Andrew Choi

I am a PhD candidate at Department of Economics, University of Chicago. I work on mechanism design and information design.

Contact Details

  • Mailing Address: The Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics, 1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637

  • Email:


Work in Progress

  • "Promises about Promises - Career Dynamics with Firm-side Learning"

I consider a dynamic principal-agent model where the principal can commit to future allocations and gradually receives private signals about a payoff-relevant state. The principal must incentivize the agent not to take her outside option, which is decreasing over time. The principal finds it optimal to make promises about promises; that is, the optimal mechanism promises to make strong promises in the future. The mechanism induces the agent to stay in anticipation of receiving valuable information, while allowing the principal the flexibility to respond to future signals. The optimal allocation may be a function of the realizations of past signals that are payoff-irrelevant. The optimal mechanism is credible as long as the agent's initial outside option is not overly attractive. The principal may prefer to receive less informative signals.

  • "Matching with Searching"

This paper introduces searching friction into the two-sided matching market by requiring that a pair of agents can match only if they are acquainted. Each worker may conduct a search to acquaint himself with new firms. Concepts of stability and efficiency are defined to account for both rematching among acquainted agents and searching behavior. I use the marginal value theorem of linear programming to show that workers never search too little, in the sense that all stable matchings are efficient. I then prove that in a large market which satisfies some regularity conditions, workers never search too much, i.e. all efficient matchings can be made approximately stable.

  • "Acquiring Information from Information Designers"

Working Papers