Homepage of Daniel F. Garrett
I am a Professor of Economics at Toulouse School of Economics. My research interests are microeconomic theory and the theory of industrial organization. I am a holder of an ERC Junior research grant (2017-2021) and an Associate Editor of the Journal of the European Economic Association.
`Bidding in a possibly common-value auction,' with Yuk-fai Fong, Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 70, 494-501.
`Managerial Turnover in a Changing World,' with Alessandro Pavan, Journal of Political Economy, 2012, vol. 120, 879-925.
`Robustness of Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement,' Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, 631-641.
`Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority Based Schemes,' with Alessandro Pavan, Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 159, 775-818.
`Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values,' American Economic Review, 2016, vol. 106, 3275-3299 (winner of Distinguished CESifo Affiliate Award).
`Dynamic Mechanism Design: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values,' Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, 595-612.
`Overbooking,' with Jeff Ely and Toomas Hinnosaar, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2017, vol. 15, 1258-1301 (Editor's Choice Collection of JEEA).
`Residual Deterrence,' with Francesc Dilme, Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming.
`Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information,' with Renato Gomes and Lucas Maestri, forthcoming at Review of Economic Studies (winner of the EARIE Young Economists Essay Award).
`Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective,' forthcoming in Japanese Economic Review (special issue of the APIOC).
`Robust Predictions in Dynamic Screening' with Alessandro Pavan and Juuso Toikka.
`Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting' (winner of ESEM Award for best applied paper by a young economist)
`A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts' with Francesc Dilme.
Work in progress
`Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings' with Francesc Dilme.