PROSEMINAR
Instructor: Dr. Chiara Brozzo, CIN Philosophy of Neuroscience Group
E-mail address: chiara.brozzo@gmail.com
Office hours: by appointment (get in touch via e-mail)
Summer 2014
Wednesdays, 12-2pm (CT), Raum X, Die Burse
***Starting 30th April 2014***
Seminar cross-listed in:
Tübingen Philosophy
Tübingen Cognitive Science Program
Tübingen Medicine
Max Planck Neural and Behavioural Graduate School
Course description:
The aim of this course is twofold. On the one hand, from an agent’s point of view, we shall explore what characterizes a certain event as a person’s action, the nature of agency, reasons for action, and what it is for an individual to know her own actions. On the other hand, from an observer’s point of view, we are going to gather insight into what it is to understand another’s action, within the more general framework of mindreading. Mindreading is the ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, to another individual. It is the sort of ability that is required when we want to understand in what mental state a given person is at a given moment, in the light of both her other mental states that are known to us (e.g., beliefs, desires) and the circumstances she’s in. The latter topic is going to be linked to recent research in the neurophysiology of action—specifically, to mirror neurons and their role in social cognition.
Seminar format:
10 sessions of 2 hours each. Each seminar will consist in the introduction to the topic by the instructor, followed by a discussion of the assigned paper.
Taking the seminar for credit:
Students taking the seminar for credit will be required to do the following:
1. Regularly attend classes and participate in discussion;
2. Write a 1500 word essay at the end of the first course unit (deadline: 11th June 2014)
3. Write a 2000 word essay at the end of the second course unit (deadline: 7th September 2014)
The grade will be determined as follows:
1. Attendance and participation in discussion: 20%
2. First essay: 30%
3. Second essay: 50%
Auditing the seminar:
Students not taking the seminar for credit are welcome to audit the seminar.
Prerequisites:
One course in philosophy of mind / philosophy of psychology and neuroscience would be helpful, but not necessary.
Weekly schedule and readings (subject to changes):
UNIT 1: ACTION THEORY
SEMINAR 1
30th April 2014
Introduction. Agency
Velleman, J. D. (1992). What happens when someone acts? Mind, 461-481.
SEMINAR 2
7th May 2014
Identifying with an action
Continuing on Velleman's "What happens when someone acts?"
Frankfurt, H. G. (1987). Identification and Wholeheartedness.
SEMINAR 3
14th May 2014
Causal explanation for action
Hornsby, J. (1993). Agency and causal explanation.
SEMINAR 4
21st May 2014
Reasons and intentional actions
Hursthouse, R. (1991). Arational actions. Journal of Philosophy, 88(2), 57-68.
28th May 2014
***NO SEMINAR***
SEMINAR 5
4th June 2014
Practical reasoning and knowledge of action
Falvey, K. (2000). Knowledge in Intention. Philosophical Studies, 99(1), 21-44.
Background: Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957). Intention. Oxford: Blackwell, esp. pp. 35-ff.
11th June 2014
***NO SEMINAR***
18th June 2014
***NO SEMINAR – FIRST ESSAY DUE***
UNIT 2: ACTION UNDERSTANDING
SEMINAR 6
25th June 2014 ***note change of time (13-14 instead of 12-14)***
Folk psychology and Theory Theory
Stich, S., & Ravenscroft, I. (1994). What is folk psychology? Cognition, 50(1), 447-468.
SEMINAR 7
2nd July 2014
Theory Theory and Simulation Theory
Continuing on Stich & Ravenscroft's "What is folk psychology?"
Stich, S., & Nichols, S. (1992). Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory? Mind & Language, 7(1‐2), 35-71.
SEMINAR 8
9th July 2014
Continuing on Stich & Nichols' "Folk psychology. Simulation or tacit theory?"
SEMINAR 9
11th July 2014 ***note change of day (Friday) and time (18-20)***
Two systems for belief reasoning
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?. Psychological review, 116(4), 953.
Butterfill, S. A., & Apperly, I. A. (2013). How to construct a minimal theory of mind. Mind & Language, 28(5), 606-637.
SEMINAR 10
16th July 2014
Mirroring and its role in social cognition
Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2010). The functional role of the parieto-frontal mirror circuit: interpretations and misinterpretations. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(4), 264-274.
Goldman, A. I. (2009). Mirroring, simulating and mindreading. Mind & Language, 24(2), 235-252.