Howard D. (2018) Disability, Well-Being, and (In)Apt Emotions. In: Flanigan J., Price T. (eds) The Ethics of Ability and Enhancement. Jepson Studies in Leadership. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Abstract: Many people view disabilities as misfortunes, call this the standard view. In this paper, I examine one criticism that has been launched against the Standard View. Rather than determine in advance whether having a disability is good or bad for a person, some critics argue that the Standard View is reflective of and brings about inappropriate emotional responses toward people with disabilities and their circumstances. For instance, philosophers have recently argued that in holding the standard view, we become prone to a destructive kind of unwarranted pity or that the view leads us to hold certain untenable or inappropriate hopes for our children and for our society. I think this sort of challenge to the Standard View has a lot of appeal, but I worry that if it is not properly articulated, the approach is vulnerable to what has been known as “The Wrong Kind of Reason” problem. The paper highlights and addresses this worry.
You can download a penultimate draft of this paper here, please cite the published chapter.