My research sits at the intersection of ethics, practical reason, moral psychology, and action theory. More recently, I have turned to issues in applied ethics -- including bioethics, engineering ethics, and ethics of AI --- exploring their relationship to features of rational agency and moral psychology. Much of my work explores the relationship between our reflective, deliberative capacities to respond to reasons, on the one hand, and the myriad ways that we respond to reasons unreflectively and non-deliberatively on the other. At stake here is the question of how these two sets of capacities interact to constitute the kind of autonomy required to be rational agents who are answerable for their actions and attitudes.

I have recent papers or papers in progress addressing the scope of moral distress, the role of hope in altruistic motivations to participate in therapeutic trials, the deliberative perspective in engineering ethics education, and relationship between behavioral-data-capturing machine learning programs and the reflective agency of the individuals whose digital behavior they capture.

You can find some of my published work here.