Online Papers

Here are various things of my mine in various (often penultimate) forms; a more up-to-date list can also be found on my PhilPapers page. 

Any comments or reactions most welcome. 

2021-a     'Is there a persuasive argument for an inner-awareness theory of consciousness?', Erkenntnis, forthcoming

2021-b.   'Two Notions of Resemblance and the Semantics of 'What it's like',  Inquiry (with Justin D'Ambrosio)

2021-c      'Realism v Equilibrism about Philosophy, Syzetesis, forthcoming

2020-a      'Philosophy as Synchronic History', Journal of the American Philosophical Association, forthcoming

2020-b.     'A Euthyphro Dilemma for Higher-order Theories of Consciousness', forthcoming in a volume on Consciousness and Grounding (Ed. Gabriel Rabin)

2020-c .    'Armstrong's Just-so Story about Consciousness', forthcoming in a volume on A Materialist Theory of the Mind: 50 Years On (Eds. Peter Anstey and David Braddon Mitchell)

2019-a.    'Williamson on Laws and Progress in Philosophy', Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, forthcoming

2019-b     'Understanding Self-ascription', Mind&Language, (with Frank Jackson) forthcoming

2019-c     'Chalmers V Chalmers', Nous, forthcoming

2018-a     'Evans on Transparency: A Rationalist Account' ,in Philosophical Studies, forthcoming

2018-b     'Review of Philip Goff, *Consciousness and Fundamental Reality*, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

2017-a    'The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness' , Analytic Philosophy, forthcoming

2016-a    'The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness', Kriegel, U (ed.) Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Consciousness, forthcoming

2016-b     'Review of Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabatés, and David Sosa (eds.), *Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World*, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

2016-c    'The Knowledge Argument and Two Interpretations of 'Knowing what it is like', in Jacquette, D (ed.) The Bloomsbury Companion to Consciousness, pp.108-125.

2016-e    'Introspection and Necessity', Nous, 2016) 50 (4), pp.1-22

2016-e    'Does the Exclusion Argument Put Any Pressure on Dualism?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, (with Christian List) forthcoming

2016-f    Review of Kriegel's *The Varieties of Consciousness*', Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming

2016-g    'Is there Progress in Philosophy? A Brief Case for Optimism', in Blackford, R and Broderick, D (eds.) Philosophy’s Future, Wiley Blackwell, forthcoming

2016-h    'Panpsychism and Non-standard Materialism: Some Comparative Remarks', in Seager, B (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism, forthcoming

2016-i    'The Semantics of 'What it is like' and the Nature of Consciousness', Mind, forthcoming

2016-j:   'In Praise of Poise', in Blockheads!  Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness (MIT Press), forthcoming

2015-a:   'Chomsky, London and Lewis', Analysis, 75 (1) 16-22

2015-b:   'Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?', in Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa (eds) Russellian Monism  (OUP), pp.324-345

2015-c:   ‘Lewis on Experience and Materialism’, in Jonathan Schaffer and Barry Loewer (eds), Blackwells Companion to David Lewis, pp. 519-532

2014-f:   ‘Four Kinds of Russellian Monism’, in Kriegel, U (ed.)  Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge, pp.17-39

2013-a:   ‘Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 86, Issue 3, pages 745–752, May 2013

2013-b:    ‘Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Ignorance’ in Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson (eds):  The Continuum Companion to Analytic Philosophy, forthcoming

2012-a:   ‘Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts’, Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 26, Issue 1, pages 389–410, December 2012

2012-b:   ‘Consciousness and Introspection:  An Overview’, in Consciousness and Introspection, Oxford University Press (with Declan Smithies)

2012-c.   ‘Knowledge of Perception’, in Consciousness and Introspection, Oxford University Press

2011-a     Meditation in mind (Review of Flanagan and Wallace)  Nature 480, 178 (08 December 2011) 

2010-a     Introduction to Physicalism, Routledge

2010-b    ‘On the Self-Locating Response to the Knowledge Argument,’ Philosophical Studies, 155 (3):437-443.

2010-c    ‘Does Nagel’s Footnote 11 Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’ (with Tyler Doggett), Philosophical Issues 20 (1):125-143. 

2009-a    ‘Précis of Ignorance and Imagination,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2009 79 (3): 748-755

2009-b    ‘Reply to Alter and Bennett,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2009 79 (3): 775-784

2009-c    ‘Perception,’ In John Shand (ed.) 2009 Central Questions of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell) pp.51-6

2009-d    ‘Hempel’s Dilemma.’ In Heather Dyke 2009 (ed) From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics Routledge Blackwells pp. 181-197

2009-e    ‘The Argument from Revelation'.’ In David Braddon Mitchell and Robert Nola 2009 (eds) Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism MIT Press

2008       ‘Distinctions in Distinction'.’  In Jesper Kallestrup and Jakob Hohwy (eds.) Being Reduced: New Essays of Causation and Explanation in the Special Sciences (Oxford University Press)

2007        ‘Two Conceivability Arguments Compared.’  In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 107 (2007), pp. 27-44

2007        ‘The Consequences of Intentionalism.’  In Erkenntnis  Vol. 66, No. 1/2, Perspectives on Colour Perception (Mar. 2007), pp. 247-270