My research centers on empirical and theoretical corporate finance, intersecting with innovation economics, industrial organization, corporate governance, and law and economics. I am particularly interested in how disclosure, corporate governance, and regulation shape the flow of information across firms and markets. In recent work, I study:
Information spillovers in credit markets and M&A, including how environmental and social risks at one firm affect the loan pricing of peer firms that share the same lenders, and how merger disclosures inform analysts’ expectations about targets’ peers.
How financial constraints, competition, and market dynamics shape corporate innovation and R&D investment.
Intellectual property (IP) strategies, such as commercialization, licensing, litigation, and acquisition.
My earlier research also evaluated how dividend and capital gains tax reforms affect investment, asset prices, and household welfare.
"The Spillover of Corporate ES to Bank Loan Costs" (with Siti Farida and Biao Yang) - Management Science (Finance track), accepted for publication, October 2026. Link on SSRN
"How Do Firms Resolve Patent Disputes? Insights from Competitive Dynamics and Market Uncertainty" (with Du Liu and A. Elizabeth Whalley) - Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol 101, Article 103063, September 2026. Link on SSRN
"The Spillover of Value-Relevant Information about Target Peers During Acquisitions" (with Congcong Li and MaryJane Rabier) - Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol 53, Issue 4, August 2026, P 1458–1480, Link on SSRN
"Commercialise or Sleep? Capturing Value from Patenting" (with Du Liu) - Research Policy, Vol 55, Issue 1, January 2026, Link on SSRN
"Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment under Financial Constraints and Competition" (sole author), Management Science (Finance track). Vol 69, Issue 7, July 2023, P 3759 - 4361. Link on SSRN. Link to the Online Appendix.
"The Effect of Board Structure on Firm Performance - New Evidence From Product Market Conditions" (with Xiaoyuan Hu and Onur Tosun), European Journal of Finance, Vol 29, Issue 4, March 2023, P 363 - 392. Link on SSRN
"Dividends and Capital Gains Taxation under Incomplete Markets" (with Alexis Anagnostopoulos and Eva Carceles-Poveda), Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol 59, Issue 7, November 2012, P 599-611. Link on SSRN
“Finance, Innovation, and Growth”, in Economic Development and Growth – Foundations and Frontiers, edited by Pantelis C. Kostis, Paraskevi Boufounou, and Theodoros Papadogonas, IntechOpen, 2025, Chapter 7.
"Where to Invest? Strategic Capital Allocation for Human-AI Collaboration" (with Du Liu) - September 2026
Abstract: This paper studies how firms allocate investment between AI capital and human oversight when generative systems can fabricate plausible but false evidence. AI investment both improves baseline classification precision and suppresses fabrication, whereas human oversight verifies fabricated content without providing an independent forecast. At low levels of AI capital, greater precision expands the set of classifications that oversight can protect, making the inputs complements. At high levels, fabrication suppression leaves less scope for human review, making them substitutes. A sharp threshold separates these regimes and generates sign reversals in optimal AI investment's response to fabrication risk and human detection. When financing is constrained and AI assets are more pledgeable than firm-specific human expertise, tighter financing contracts both inputs under complementarity but can reallocate investment away from oversight under substitutability, creating an oversight gap. The model provides testable predictions linking AI risk, verification technology, and financial capacity to firms' investment in AI and human review.
"Not just the option to exclude: Valuing patents as a portfolio of options" (with Du Liu and A. Elizabeth Whalley) - August 2026
Abstract: This paper develops a real-options duopoly model to value patents under imperfect enforcement. Rather than treating patents as guaranteeing monopoly exclusion, we model protection as the threat of litigation after rival entry. Patent value consists of two options: the option to litigate and, when feasible, the option to settle. Thus, patents create value not only by deterring entry, but also by allowing the patent holder to monetize post-entry competition through royalty-based settlement. Incorporating settlement option shows that patent value under imperfect protection can exceed the value of guaranteed monopoly exclusion. The model also shows that patent value does not always increase monotonically with protection, because stronger protection delays rival entry and can therefore postpone the sharing of higher market profits.