Welcome

My research focuses on how the domestic political incentives of leaders targeted by foreign policy affect the process of influence attempts. I examine how leader turnover, dynamics in support and opposition coalitions, and political preferences condition the targeting and effect of economic sanctions and foreign aid. My work often concludes that the room available for compelling changes in target behavior is tight indeed, even for very powerful countries. In more recent work, I am delving into the dynamics of protest and repression, as well as civil conflict. I am particularly interested in how leader incentives change over time in ways that may make increased repression predictable. New work with co-authors also explores the role of domestic politics in more detail, incorporating policy preferences and social movement theory into my studies of aid and sanctions.

To improve my statistical analyses of leader turnover, I have developed a dataset which provides the basis for more refined identification of leader "failures." The current version is available on the Regular Turnover Details page in the Research section of this site. I am currently performing validity checks to ensure the accuracy of an updated version with information on turnovers from 1960-2014. Please contact me if you are interested in this newer data, or if you have found errors in the existing data.