Research

Abstract: A counterpart of what is known as “European exceptionalism”—political stability and institutional arrangement that enabled modern economic growth and political development—is a “Chinese anomaly.” This anomaly takes the form of a sharp contrast with pre-modern Europe: Chinese imperial rulers stayed in power longer than their European counterparts but this political stability was accompanied by a high level of institutional stasis. In this paper, we argue that a well-known Chinese institution, the civil service examination (CSE) system, contributed to China’s imperial longevity. We utilize detailed historical data on individual CSE performance to demonstrate the longevity-contributory mechanisms of CSE—constraining access to power by aristocrats and other wealth-holders. We argue that a key to unpacking the so-called “Chinese anomaly” is to understand the role of bureaucracy in political development in China and potentially in other regions.

Abstract: This paper investigates meritocracy as a power-sharing institution in authoritarian regimes. A critical source of instability in historical states was the mismatch between de jure institutions and de facto political power. We propose a formal theory to investigate the implication of meritocracy on ruler-elite power dynamics. Meritocracy can benefit the ruler by enabling him to co-opt high-ability agents, and it can serve as a credible commitment device in authoritarian regimes with no enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, unlike other power-sharing institutions, such as parliament, which function better under a balanced power distribution, meritocracy is more likely to emerge endogenously under strong rulers. In a dynamic setting, as inspired by Greif and Laitin (2004), we show that meritocracy under a strong ruler is self-enforcing and reinforcing, while that under a weak ruler can be self-undermining. We examine historical case studies and empirical evidence based on a panel of 289 historical polities. The empirical result confirms a positive association between meritocracy and autocracy.