3) A many-to-one job market: more about the core and the competitive salaries, with Marina Núñez and Tamás Solymosi (April 2024).
This paper studies many-to-one assignment markets, or matching markets with wages. Although it is well-known that the core of this model is non-empty, the structure of the core has not been fully investigated. To the known dissimilarities with the one-to-one assignment game, we add that the bargaining set does not coincide with the core and the kernel may not be included in the core. Besides, not all extreme core allocations can be obtained by means of a lexicographic maximization or a lexicographic minimization procedure, as it is the case in the one-to-one assignment game.
The maximum and minimum competitive salaries are characterized in two ways: axiomatically and by means of easily verifiable properties of an associated directed graph. Regarding the remaining extreme core allocations of the many-to-one assignment game, we propose a lexicographic procedure that, for each order on the set of workers, sequentially maximizes or minimizes each worker's competitive salary. This procedure provides all extreme vectors of competitive salaries, that is all extreme core allocations.
Keywords: Many-to-one assignment markets · extreme core allocations · side-optimal allocations · kernel · core
JEL Classifications : C71 · C78 · D47
2) Optimistic and pessimistic approaches for cooperative games, with Christian Trudeau (Updated: December 2024, First version: March 2024).
Cooperative game theory aims to study how to divide a joint value created by a set of players. These games are often studied through the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value obtainable by each coalition. In the presence of externalities, there are many ways to define this value. Various models that account for different levels of player cooperation and the influence of external players on coalition value have been studied. Although there are different approaches, typically, the optimistic and pessimistic approaches provide sufficient insights into strategic interactions. This paper clarifies the interpretation of these approaches by providing a unified framework. We show that making sure that no coalition receives more than their (optimistic) upper bounds is always at least as difficult as guaranteeing their (pessimistic) lower bounds. We also show that if externalities are negative, providing these guarantees is always feasible. Then, we explore applications and show how our findings can be applied to derive results from the existing literature
Keywords: Cooperative games · optimization problems · cost sharing · core · anti-core · externalities
JEL Classifications : C44 · C71 · D61 · D62 · D63
1) Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities, with Antonio Romero-Medina
("Optimizing daycare enrollment: how to avoid early applications" which subsumes this working paper will be available soon).
We investigate the allocation of children to childcare facilities and propose solutions to overcome limitations in the current allocation mechanism. We introduce a natural preference domain and a priority structure that address these setbacks, aiming to enhance the allocation process. To achieve this, we present an adaptation of the Deferred Acceptance mechanism to our problem, which ensures strategy-proofness within our preference domain and yields the student-optimal stable matching. Finally, we provide a maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings using the properties that define our natural preference domain. Our results have practical implications for allocating indivisible bundles with complementarities.
Keywords: Childcare allocation · complementarities · market design · stability · strategy-proofness
JEL Classifications : C78 · D47 · D61 · D63 · I21
Halloween @ SLMath in Fall 2023 (Arrangement by Sierra S. )