Research

Publications and working papers:

Sovereign borrowers may tighten their fiscal stance in order to signal their creditworthiness to lenders. In a model of sovereign debt with incomplete information, I show that a trustworthy country may reduce its debt beyond the optimal level in order to separate itself from less reliable countries. Since austerity is costly, the gains in the price of debt from separating need to be high enough, as is the case when credit ratings provide very noisy signals. I proxy for the informativeness of the ratings with two model-implied variables and find empirical support for the existence of a signalling channel.

This paper analyzes the extent to which selection explains the observed discrepancy between solicited and unsolicited ratings. I propose a model of selection with truth telling rating agencies and borrowers with the ability to veto the revelation of the rating. The observed difference between the two categories of ratings in different sectors is in line with the prediction of the model. In the sovereign market there is a positive selection of borrowers into unsolicited ratings whereas other sectors have, on the contrary, lower unsolicited rating grades than those solicited.

The introduction of gender quotas on corporate boards may be a shock to the status-quo that produces externalities to the advancement of women in the company. In this paper, we investigate whether boardroom quotas contribute to lift more women further up the corporate ladder and to a wider range of positions. Using a legislative change in Germany as a natural experiment, we find that quotas increase female representation on the affected board but may have a negative impact on executive careers for women. They also fail short of eliminating the glass ceiling and do not level the playfield across women insiders and outsiders. Quotas can not be tasked with achieving gender equality in corporations on their own.

Work in progress:

Policy papers: