts, Conceptions and Self-Knowledge.
Sarah Sawyer - 2019 - Erkenntnis
Inquiry
Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1033-1065
No, One Should Not Believe All Truths.
Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1091-1103
Knowing How, Basic Actions, and Ways of Doing Things.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):956-977
Knowledge Requires Belief – and It Doesn’T? On Belief as Such and Belief Necessary for Knowledge.
Peter Baumann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):151-167
Disqualifying ‘Disqualifiers’.B. J. C. Madison - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
Mind
Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?
Marcello Di Bello - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1045-1084
Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259
New Hope for Relative Overlap Measures of Coherence.
Jakob Koscholke, Michael Schippers & Alexander Stegmann - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1261-1284
Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, by Jessica Brown.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1395-1402
Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception.
Eric Marcus - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1205-1225
After Certainty: A History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions, by Robert Pasnau.
Kevin Meeker - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1355-1360
Epistemology, Pettigrew Style: A Critical Notice of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, by Richard Pettigrew1
Scott Sturgeon - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1319-1336
Normative Uncertainty and Social Choice.
Christian Tarsney - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1285-1308
Faculties, Knowledge, and Reasons for Doubt in the Cartesian Circle.
Matthew Clark - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):647-672
Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):887-906
Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.
Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859
David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926
Markos Valaris - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):861-885
Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):367-395
Bernhard Salow - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):397-427
Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.
Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211
Analogical Predictive Probabilities.
Simon M. Huttegger - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):1-37
The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.
Jason Konek & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107
What Do Philosophers Do? Scepticism and the Practice of Philosophy, by Penelope Maddy. [REVIEW]
Brian Weatherson - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):269-271
Naturalness as a Constraint on Priors.
Darren Bradley - 2019 - Mind:fzz027
Nous
Franz Dietrich - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):708-736
Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding
Karl Schafer - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):639-663
Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315
Varieties of Cognitive Integration.
J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2019 - Noûs
Philosophical Quarterly
The Explosion of Being: Ideological Kinds in Theory Choice.
Peter Finocchiaro - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):486-510
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.
Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533
Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. By Schmidt Eva
Kateryna Samoilova - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):650-653
Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science. By Ruse Michael.
Brendan Sweetman - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):653-656
New Models of Religious Understanding. [REVIEW]
Guy Bennett-Hunter - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):429-432
Epistemology for the Rest of the World. [REVIEW]
Mark Satta - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):438-440
On What It Takes to Be an Expert.
Michel Croce - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):1-21
The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method. [REVIEW]
Hossein Dabbagh - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):195-197
Why Doxastic Dependence Defeats Grue: A Response to Dorst's Reply.
Wolfgang Freitag - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):156-165
Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. By Marušić Berislav.
Christian Kietzmann - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):197-199
Genealogy and Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Mismatch?
Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):100-120
Philosophical Review
Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism.
Jack C. Lyons - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):463-509
The Importance of Being Rational, by Errol Lord. [REVIEW]
Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):523-527
The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.
Igor Douven - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):371-375
Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291
Angela Potochnik - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):363-366
Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):367-371
Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217
The Rationality of Perception.
Casey O'Callaghan - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):126-130
Philosophical Studies
Jonathan Birch - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3329-3352
Are Epistemic Reasons Perspective-Dependent?
Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283
Knowledge-Yielding Communication.
Andrew Peet - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3303-3327
Implicit Attitudes and the Ability Argument.
Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2961-2990
Jamee Elder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3019-3039
An Objection of Varying Importance to Epistemic Utility Theory.
Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2919-2931
‘Ought’-Contextualism Beyond the Parochial.
Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3099-3119
We Cannot Infer by Accepting Testimony.
Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2589-2598
Levi Spectre - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2785-2805
Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.
Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496
Against Epistemic Partiality in Friendship: Value-Reflecting Reasons.
Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2221-2242
The Epistemic Significance of Political Disagreement.
Bjørn G. Hallsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2187-2202
Does Reliabilism Have a Temporality Problem?
Jeffrey Tolly - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2203-2220
Higher Order Ignorance Inside the Margins.
Sam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1789-1806
A Patchwork Epistemology of Disagreement?
Yoaav Isaacs - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1873-1885
Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950
The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons.
Hamid Vahid - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1887-1904
Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617
How to Know One’s Experiences Transparently.
Frank Hofmann - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1305-1324
The Trouble with Having Standards.
Han Li - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1225-1245
Peter J. Markie - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1291-1304
Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224
What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.
Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931
The Ordinary Language Argument Against Skepticism—Pragmatized.
Sinan Dogramaci - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):879-896
Parity, Prospects, and Predominance.
Ryan Doody - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):1077-1095
Jason D’Cruz - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):933-953
Conspiracy Theories, Impostor Syndrome, and Distrust.
Katherine Hawley - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):969-980
Trust, Distrust, and Affective Looping.
Karen Jones - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):955-968
Jane Friedman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):673-691
Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732
Epistemic Innocence and the Production of False Memory Beliefs.
Katherine Puddifoot & Lisa Bortolotti - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):755-780
John Gibbons - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):559-579
Studies in the Logic of K -Onfirmation.
Clayton Peterson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):437-471
Possessing Epistemic Reasons: The Role of Rational Capacities.
Eva Schmidt - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):483-501
Knowledge Requires Commitment (Instead of Belief).
Nicholas Tebben - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):321-338
Normalcy, Justification, and the Easy-Defeat Problem.
Marvin Backes - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 11 (176):2877-2895
A. K. Flowerree - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 1 (online first):1-18
Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem.
J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-26
On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.
J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.
Brian Hedden - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):581-604
On Constraints, Context, and Spatiotemporal Explanation.
John Heron & Eleanor Knox - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):732-738
Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.
Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627
Deviance and Vice: Strength as a Theoretical Virtue in the Epistemology of Logic.
Gillian Russell - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):548-563
Understanding, Self‐Evidence, and Justification.
Robert Audi - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):358-381
Self‐Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time.
David Builes - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):478-490
Owen Flanagan - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):508-513
Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge.
Christoph Kelp - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):298-310
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.
Miriam Schoenfield - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297
Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.
Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430
Robert Steel - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):431-460
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import.
J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):49-80
Triviality Results For Probabilistic Modals.
Goldstein Simon - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):188-222
Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.
Cameron Buckner - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):697-724
Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566
Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):261-285
Frauds, Posers And Sheep: A Virtue Theoretic Solution To The Acquaintance Debate.
Madeleine Ransom - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):417-434
Consequence and Normative Guidance.
Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):306-328
Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):190-220
Varieties of Risk.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:01-24
Philosopher’s Imprint
Discrimination-Conduciveness and Observation Selection Effects.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (40)
Epistemic Diversity and Editor Decisions: A Statistical Matthew Effect.Remco Heesen & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (39
Dispelling the Disjunction Objection to Explanatory Inference.
Kevin McCain & Ted Poston - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (36)
J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (29):1--22
Imprecise Chance and the Best System Analysis.
Luke Fenton-Glynn - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (23)
Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations.
Bob Beddor - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19
Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?
Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19
Method Pluralism, Method Mismatch, & Method Bias.
Adrian Currie & Shahar Avin - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19
Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence.
David Faraci - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19
Pragmatic Encroachment and the Challenge From Epistemic Injustice.
Mikkel Gerken - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19
How to Avoid Maximizing Expected Utility.
Bradley Monton - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19
Thought
Knowledge From Falsehood: An Experimental Study.
John Turri - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):167-178
Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So.
Jaakko Hirvelä - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):110-118
Are Contradictions Believable?
Yale Weiss - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):42-49
Two Tales of Epistemic Models.
Yang Liu - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8:291--302