NEW VERSION COMING SOON
We investigate the allocation of children to childcare facilities and propose solutions to overcome limitations in the current allocation mechanism. We introduce a natural preference domain and a priority structure that address these setbacks, aiming to enhance the allocation process. To achieve this, we present an adaptation of the Deferred Acceptance mechanism to our problem, which ensures strategy-proofness within our preference domain and yields the student-optimal stable matching. Finally, we provide a maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings using the properties that define our natural preference domain. Our results have practical implications for allocating indivisible bundles with complementarities.
Keywords: childcare allocation · complementarities · market design · stability · strategyproofness
NEW VERSION COMING SOON
This paper examines strategic behavior in multi-unit assignment problems, employing simple manipulation strategies. Assuming responsive preferences and priorities, we demonstrate that dropping strategies are exhaustive in the immediate acceptance mechanism, while truncation strategies fall short. This finding clarifies the trade-offs among stability, simplicity, and manipulability in assignment mechanisms, with implications for real-world applications, such as course allocation.
Keywords: multi-unit assignment · stability · immediate acceptance