danalgoswick2

Dana Goswick

AOS: Metaphysics

AOC: Philosophy of Language, Logic, Philosophy of Science, Feminist Philosophy

Email: danasunimelb@gmail.com or dgoswick@unimelb.edu.au

CV 2026

I received my doctorate in Philosophy from the University of California at Davis in 2009. I've been at the University of Melbourne in Australia, first as an Assistant Professor and now as as Associate Professor, since 2010.

My primary area of research is metaphysics. I'm currently completing a monograph, Our Artifactual World: The Creative Account of Ordinary Objects, in which I defend a hard-core naturalist view of a very sparse (human-independent, fundamental) world. Unlike most hard-core naturalists I argue that what we as subjects bring to the world is just as important as what we find there independent of our own influence. I show how, once we add our own responses and methods of categorization to this very sparse (human-independent, fundamental) world, we end up with the much richer world of (human-dependent) modal and temporal objects. See here for a detailed outline of the book -- which I aim to have completed by 1 July 2026.

In addition to the above monograph, I've also recently been working on a novel theory of properties as troversals and on Realism. With regard to properties, I argue that our best account of properties borrows certain aspects from Armstrongian universalism and certain aspects from trope theory. I call properties so understood "troversals", tro- from "trope" and -versal from "universal". See below for summaries of a current series of papers on troversals. With regard to Realism, I argue that defining Realism in terms of mind-independence is archaic and anthropocentric. I'm currently trying to come up with a better, 21st century, version of Realism.

Each January I compile a list of all the metaphysics articles from the previous year that I ought to have read and post it in the Metaphysics Digest, https://sites.google.com/site/metaphysics digest/. From 2010 to 2020, I organized the Australian Metaphysics Conference (AMC) which was held every eighteen months at the ANU's Kioloa Coastal Campus in NSW, see here for summaries of past conferences: https://sites.google.com/view/australiametaphysicsconference/home. In June 2026 I'll be hosting the first Conference on Deep Metaphysics in Bonaire, see here: https://sites.google.com/view/cdm2026/home.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS (click on title for link to article)

Odd Objects: LEM Violations and Indeterminacy (Erkenntnis 2021)

I argue there are some objects which do not respect the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM), i.e., which are such that, for some property F, the disjunction Fo v ~Fo fails to be true. I call such objects "odd objects" and present three examples -- fictional objects, nonsort objects, and quantum objects. I argue that each of these objects is best understood as violating LEM. I, then, discuss Jessica Wilson's (LEM-respecting) account of metaphysical indeterminacy. I show how the indeterminacy which arises with odd objects can be accounted for on Wilson's account. I, then, argue that my Wilson-inspired, but non-LEM-respecting, account of metaphysical indeterminacy is superior to Wilson's in terms of costs and benefits.

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism (Metaphysics, 2018)

The view that ordinary objects are constituted by matter and form ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the view that ordinary objects are constituted by matter alone ("matter-only"). I argue that hylomorphic views have an advantage over matter-only views when it comes to grounding an object's modal properties. I, then, defend a response-dependent hylomorphic account of ordinary objects and argue that it fairs even better than non-response-dependent hylomorphic views with regard to grounding objects' modal properties.

Bridging the Modal Gap (Journal of Philosophy, 2010)

I argue that standard Realists about ordinary objects (e.g. Kripke, Bealer) cannot tell a satisfactory epistemological story with regard to our knowledge of the modal properties of ordinary objects. I suggest that this gives us reason to endorse some ontology other than standard Realism.

Are Modal Facts Brute Facts? (Brute Facts, OUP, 2018)

Modality appears to be all around us: water molecules are necessarily H20; it's necessary that if something is a cat, then it's a mammal; it's possible for you to wear brown shoes. The implausibility of eliminativism about modality combined with the lack of an ontologically conservative, genuinely reductive account of modality lends a prima facie plausibility to modal primitivism. Despite this prima facie plausibility, I argue that modal primitivism is ultimately untenable. I first discuss what brute modality is, what the prima facie reasons for endorsing it are, and why philosophers have, in general, been so keen to avoid it. I, then, argue that there's a plausible form of modal reductionism which has, thus far, been overlooked in the literature. Namely, a reductive account which proceeds via providing a reductive account of the existence of objects which have modal properties rather than via providing a reductive account of objects' instantiation of modal properties. Ultimately, I argue that -- in light of the availability of this new way of reducing modality -- modal reductionism is preferable to modal primitivism. Modal facts are not brute.

The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing (Metaphysica, 2022)

Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.

Creationism,Easy Ontology, and Indeterminacy (Philosophers in Depth: Amie Thomasson, 2023)

Creationists about fictional objects are committed to the following two claims: (i) fictional objects exist, and (ii) many of a fictional object's properties are determined by the author of the fiction. I argue that, despite their protestations to the contrary, these two claims inexorably commit the Creationist to indeterminacy.

The Anti-Realist Bogeyman (And How to Avoid Him) (Philosophia, 2022)

I distinguish Local Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing some of the objects we have epistemic access to) from Global Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing all of the objects we have epistemic access to). I explicate and clarify Local Constructivism and show how the metaphysical concerns which motivate endorsing Local Constructivism about some objects (e.g. social objects, modal objects) differ from the epistemic and semantic concerns which motive endorsing Global Constructivism. I, then, examine the criticisms Realists typically present against Constructivism. I argue that, although these criticisms undermine Global Constructivism, Local Constructivism is immune to them. If one has anti-Realist inclinations, but wishes to avoid the morass anti-Realism usually falls into (aka: anti-Realist Bogeyman), one should endorse Local, rather than Global, Constructivism.

Constructivism in Metaphysics (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020)

An overview of constructivism in analytic metaphysics.

The Role of Structure (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014)

In this critical notice of Ted Sider's Writing the Book of the World, I look at what structure is and at the arguments for structure.

Change and Identity Over Time (Blackwell's Companion to Philosophy of Time 2013)

What is at stake when we're concerned with the change and identity of objects over time? I examine the three most common accounts of persistence over time: endurantism, perdurantism, and exdurantism. The main arguments for and objections to each view are considered. I note that there's no reason to think all objects persist in the same way and briefly examine pluralism about persistence.

Why Being Necessary Really Isn't the Same as Being Not Possibly Not (Acta Analytica 2015)

Standardly, □ ≡ ~◊~ and ◊ ≡ ~□~. I, first, examine why in tense logic Arthur Prior thinks that ~◊~ is weaker than □ and ~□~ is weaker than ◊. I, then, examine whether there are similar motivations in modal logic to take ~◊~ to be weaker than □ and ~□~ to be weaker than ◊. The upshot is that, just as certain metaphysical views within the philosophy of time (e.g. Presentism) motivate one to deny the standard tense equivalences, certain metaphysical views within the metaphysics of modality (e.g. Contingentism, nonmodalism) motivate one to deny the standard modal equivalences.

Events (Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018)

An examination of the nature of events. Section I provides an overview of the metaphysics of events. Sections II-VI address the views of Roderick Chisholm, W.V.O. Quine, Donald Davidson, Jaegwon Kim, and David Lewis. Section VII considers the ways in which events are and are not similar to near-by ontological categories, such as states, facts, and objects. Section VIII provides an overview of the semantics of events.

SOME WORKS IN PROGRESS (abstracts only)

Protecting Our Daughters: Harvey Weinstein, Stanley Milgram, and the Cult of Compliance

The film She Said includes a wire tape recording in which Harvey Weinstein is trying to persuade Ambra Gutierrez to come to his room; she is resisting. When I heard this, I immediately thought of three things: (1) Look how similar the language Weinstein uses to persuade Guiteirrez to his bed is to the language Milgram used sixty years ago in his obedience to authority experiments to persuade men to electrically shock. (2) Look how similar the language Weinstein uses is to the language I use to persuade my daughter to get her immunization shots. (3) Is the way we raise our daughters -- particularly e.g., when we force them to do things with their bodies they don't want to do (such as getting shots, taking baths, combing their hair) inadvertently making them more vulnerable to predators like Weinstein by teaching them resistance is futile? In this talk I examine (i) the ways in which we persuade others to do things that, reflectively, they don't really want to do, (ii) why people generally comply so readily, (iii) the after-effects of complying, and (iv) how we can inure ourselves from complying with commands we don't really want to obey.

Sparse Properties as Troversals (vs. Universals & Tropes)

Those wanting an account of properties which is sparse, naturalistic, and permits only instantiated properties have long had two views to chose between: universals and tropes. So bifurcating the choice leaves out an important position: troversals. Troversals share some features with universals ( there's only one troversal being gold just as there's only one universal being gold) and some features with tropes (a rejection of multi-location). Hence, "troversal": tro- from "trope" and -versal from "universal". I think troversals are superior to both universals and tropes. But I won't try to convince you of that here. My aim is more modest: (i) to show what troversals are, (ii) to show that they can do the same property work done by universals and tropes, (iii) to show the advantages of endorsing troversals, and (iv) to show that there is no objection to troversals so glaring that troversals deserve to be booted from the property options table. There are objections to troversal theory, but these objections are no worse that those to universals or tropes; some may even find the objections to troversals pale in comparison to the objections to universals and tropes.

Abundant Properties as Troversals (vs. Platonic Properties & Lewisian Properties)

I defend a novel account of properties as mereologically complex entities which contain a qualitative-character parthood slot and a having-instances parthood slot. I call properties which have this mereological structure "troversals". I argue that a troversal's qualitative- character parthood slot is always filled by exactly one qualitative- character part which is itself a mereological simple. I argue that whether a troversal's having-instances parthood slot is filled depends on whether it has instances. A troversal has one having-instances part for each instance of instantiation. I call these having-instances parts "q-parts" for "qualitative-part". Q-parts are themselves mereological simples. Uninstantiated troversals have no q-parts. I argue that the troversal account of properties is superior to the Platonic account and to Lewisian class nominalism.

Properties as Troversals

I present and defend a novel account of properties as troversals. I argue that, although troversal theory borrows various elements from the Big Four views of properties (i.e., Platonic, Armstrongian, trope theory, Lewisian class nominalism), it is a novel view which falls under the aegis of none of these other property views. I highlight the advantages of troversal theory and respond to some objections to it. Ultimately I conclude that troversal theory compares favorably with the Big Four views and, thus, deserves a seat at the property options table.

Realism in a Post-Cartesian World

Realism is standardly understood as involving an existence clause and an independence clause. I argue that, although thinking of Realism this way is useful if one's goal is to understand historically what people have been up to in the (ontological) Realism/anti-Realism debate that traces back to the British Empiricists, it's not a particularly good definition of Realism. First off, it doesn't capture our intuitions about Realism. In support of this, I present several counterexamples to the independence clause and argue that, far from being constitutive of Realism, independence is actually orthogonal to Realism. Secondly, it doesn't trace out a metaphysically important distinction. That is, Realism understand in terms of existence and independence does not carve nature at the (Siderian) joints. Given that it neither matches our intuitions (about cases) nor carves nature at the joints, there's very little -- other than historical precedence -- to recommend understanding Realism in terms of existence and independence. I close by briefly examining what should play the role independence has hitherto played in defining Realism.