Carlos J. Serrano
Carlos Serrano is an Associate Professor of Economics and Management at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. He is also an Affiliated Professor at the Barcelona School of Economics and the Barcelona School of Management.
Professor Serrano's research and teaching interests are focused on innovation, strategy, entrepreneurship and the financing of entrepreneurial activity. His research focuses on the market for patents, the venture capital industry, and the value and use of patents for technology startups. In addition to his doctorate degree in Economics from the University of Minnesota in 2006, he holds a BSc in Economics from Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, a MSc in Economics from the University College London, and a MA in Economics from the University of Minnesota.
Serrano's research has been published in top tier journals including the Journal of Financial Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Strategic Management Journal, the International Economic Review, and Science and has been presented at numerous universities and government agencies.
Prior to his appointment at Pompeu Fabra, Serrano taught at the University of Toronto (2005-2012), University of Minnesota (2002-2004), and was a Research Analyst at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2002-2005).
Serrano's Google Scholar profile can be found here
Information Disclosure and the Market for Acquiring Technology Companies
The market for acquiring technology companies is rife with information frictions. Although such frictions can stifle trading activity, they also provide room for strategic gain. We investigate this dual role of information frictions by exploiting an institutional reform that releases technological information to the public domain. Leveraging cross-sectoral variation in the magnitude of disclosure, we find an increase in acquisition activity and in the technological distance between matched pairings. In line with predictions from strategic factor market theory, however, we also find a disproportionate erosion in returns to acquirers better shielded by private sources of information in the pre-reform era. Our findings suggest that information disclosed through the reform facilitated exchange in the takeover market yet had a leveling effect on the returns to acquirers. Published in 2021 at the Strategic Management Journal [Link to Journal] [Version in pdf]
Strategic Management Society Annual Conference Competitive Strategy IG Best Reviewer Award 2021, September 2021.
My paper with G. Chondrakis and R. Ziedonis, "Information disclosure and the market for acquiring technology companies," has been published in the May 2021 issue of the Strategic Management Journal. [Link]
I recently became a member of the Research Committee of the TIM Division of the Academy of Management, as well as member of the Executive Committee of the Strategy, Entrepreneurship, and Innovation Consortium.