Alex Smolin

I am an Assistant Professor of Economics at Toulouse School of Economics and a Research Affiliate at CEPR. I received my PhD in Economics from Yale University under the supervision of Dirk Bergemann. My research is in microeconomic theory with a special focus on information design, mechanism design, and digital economy. Here is my CV.

Contact Information:

Office: T.584, Toulouse School of Economics, 1 Esplanade de l'Université, 31080 Toulouse Cedex 06, France

E-mail: alexey.v.smolin [at]

Academic Profiles: Google Scholar

Working Papers:

  1. Information Design in Concave Games, [EC'22 Extended Abstract], with Takuro Yamashita, August 2022.
    Solution method for information-design problems in games. Duality. Optimality of selective informing and Gaussian information structures.

  2. Data Collection by an Informed Seller, with Shota Ichihashi, April 2022.
    Data collection game. Informed principal. Adverse selection. Consumer privacy and welfare.

  3. Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective, with Laura Doval, February 2022.
    Interim analysis of Bayesian persuasion. Multi-valued concavification. Payoff redistribution by information systems.

  4. Optimal Technology Design, with Daniel Garrett, George Georgiadis, and Balázs Szentes, October 2020, Online Appendix.
    Journal of Economic Theory, conditionally accepted.
    Production technologies that maximize moral-hazard rents. Coarse output. Variational analysis of indirect utility.


  1. Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes, August 2022.
    RAND Journal of Economics, accepted.
    Menu design for a multi-attribute product bundled with information about it. Statistical properties of binary linear classifiers. Distinction between the information about product attributes and the information about consumer value.

  2. The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing, with Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, and Andreas Haupt,
    WINE 2021, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2021.

  3. Dynamic Evaluation Design,
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021.

  4. Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets, with Gleb Romanyuk,
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019.
    Media coverage: AEA Research Highlights.

  5. Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders, with Chiara Margaria,
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2018.

  6. The Design and Price of Information, with Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti,
    American Economic Review, 2018.
    Media coverage: LSE Business Review.