Research

Banerjee S., Homroy S. & A. Slechten (2022), "Stakeholder Preference and Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility", Journal of Corporate Finance, 77, 102286. Paper DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102286

Cai J., De Silva D., & Slechten A. (2021), "Effects of Oil Booms on the Local Environment", Energy Economics, 101, pp. 1-12. Paper DOI: doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105365

De Silva D., McComb R., Schiller A., & Slechten A. (2021), "Firm Behavior and Pollution in Small Geographies", European Economic Review, 136, pp. 1-33. Paper DOI: doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103742  

Slechten A. (2020), "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information", Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists , 7(3), 455-481.  Paper DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/707653  

Homroy S. & Slechten A.  (2019),“Board Expertise, Networked Boards and Environmental Performance”, Journal of Business Ethics, 158 (1), 269-292. Paper DOI: 10.1007/s10551-017-3769-y 

Cantillon E. & Slechten A. (2018), "Information aggregation in emissions markets with abatement", Annals of Economics and Statistics, 132, 53-79. Paper DOI:  10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0053

Slechten A. and Verardi V. (2016), "Measuring the impact of international agreements on global CO2 emissions", Land Economics, 92 (3), 534-554. Paper DOI:  10.3368/le.92.3.534

Slechten A. (2013), "Intertemporal links in cap-and-trade schemes", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 66, 319-336. Paper DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2013.01.002

“Market Design for the Environment", with Estelle Cantillon, NBER working paper 31987, December 2023

The main argument in favor of markets in environmental contexts is the same as in other contexts: their ability to promote efficient allocations and production. But environmental problems bring their own challenges: their underlying bio-physical processes - and the technologies to monitor them - constrain what is feasible or even desirable. This chapter illustrates the main design dimensions in environmental markets, the trade-offs involved and their impact on performance, through the lens of a regulated market for pollution rights (the EU emissions trading scheme) and a voluntary market for the provision of environmental services (the global market for carbon credits). While both markets eventually contribute to climate change mitigation, their organisation as a ``pollution market'', for the former, and as a ``provision market'', for second, means that different design considerations take precedence. Both markets also face challenges: volatile prices in the EU emissions trading scheme and low trust for voluntary carbon markets. We discuss how alternative design options could address those.

“Who gains from market fragmentation? Evidence from the early stages of the EU Carbon market", with Estelle Cantillon (Online Appendix)

We document the impact of market fragmentation during the first phase of the EU emissions trading scheme on the terms that traders were able to get. We observe the universe of over-the-counter (OTC) and exchange transactions and the transaction prices associated with four of the 11 exchanges that were active during that period. We define a measure of price advantage based on the difference between the transaction price and the median market-wide price that day. We decompose price advantage into its exchange, counterparty and trader drivers and show that where traders traded and how connected they and their counterparties were with the rest of the market covary with the terms they were able to obtain. Such features are expected to characterize OTCt ransactions but not, typically, anonymous exchange transactions. The high level of market fragmentation during the first phase, which was a policy choice, hampered information aggregation about the overall balance between supply and demand in the market, and put small and non-energy compliance traders at a large disadvantage.

“Tiebout Sorting and Toxic Releases", with Dakshina De Silva, Anita Schiller and Leonard Wolk 

Combining detailed county-to-county migration data with Toxic Release Inventory data, and fine-scale PM2.5 concentration estimates, we investigate the relationship between internal migration in the US, income of migrant and non-migrant households and county-level differences in environmental quality. We find that differences in pollution between home and destination counties matter for households' moving decisions. We also show that households moving to "cleaner'' counties are relatively "richer''. We interpret those results as evidence of pollution-driven sorting by income in the spirit of Tiebout (1956). As a result, migration could contribute to disparities in pollution exposure by reshaping the socio-demographic distribution of counties.

“Director Appointments, Boardroom Networks, and Firm Environmental Performance", with Dakshina De Silva and Mingyuan Chen

Using BoardEx (2000-2017), we create a dynamic network connecting firms and board directors for the United States. We use the Environmental Protection Agency's Toxic Release Inventory to measure environmental performance at the director and firm-level. We examine how a candidate's environmental performance and networks affect director appointments. This allows us to endogenize the effect of directors' environmental experience when studying the impact on firms' chemical releases. We show that firms are likely to appoint influential directors with good environmental records and similar characteristics. Further, boards with good environmental performance and with diverse environmental backgrounds improve firms' environmental performance.

"Risk Management and Price Formation in the EU Carbon Market" (with Estelle Cantillon)

"Board Networks, Corporate Political Donations, and Environmental Performance" (with Mingyuan Chen, Dakshina De Silva and Anita Schiller)

"School Choice, Oil Boom, and Education Outcomes" (with Anita Schiller)

"Tidal Wave Energy and Energy Independence: Evidence from Korea" (with Dakshina De Silva, Soon Cheul Lee, Inkoo Lee, and Anita Schiller)