Research
Here are abstracts and copies of my published and forthcoming papers. Please cite the published versions where possible. I always appreciate comments or questions, which you can send by email.
Teaching
Engaging Classroom Observation: A Brief Measure of Active Learning in the College Classroom, (second author with Chase Young and George Kevin Randall) Active Learning in Higher Education (Online First, February 15, 2024)
The purpose of this study was to develop a valid, reliable, and brief measure of active learning in college classrooms that is cheap and easy to complete and yields results that faculty can easily use to inform their development as instructors. Initial construct and face validity was achieved by modifying existing instruments and creating a draft of a brief measure of active learning for external expert review. Following the suggested revisions, the engaging classroom observation was then piloted and revised as necessary. Reliability was tested and measures of internal consistency and interrater reliability were acceptable. A principal component analysis showed two components that were moderately correlated, which indicated the potential they could be combined. An Exploratory Factor Analysis confirmed the instrument is measuring one factor, which we propose as active learning. This study is significant because it offers a brief instrument based on students’ perceptions that can be used formatively by faculty.
Don't Believe the Hype: Why ChatGPT May Breathe New Life into College Writing Instruction, Teaching Philosophy (OnlineFirst)
This paper argues that the threat Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, pose to writing instruction is both not entirely new and a welcome disruption to the way writing instruction is typically delivered. This new technology seems to be prompting many instructors to question whether essay responses to paper prompts reflect students' own thinking and learning. This uneasiness is long overdue, and the hope is it leads instructors to explore evidence-based best practices familiar from the scholarship of teaching and learning. We’ve known for some time how to better teach our students to think and write. Perhaps the arrival of LLMs will get us to put these lessons into widespread practice.
Generating Ownership of Learning and Community in the Classroom through an Interconnected Sequence of Assignments (APA Studies on Teaching Philosophy 22 (Fall 2022): 2-8.
Here I describe a course structure I’ve been developing and refining over the past several years that has engendered robust student ownership of learning in my classes and, as a result, promoted collaborative, engaged classrooms and increased student success. My plan is to describe the course structure, explain some of the key motivations behind the various interlocking elements, and share some anecdotal evidence of its effectiveness as well as comments about modifications and challenges. My aim is to share with others something that has worked incredibly well for me and my students; my hope is that something in here will work for you and your students.
Racism
Racism Is Necessarily Immoral, Social Theory and Practice (forthcoming)
Not only do philosophers disagree about what racism is, but they also disagree about how to account for its moral status. Just about everyone in the philosophical literature, no matter their account of racism, adopts one of two views about the immorality of racist conduct. They either take the immorality of racist conduct to be a function of the attitudes that issue in it or they take it to be a function of the societally-imposed harms that result from it. This article seeks to show that neither view captures the complete picture. To properly account for the full range of cases, it helps to invoke a distinction between two senses of “immoral”: impermissible and blameworthy. Doing so allows us to appreciate that racism is necessarily immoral, just not always in the same way.
A View of Racism: 2016 and America's Original Sin (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 13 (March 2018): 53-72)
The 2016 US Election and its aftermath have renewed anti-racist activism on the American left. This article takes a close look at familiar philosophical analyses of racism and argues that they have two shortcomings: (1) they do not offer proper guidance in combating racism, and (2) they do not adequately represent the historical relationship between race and racism. A different view of racism, one that adopts a genealogical, as opposed to analytical, approach is laid out. And it is argued that this view is better able to account for what racism is and to guide the anti-racist response called for by current events.
A View of Racism-accepted version.pdf
Unraveling the Knot: On Race, Racism, and Human History (Think 17 (Autumn 2018): 61-74)
This article argues for a shift in our thinking about racism. There are two main philosophical approaches at present: the moral view, which analyzes racism in terms of individuals' attitudes, and the political view, which analyzes it in terms of institutions. But neither is fully satisfactory. So I propose an alternative, genealogical account, which is better equipped to explain the phenomena associated with racism and is more in line with the historical record.
Unraveling the Knot-penultimate.pdf
Action
On Valuing (to be presented at NOWAR 2023)
Many philosophers no longer accept the view that to value something just is to believe that it is good. Contemporary accounts of the attitude of valuing tend to characterize it as involving, not just evaluative judgment, but also emotional, desiderative, and deliberative dispositions. Though an improvement, it’s argued here this doesn’t go far enough. This paper sketches a fully dispositional account of valuing, presents some considerations in its favor, defends it against some objections, and shows how taking it seriously can inform a variety of debates.
In Defense of the Platonic Model: A Reply to Buss (Ethics 124 (Jan. 2014): 342-357)
Sarah Buss has recently argued that endorsement theories of autonomy face three problems: they conflate autonomous agency with agency simpliciter, they face a vicious regress, and they get the extension of autonomous actions wrong. I argue that one such theory, Gary Watson’s Platonic Model, is not subject to any of these problems. I conclude that Buss has not given us reason to reject the Platonic Model and that it may be compatible with her own theory of accountability.
The Platonic Model: Statement, Clarification and Defense (Philosophical Explorations 18(3): 378-392)
I motivate a novel understanding of the debate about which theory of self-governance is best and show that it has special features that undermine the effectiveness of a common argument form. Though counterexamples are commonly offered to discredit rival theories, the most that can be established, in this debate, by appeal to cases are substantive points of disagreement between theories. These disagreements can be traced to distinct background commitments about what is fundamental to self-governing agency, and these commitments, I argue, are not fit to be impugned on the basis of cases.
How Not To Argue About Self-Governance Phil Exp Final.docx
Aligning with the Good (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy (July 2015))
I argue that Michael Bratman's Frankfurtian challenge to Sharon Street's constructivism misses its target.
Moral Philosophy
Commentary: Three Views on Morality, Critical Thinking, and Education (Critical thinking and moral development: Philosophy, psychology, education, and assessment (D. Fasko & F. Fair, eds., Brill, forthcoming))
This commentary addresses the three chapters in this section: first, with an eye towards summarizing the authors’ main points; second, with attention to the value of examining the ways in which one’s moral theoretic commitments entail commitments in other areas, such as one’s conception of human rationality and proper education; and third, with critical attention to some areas that would benefit from further discussion.
Deep Reflection: In Defense of Korsgaard’s Orthodox Kantianism (Res Philosophica 93 (1): 1-25)
This paper defends the Kantian moral theory developed by Christine Korsgaard against the charge that it does not establish that immorality is always irrational because moral obligations are inescapable and overriding. I argue, first, that G. A. Cohen makes too much of the difference between Korsgaard and Kant on the source of moral norms and that we can appeal to what she says about practical reason in an early paper of hers in order to handle his Mafioso case. Next, I take up J. David Velleman’s recent treatment of Korsgaard’s view in response to Cohen’s Mafioso case. I show that Velleman’s argument that her view is concessive conflates his own view of human agency with Korsgaard’s practical identity theory. My hope is that this discussion shows how Korsgaard’s view can be made to work as an orthodox Kantianism.
Death and Immortality
Near-death experiences offer a glimpse not only into the nature of death but also into the meaning of life. They are not only useful tools to aid in the human quest to understand death but are also deeply meaningful, transformative experiences for the people who have them.
In a unique contribution to the growing and popular literature on the subject, philosophers John Martin Fischer and Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin examine prominent near-death experiences, such as those of Pam Reynolds, Eben Alexander and Colton Burpo. They combine their investigations with critiques of the narratives' analysis by those who take them to show that our minds are immaterial and heaven is for real. In contrast, the authors provide a blueprint for a science-based explanation. Focusing on the question of whether near-death experiences provide evidence that consciousness is separable from our brains and bodies, Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin give a naturalistic account of the profound meaning and transformative effects that these experiences engender in many. This book takes the reality of near-death experiences seriously. But it also shows that understanding them through the tools of science is completely compatible with acknowledging their profound meaning.
Reviewed at The Philosophical Quarterly
Reviewed at the Los Angeles Review of Books
The Near-Death Experience Argument Against Physicalism: A Critique (w/ John Martin Fischer) (Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 21, No. 7-8 (July/Aug. 2014): 158-183)
Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, including the mind. Some have argued that Near-Death Experiences (NDEs), conscious experiences during episodes, such as cardiac arrest, when one’s normal brain functions are severely impaired, tell against physicalism and in favor of an alternative conception of the mind as non-localized and immaterial. In this paper, we consider in detail Pim van Lommel’s recent attempt to do so. Our main contentions are, first, that it is not clear that physicalism cannot accommodate the phenomena of NDEs and, second, that it is not clear how the conception of the mind as non-localized and immaterial is supposed to help.
Immortality and Boredom (w/ John Martin Fischer) (The Journal of Ethics 18 (Dec. 2014): 353-372)
In this paper, we aim to clarify and evaluate the contention that immortality would be necessarily boring (the Necessary Boredom Thesis). It will emerge that, just as there are various importantly different kinds of immortality, there are various distinct kinds of boredom. To evaluate the Necessary Boredom Thesis, we need to specify the kind of immortality and the kind of boredom. We argue against the thesis, on various specifications of ‘immortality’ and ‘boredom.’
(Not) Riding Into the Sunset: The Significance of Endings (w/ John Martin Fischer) (Reflections on Responsibility: Essays in Honor of Peter French (Zachary J. Goldberg, ed., Springer, 2017))
Peter French contrasts the world view of the westerners, which is committed to the claim that death is necessary for a certain sort of meaningfulness in our lives, with the world view of the easterners, with its Christian commitment to an afterlife. We argue that it is worth taking seriously a “third world view,” which posits the potential desirability of secular immortality. We consider a dilemma offered by Bernard Williams against this third world view. The first horn has it that if an individual’s character remains the same in a radically extended (or immortal) life, she would necessarily become bored. The second horn claims that if one’s character changes significantly, then one will either not be the same person any more or, even if one is the same person, it will not be rational for the antecedent individual to care about the resultant individual. We reply to the first horn by pointing out that there is no reason to individuate the relevant character traits (and events) as narrowly as Williams seems to, and once a more appropriate and relatively broad individuation of such traits (and events) is employed, his claim becomes implausible. Our reply to the second horn defends the symmetry of our situations in our limited, finite lives and the envisaged situation of individuals in an extended (or immortal) life. In both contexts, we may have good reason to care about future selves.
The Significance of an Afterlife (Ethics at the End of Life: New Issues and Arguments (John Davis, ed., Routledge, 2017))
What role does belief in the afterlife play in our thinking about death? This chapter argues that insights from traditional philosophical discussions of the badness of death and the desirability of immortality, which operate on the assumption that there is no afterlife, remain relevant even if we assume that there is an afterlife. It turns out that believers and non-believers have more common ground on these issues than one might have thought.
The Significance of an Afterlife-penultimate draft.pdf
Understanding Near-Death Experiences: A Response to Mays and Mays's Review (Journal of Near-Death Studies 36 (Winter 2017): 100-109)
I respond to a critique of my book, with John Martin Fischer, on near-death experiences. The critique claims (a) that our suggestions for physical explanations of NDEs were ad hoc, (b) that we labeled NDEs "hallucinations," thus pathologizing them and potentially harming NDErs, (c) that we illicitly appealed to the progress of science in order to refute supernaturalism, and (d) that we fell prey to the same pitfalls of confirmation bias we claimed others should avoid. I show that none of these charges stick and try to clear up the attendant misreadings, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings of what we said.
How to Live a Never-Ending Novela (Exploring the Philosophy of Death: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives (Michael Cholbi and Travis Timmerman, eds., Routledge, 2021))
This chapter argues that immortality need not undermine identity.
Reflections on Meaning and Immortality (Ergo 8: 8)
This article revisits Bernard Williams’ influential argument that an immortal human life would be meaningless and argues for a shift in focus. There’s good reason to keep Williams’ framework for evaluating the prospects of meaning in continued life. But there’s also good reason to abandon the conception of human psychology that he, and most of the vast literature in response, uses to fill in that framework. Focusing on values, as opposed to desires, reveals that the most pressing threats to a meaningful immortal human life are not repetition or satisfaction, but rather changes in what the world has to offer.
Reflections on Meaning and Immortality.pdf
Modal Logic
S5 for Aristotelian Actualists (w/ Michael Nelson) (Philosophical Studies 173 (6): 1537-1569)
Aristotelian Actualism is, first, the thesis of Actualism, that absolutely everything that exists actually exists or is composed or constituted by actually existing objects and, second, Aristotelianism, the thesis that individuals, the bearers of properties, are basic or fundamental, not just sets or collections of properties. Two prominent Aristotelian Actualists, R. M. Adams and G. W. Fitch, argue that the thesis entails that the correct modal logic for contingent existents is weaker than S4 and S5. We argue that both Adams’ and Fitch's cases against S4 and S5 turn on a similar mistake, that of evaluating the truth or falsity of certain propositions with respect to a nonactual world in terms of what would have been true were that world actual. This is at odds with the Actualist's metaphysical picture. How matters would have been had a nonactual world been actual, we suggest, should not be modeled on a par with how an ordinary individual or group of individuals would have been had matters been such and so. We also argue that a more consistent, universal application of the notion of truth at as the basis of all necessity and possibility undercuts Adams and Fitch's counterexamples to S4 and S5. The result is a view consistent with the metaphysical commitments of Aristotelian Actualism that is also consistent with S5 as the correct modal logic of contingent beings.