Dana Goswick   

         

 

AOS: Metaphysics, Logic

AOC: Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Language

Email: dgoswick@unimelb.edu.au

 

CV 2023

 

I received my doctorate from the University of California at Davis in December 2009.  In my dissertation I defended a response-dependent account of ordinary objects and argued that objects that have non-trivial de re modal properties depend for their existence partly on our having certain sort-responses.  Whilst in graduate school, I was a visiting student at the Australian National University, UNC at Chapel Hill, and the University of Arizona.  Prior to graduate school, I earned a B.A. in Political Studies at Bard College in upstate NY and a CELTA certificate from Cambridge University.   

Since 2010, I've been a lecturer at the University of Melbourne.  My current work concerns modality, ordinary objects,  and Realism.  I argue that the negative modalities (not necessarily not, not possibly not) are weaker than the positive modalities (possibly, necessarily).  This creates room in logical space for entities which have no non-trivial de re modal properties.  I call such objects "n-entities".  I defend the existence of n-entities and argue that ordinary objects are composite objects which contain n-entities and sort properties as parts.  With regard to Realism, I argue that defining Realism in terms of mind-independence is archaic and anthropocentric.  I'm currently trying to come up with a better, 21st century, version of Realism. 

Every eighteen months I organize the Australian Metaphysics Conference (AMC) which is held at the ANU's Kioloa Coastal Campus in NSW, https://sites.google.com/view/australiametaphysicsconference/home.  Each January I compile a list of all the metaphysics articles from the previous year that I ought to have read and post it in the Metaphysics Digest,  https://sites.google.com/site/metaphysics digest/.  I, also, run a monthly metaphysics reading group, Melbourne Area Metaphysics (MAM), https://sites.google.com/site/melbourneareametaphysics

 

 

 


SELECTED PUBLICATIONS (click on title for link to article)

 


Odd Objects: LEM Violations and Indeterminacy  (Erkenntnis 2021)

I argue there are some objects which do not respect the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM), i.e., which are such that, for some property F, the disjunction Fo v ~Fo fails to be true.  I call such objects "odd objects" and present three examples -- fictional objects, nonsort objects, and quantum objects.  I argue that each of these objects is best understood as violating LEM.  I, then, discuss Jessica Wilson's (LEM-respecting) account of metaphysical indeterminacy.  I show how the indeterminacy which arises with odd objects can be accounted for on Wilson's account.  I, then, argue that my Wilson-inspired, but non-LEM-respecting, account of metaphysical indeterminacy is superior to Wilson's in terms of costs and benefits.



The Hard Question for Hylomorphism  (Metaphysics, 2018)

The view that ordinary objects are constituted by matter and form ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the view that ordinary objects are constituted by matter alone ("matter-only").  I argue that hylomorphic views have an advantage over matter-only views when it comes to grounding an object's modal properties.  I, then, defend a response-dependent hylomorphic account of ordinary objects and argue that it fairs even better than non-response-dependent hylomorphic views with regard to grounding objects' modal properties.



Bridging the Modal Gap (Journal of Philosophy 2010)                                          

I argue that standard Realists about ordinary objects (e.g. Kripke, Bealer) cannot tell a satisfactory epistemological story with regard to our knowledge of the modal properties of ordinary objects.  I suggest that this gives us reason to endorse some ontology other than standard Realism.



Are Modal Facts Brute Facts?  (Brute Facts, OUP, 2018)

Modality appears to be all around us: water molecules are necessarily H20; it's necessary that if something is a cat, then it's a mammal; it's possible for you to wear brown shoes.  The implausibility of eliminativism about modality combined with the lack of an ontologically conservative, genuinely reductive account of modality lends a prima facie plausibility to modal primitivism.  Despite this prima facie plausibility, I argue that modal primitivism is ultimately untenable.  I first discuss what brute modality is, what the prima facie reasons for endorsing it are, and why philosophers have, in general, been so keen to avoid it.  I, then, argue that there's a plausible form of modal reductionism which has, thus far, been overlooked in the literature.  Namely, a reductive account which proceeds via providing a reductive account of the existence of objects which have modal properties rather than via providing a reductive account of objects' instantiation of modal properties.  Ultimately, I argue that -- in light of the availability of this new way of reducing modality --  modal reductionism is preferable to modal primitivism.  Modal facts are not brute.