My research interests are in the areas of Applied Microeconomics: Experimental/ Behavioral Economics, Applied Microeconometrics, Labor Economics, and Health Economics. Below are abstracts from several of my working papers.
Abstracts
Social Information and Gender Differences in Competitive Preferences
I examine the effect of social information on gender differences in selection into a winner-take-all tournament using a simple addition task. Participants perform this task in multiple rounds and are then asked to select into a competitive or non-competitive pay scheme. Prior to choosing their payment schemes, participants are shown selected results about average performance and choices in a similar experiment. I find that the inclusion of social information eliminates any extant gender gap in competitive choices in every treatment. The reduction in the gender gap is not due to greater efficiency of choices by men or women, even though inefficient choices by low performing individuals are mostly eliminated. Rather, the inclusion of feedback causes men and women to select into a competitive pay scheme in a similar manner, which thereby removes the gender gap. I find that the existence, or lack, of a tournament entry gap is weakly consistent with participants' competitive preferences.
Can Loss Framing Improve Coordination in the Minimum Effort Game?
I study how framing payoffs as losses affects group coordination using the minimum effort game. Previous literature shows groups as small as four have a difficult time coordinating on an efficient outcome, even in the presence of higher payoffs for more efficient outcomes. Though penalties for inefficient coordination behavior have been studied in a variety of contexts, the role of losses on coordination behavior has not. Loss framing has been shown to induce more efficient actions in a variety of other areas, since individuals tend to be more sensitive to losses than gains. I examine the framing effect of losses, specifically if framing payoffs as losses can lead to payoff dominant coordination, using three treatments. These treatments help tease out the effects and dynamics of coordination behavior when payoffs are framed as losses. I find that framing payoffs as losses leads to an improvement in coordination, demonstrating the robustness of loss framing in the setting of the minimum effort game.
The Effect of an Increased Minimum Smoking Age on Smoking and Alcohol Consumption: Evidence from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
I study the role of minimum smoking age policies on cigarette and alcohol consumption. Minimum smoking age policies have been in effect for over 20 years, yet we still know little about their effects on risky behaviors. Many states have a minimum smoking age of 18, which makes it difficult to estimate the impact of this policy, given the multitude of other major life changes that occur at age 18. However, some states have a minimum smoking age of 19. Assessing the policy at this age should offer a cleaner pathway to estimate the effect of this policy. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design and data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), I assess how age 19 minimum smoking laws affect consumption of alcohol and smoking. I find that despite the discontinuous decrease in the cost of smoking at age 19, smoking behavior is unaffected in states who observe this policy. Because I find no relationship between the age 19 policy and smoking behavior, I am unable to say anything about how the policy affects alcohol, which does not change at the age 19 threshold.
Future Research Agenda
My research focuses on preferences and policies which affect economic decision making, whether in a laboratory or real-world setting. My desire is to further pursue this research in the coming years. My current work with gender differences in competitive preferences is an area with a wealth of possibilities for future research. After seeing the results in my above paper, I would like to see if feedback, even more simple than the social information provided, would be successful in alleviating the gender gap in competitive entry. Another extension of this research is to evaluate how competitive preferences may extend to behavior in other areas. For instance, I am curious how competitive preferences might affect bidding behavior in auction markets. I plan to develop an experiment to this effect, incorporating some of the structure from my above work. Coordination in the loss domain is an area that is not very well served in the literature thus far. Keeping in line with the framing effect of losses, I would like to extend this analysis to different coordination games. I am also interested in continuing to assess the effects of risky behaviors, and their consequences. Recently I have become interested in economic education at a more profound level, and intend to to contribute to this research stream. These areas represent a promising way forward, and I wish to continue working on projects like these in the future. I hope that I can contribute to better understanding of these issues, and have the opportunity to work with my future colleagues to this end.