Jack, B.K. and N. Ryan (2026) “Economic Development and the Environment” Handbook of Development Economics, Dupas, Goldberg and Pande, Eds. Elsevier. Forthcoming.
Aker, J., J. Burney, A. Campion, B.K. Jack and C. Liao (2026) “How Many (Half) Moons? Measuring Technology Adoption, From the Sky and on the Ground” American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 116:173-177. Appendix.
Abajian, A., C. Cole, B.K. Jack, K. Meng and M. Visser (2025) "Dodging Day Zero: Drought, Adaptation, and Inequality in Cape Town" Journal of the European Economic Association, jvaf045. Appendix.
Jack, B.K., S. Jayachandran, N. Kala and R. Pande (2025) "Money (not) to burn: Payments for ecosystem services to reduce crop residue burning" American Economic Review: Insights, 7(1): 39-55.
Aker, J. and B.K. Jack (2025) “Harvesting the rain: The adoption of environmental technologies in the Sahel” Review of Economics and Statistics, 107(5): 1197-1214. Appendix.
Carleton, T., E. Duflo, B.K. Jack and G. Záppala (2024) "Adaptation to Climate Change" Handbook of the Economics of Climate Change, Barrage and Hsiang, Eds. Elsevier.
Jack, B.K., S. Jayachandran, F. Malagutti and S. Rao (2024) “Environmental externalities and intrahousehold inefficiency” Journal of Development Economics, 170.
Kar, A., T. Tawiah, L. Graham, G. Owusu-Amankwah, M. Daouda, F. Malagutti, S. Chillrud, S. Iddrisu, E. Apraku, R. Tetteh, B.K. Jack, S. Abubakari, D. Jack, K.P. Asante (2024) “Factors associated with the use of liquefied petroleum gas in Ghana vary at different stages of transition” Nature Energy, 9: 434-445.
Fehr, D., G. Fink and B.K. Jack (2022) “Poor and rational: Decision-making under scarcity” Journal of Political Economy, 130(11): 2862-2897.
Jack, B.K., K. McDermott and A. Sautmann (2022) "Multiple price lists for willingness to pay elicitation." Journal of Development Economics, 159. Technical appendix. Implementation package.
Fink, G., B.K. Jack and F. Masiye (2020) “Seasonal liquidity, rural labor markets and agricultural production” American Economic Review, 110(11): 3351–3392. Appendix.
Pilot study: 2014 NBER Working Paper 20218.
Jack, B.K. and G. Smith (2020) “Charging ahead: Prepaid electricity metering in South Africa” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12(2): 134-168.
Oliva, P., B.K. Jack, S. Bell, C. Severen and E. Walker (2020) “Technology adoption under uncertainty: Take-up and subsequent investment in Zambia” Appendix Review of Economics and Statistics, 102(3): 617-632.
Cole, H., B.K. Jack, D. Strong and B. Maughan-Brown (2020). “City of Cape Town, South Africa: Aligning Internal Data Capabilities with External Research Partnerships” in Handbook on Using Administrative Data for Research and Evidence-based Policy, S. Cole, I. Dhaliwal, A. Sautmann and L. Vilhuber, Eds.
Jack, B.K. and S. Jayachandran (2019) "Self-selection into payments for ecosystem services programs" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(12): 5326-5333.
Guiteras, R. and B.K. Jack (2018) “Productivity in piece rate labor markets” Journal of Development Economics, 131: 42-61.
Jack, B.K. (2017) “Environmental economics in developing countries: Introduction to the Special Issue” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 86: 1-7.
Jack, B.K. and G. Smith. (2015) “Pay as you go: Pre-paid metering and electricity expenditures in South Africa” American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 105(5): 237-41.
Jack, B.K. and M. Recalde (2015) “Local leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods: Field evidence from Bolivia” Journal of Public Economics, 122: 80-93.
Greenstone, M. and B.K. Jack (2015) “Envirodevonomics: A research agenda for an emerging field” Journal of Economic Literature, 53(1): 5-42.
Greenstone, M. and B.K. Jack (2019). "Environmental Economics in Developing Countries" in Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings (Seventh Edition), Robert Stavins, Ed., Edward Elgar.
Ashraf, N., O. Bandiera and B.K. Jack (2014) “No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery“ Journal of Public Economics, 120: 1-17.
Jack, B.K. (2013) “Private information and the allocation of land use subsidies in Malawi” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(3): 113-135.
Ashraf, N., B.K. Jack and E. Kamenica (2013) “Information and subsidies: Complements or substitutes?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 88: 133-139.
Ajayi, O.C., B.K. Jack and B. Leimona (2012) “Auction design for the private provision of public goods in developing countries: Lessons from payments for environmental services in Malawi and Indonesia” World Development 40(6): 1213-1223.
Jack, B.K., B. Leimona and P.J. Ferraro (2009) “A revealed preference approach to estimating supply curves for ecosystem services: Experimental field auctions and soil erosion control in Indonesia” Conservation Biology 23(2): 359-367.
Jack, B.K., C. Kousky and K.R.E. Sims (2008). “Designing payments for ecosystem services: Lessons from previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105: 9465-9470.
Augenblick, N., B.K. Jack, S. Kaur, F. Masiye and N. Swanson "Retrieval Failures and Consumption Smoothing: A Field Experiment on Seasonal Hunger" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Conditionally accepted.
Abubakari, S., K.P. Asante, M. Daouda, B.K. Jack, D. Jack, F. Malagutti and P. Oliva "Targeting subsidies through price menus: Menu design and evidence from clean fuels" Journal of Political Economy, Revise and resubmit. Appendix. Online supplement.
Jack, B.K. and K. Walker "Integrating remote sensing and randomized controlled trials: Challenges, opportunities and practical guidance" Prepared for Geospatial Impact Evaluation: Integration of Earth Observation with Impact Evaluations, BenYishay, Singh and Zanuso, Eds. Taylor & Francis.
Jack, B.K. “Market inefficiencies and the adoption of agricultural technologies in developing countries” White paper prepared for the Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative, JPAL (MIT) / CEGA (Berkeley).
Collateral accounts: Debt recovery through prepaid electricity metering (with J. Cross and A. Jensen)
Abstract: Much of the literature on tax compliance has focused on evasion. Delinquency is an equally pervasive problem in developing countries, yet less is known about the effectiveness or distributional impacts of efforts to address delinquency. We study a program in Cape Town, South Africa that enrolls household with delinquent municipal tax and service accounts in an aggressive debt recovery program that leverages linkages across municipal accounts. Specifically, households in Cape Town receive electricity through prepaid meters, that require advance purchase of electricity, thereby eliminating arrears in electricity payments. When households reach high levels of billing debts, these debts are recovered through electricity purchases. We exploit program rules surrounding eligibility and targeting to recover a price elasticity of demand for electricity, cross-price elasticity of water demand, and the overall revenue impacts of the program, inclusive of demand responses. We also assess the welfare consequences of debt recovery, both for targeted households and for the population as a whole. Our findings highlight the importance of digitization and linking of government databases for state capacity.
The supernatural and the commons (with C. Costello and T. Bambridge)
Abstract: We examine whether beliefs in supernatural punishment can coordinate resource extraction in the commons. Traditional small-scale religious belief systems around the world often include restrictions on the use of natural resources, such as fish, forests and specific species, that result in supernatural punishment if violated. Motivated by specific regularities documented in the anthropological literature, and by the Rāhui of Polynesian cultures in particular, we introduce beliefs about supernatural punishment into a standard commons model for which the tragedy of the commons is the no-regulation equilibrium. Here, players form beliefs about whether they will be punished, for example via sickness or misfortune, for violating extraction norms, even when their extraction is private information. We show that sufficiently strong beliefs can sustain fully cooperative behavior even in the complete absence of formal rules, monitoring, or punishment. We then introduce the possibility of learning about the supernatural, where agents can violate norms and learn (albeit noisily) about true supernatural punishment. Even in this setting, certain belief structures can sustain cooperation indefinitely. Comparative statics reveal the features of a belief system under which cooperation is sustained or unravels. We develop a new database of traditional belief systems around the world, providing empirical support for our theoretical predictions.
Health Insurance for Seasonal Savings: Evidence from Rural Côte d'Ivoire (with D. Daouda, G. Fink, and R. Strobl)
Abstract: Households in low-income agricultural economies face large seasonal fluctuations in income and limited access to financial tools for smoothing consumption. In such settings, health insurance can serve not only as risk protection, but also as a state-contingent savings technology, transferring resources from high-income harvest periods to low-income lean periods. We study the rollout of Côte d'Ivoire's national health insurance scheme in a context with high morbidity, substantial out-of-pocket expenditures, and pronounced income seasonality---conditions under which the potential welfare gains from insurance are particularly large. Using a randomized subsidy design among 2,468 cocoa-farming households, we show that insurance demand is highly responsive to both price and cash-on-hand liquidity. Despite strong demand and actuarially favorable pricing, we find limited effects on health spending or consumption. We show that this disconnect arises from frictions in accessing benefits, including weak verification and reimbursement environments that limit providers' willingness to honor coverage without immediate proof. Our results highlight the importance of implementation, trust, and contract enforceability in determining the welfare impacts of social insurance.