Chen, M., De Silva, D., Schiller, A., & Slechten, A. (2026), "Corporate Political Ideology and Environmental Strategy: Evidence from U.S. Toxic Releases", Business Strategy and the Environment, forthcoming.
Slechten, A., & Walheer, B. (2026), "Decomposing the pollution generation process: who is to blame?", Energy Economics, forthcoming. Paper DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109564
Chen M., De Silva D., & Slechten A. (2026), "Director Appointments, Boardroom Networks, and Firm Environmental Performance", Environmental and Resource Economics, 89(7), pp.1-41. Paper DOI: doi.org/10.1007/s10640-026-01091-4
Schiller A., & Slechten A. (2025), "Effect of natural resource extraction on school performance: Evidence from Texas", Energy Economics, 144, pp. 1-21. Paper DOI:doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108308
De Silva D., Schiller A., Slechten A. & Wolk L. (2024), "Tiebout sorting and toxic releases", Environmental and Resource Economics, 87, pp. 2487–2520. Paper DOI: doi.org/10.1007/s10640-024-00893-8
Banerjee S., Homroy S. & A. Slechten (2022), "Stakeholder Preference and Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility", Journal of Corporate Finance, 77, 102286. Paper DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102286
Cai J., De Silva D., & Slechten A. (2021), "Effects of Oil Booms on the Local Environment", Energy Economics, 101, pp. 1-12. Paper DOI: doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105365
De Silva D., McComb R., Schiller A., & Slechten A. (2021), "Firm Behavior and Pollution in Small Geographies", European Economic Review, 136, pp. 1-33. Paper DOI: doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103742
Slechten A. (2020), "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information", Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists , 7(3), 455-481. Paper DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/707653
Homroy S. & Slechten A. (2019),“Board Expertise, Networked Boards and Environmental Performance”, Journal of Business Ethics, 158 (1), 269-292. Paper DOI: 10.1007/s10551-017-3769-y
Cantillon E. & Slechten A. (2018), "Information aggregation in emissions markets with abatement", Annals of Economics and Statistics, 132, 53-79. Paper DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0053
Slechten A. and Verardi V. (2016), "Measuring the impact of international agreements on global CO2 emissions", Land Economics, 92 (3), 534-554. Paper DOI: 10.3368/le.92.3.534
Slechten A. (2013), "Intertemporal links in cap-and-trade schemes", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 66, 319-336. Paper DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2013.01.002
Estelle Cantillon and Aurélie Slechten, In: New Directions in Market Design, NBER, eds. Irene Yuan Lo, Michael Ostrovsky & Parag Pathak, (University of Chicago Press, 2026), chap. 2, https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/new-directions-market-design/market-design-environment.
“Who gains from market fragmentation? Evidence from the early stages of the EU Carbon market", with Estelle Cantillon (Online Appendix)
We document the impact of market fragmentation during the first phase of the EU emissions trading scheme on the terms that traders were able to get. We observe the universe of over-the-counter (OTC) and exchange transactions and the transaction prices associated with four of the 11 exchanges that were active during that period. We define a measure of price advantage based on the difference between the transaction price and the median market-wide price that day. We decompose price advantage into its exchange, counterparty and trader drivers and show that where traders traded and how connected they and their counterparties were with the rest of the market covary with the terms they were able to obtain. Such features are expected to characterize OTCt ransactions but not, typically, anonymous exchange transactions. The high level of market fragmentation during the first phase, which was a policy choice, hampered information aggregation about the overall balance between supply and demand in the market, and put small and non-energy compliance traders at a large disadvantage.
"Learning from Others to Reduce Pollution: Corporate Siblings, Networked Cousins, and Regional Peers", with Dietrich Earnhart
This study examines the relationships among facilities regarding their management of pollutant emissions and how one facility can learn from other facilities about their corporate environmental management. The analysis distinguishes among facilities based on corporate arrangements: sister facilities operating within the same corporate family, facilities owned by other firms that operate within the network created by the focal firm’s board of directors, and facilities without any corporate connection (“unaffiliated”). Based on this distinction, we derive hypotheses about the strength of the learning from other polluting facilities. We extend this consideration by distinguishing other facilities based on their (1) geographical closeness to the focal facility and (2) sectoral closeness to the focal facility. Our empirical analysis then tests these hypotheses. The empirical results demonstrate that a focal facility learns from the environmental performance of sister facilities within the corporate family but not from facilities operating within the network established by the firm’s board of directors. The focal facility also learns from unaffiliated peer facilities operating in the same regulatory region; however, strategic considerations dominate this learning when these peers operate in the same state – regulated by the same state agency. Moreover, learning from corporate sister facilities depends on the spatial proximity and sectoral similarity. The focal facility learns more from its sister facilities operating in the same state (or same sector) than sister facilities operating in a different state (or different sector). Lastly, the role of effluent limits depends on the relationship between the focal facility and other facilities. For corporate sister facilities, a focal facility facing an effluent limit learns more from its sister facilities as the prevalence of effluent limits falls. We conjecture that the focal facility learns more when the sister facilities voluntarily reduce their pollutant releases. In contrast, a focal facility facing an effluent limit learns more from its unaffiliated peer facilities as the prevalence of effluent limits rises, reflecting a stronger regulatory similarity (i.e., a regulated facility learns more from other regulated facilities).
"Risk Management and Price Formation in the EU Carbon Market" (with Estelle Cantillon)
"Persistent inequalities in industrial pollution exposure across neighbourhoods in England and Wales'' (with Dakshina De Silva and Anita Schiller)
"Politics of Toxic Releases" (with Dakshina De Silva and Anita Schiller)
"Predictable Renewable Generation, Coal Displacement, and Energy Security: Evidence from Tidal Power in South Korea" (with Dakshina De Silva, Soon Cheul Lee, Inkoo Lee, and Anita Schiller)