Research

Working Papers

• 1. Mediation design by an informed party. This paper examines mediation design by an informed party—the expert—who selects a mediation mechanism at the interim stage, i.e., after observing her private information. We consider a basic strategic model in which the expert's information corresponds to a binary state of the world, and an uninformed decision-maker must choose an action on the real line. The parties have different preferred outcomes in each state. Our framework is closely related to the informed-principal problem, and we build on the theoretical foundations developed in that literature. We provide a complete characterization of all perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the interim mediation design game. We then refine this set using the solution concepts of strong solution, core mechanisms, neologism proof equilibria, and neo-optimum.

  2. Random dictatorship and the value in cooperative games with incomplete information. We present and analyze a theory of cooperative bargaining under asymmetric information, based on the equity principles of the conditional random dictatorship—choosing with equal probability one of the individuals to act as a dictator under the participation constraint of the other players. Our approach leads to a unified bargaining solution that encompasses, as special cases, the Maschler-Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games with complete information and Myerson's Neutral bargaining solution for two-person bargaining problems with incomplete information. This solution is shown to be the smallest possible set satisfying two axioms: one of these axioms states what the solution should be for the class of problems where conditional random dictatorship yields an efficient outcome, and the other axiom relates the solutions of a problem to the solutions of its extensions.

Publications

Articles in refereed journals

Mechanism design

• • Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 114, 103023, 2024. (with F. Forges and F. Koessler). [Slides]

Strategic Information Transmission

• • Biased mediators in conflict resolution. To appear in American Law and Economics Review, 2024. [Slides] [Preprint version]

  • The value of mediated communication, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 192, 105191, 2021. [Slides][Preprint version]

Cooperative Game Theory

• On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 108, pp. 38-49, 2020. [Preprint version]

• A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 49, pp. 195-225, 2020. [Preprint version]

• A comparison of NTU values in a cooperative game with incomplete information, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, vol. 4, no. 1, pp 109-117, 2019.

Empirical Economics

• Sincronización de los ciclos económicos: El caso de Colombia, Ecuador y Venezuela, Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 31, no. 57, pp. 179–199, 2012.

• El efecto riqueza de la vivienda en Colombia, Revista Coyuntura Económica, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 129–170, 2009 (with E. López).

• Deuda externa pública e inversión en Colombia 1994-2007: Evidencia de un modelo no-lineal TAR,” Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 28, no. 51, pp. 205–243, 2009.

Chapters in Books

• • Los ciclos de crecimiento en Colombia, in Hacia la Renovación de la Economía Colombiana, Á. Zerda and D. Gutiérrez, Eds., Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, CID, 2013, pp. 31–66.

  • Un análisis del efecto riqueza de la vivienda en la transmisión de la política monetaria en Colombia,” in Mecanismos de Transmisión de la Política Monetaria en Colombia, L. Mahadeva and M. Jalil, Eds., Bogotá: Banco de la República and Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2010, pp. 349–404 (with E. López).