On Optimal Scheduling Joint with Kfir Eliaz and Daniel Fershtman, American Economic Journal: Microeconomic,16 (4) 2024: 475-522.
Toxic Types and Infectious Communication Breakdown joint with Kfir Eliaz, Games and Economic Behavior, 142 (2023): 718-729
Monotone Contracts, joint with Daniel Bird, Theoretical Economics, 17 (2022): 1041–1073.
Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks, joint with Daniel Bird, The Economic Journal 131 (2021): 1905-1918.
Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives, joint with Daniel Bird, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11 (2019): 111-150 .
Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission, Journal of Economic Theory, 177 (2018): 594-615.
Bilateral Trade with Strategic Gradual Learning , joint with Kfir Eliaz, Games and Economic Behavior 107 (2018): 380-395.
A Note on Optimal Cheap Talk Equilibria in a Discrete State Space. Games and Economic Behavior 99 (2016): 180–185.
Dynamic Cheap Talk with Static Informational Control. Economics Letters 143 (2016): 118-120.
A Theory of Front-line Management (Joint with Daniel Bird) R&R at Management Science
Abstract Mid- and low-level managers play a significant role within the organizational hierarchy, far beyond monitoring. It is often their responsibility to respond to opportunities and threats within their units by adjusting their subordinates' assignments. Most such managers, however, lack the authority to adapt their subordinates' wages. Instead, they rely on other, more restrictive incentive schemes. We study the interaction between a front-line manager and worker, and characterize the ``managerial style'' as a function of the players' relative patience and information. Our analysis also offers insights into broader organizational design problems such as selecting the managers' discretion level, promotion policies, etc.
Keeping in the dark with hard evidence (Joint with Daniel Bird)
Abstract We examine a dynamic setting where, in each period, an agent privately observes periodic data and submits a report to the principal based on the realized data. We identify conditions under which the Law of Large Numbers, which typically guarantees accurate inference, may fail in this mediated environment. In particular, we characterize when the agent can systematically bias the principal’s long-run beliefs and obstruct her ability to learn the true state. We then study two distinct scenarios —- persuasion and reform avoidance —- demonstrating how strategic disclosure can significantly alter long-term outcomes.
Clerks (Joint with Kfir Eliaz and Daniel Fershtman)
Abstract We study the optimal dynamic scheduling of workers to tasks when task-completion is privately observed (hence, workers can delay the release of completed tasks), and when idle time is the only means of providing incentives. Our main result characterizes a scheduling rule, and the equilibrium it induces, maximizing the expected discounted output subject to workers’ incentive constraints. When workers are inherently slow, a simple rotation scheme suffices to attain first-best output, but when they are more productive, optimal scheduling alternates between phases with and without delay. Our analysis highlights a trade-off between the quality and size of workforce.
On the Inconsistency of Stability-Based Equilibria in Infinite Horizon: An Example (Joint with Malachy James Gavan)
Abstract This paper shows that stability-based equilibrium refinements may not be well defined when taken to the infinite horizon. To do so, we extend the concept of Asheim (1997)’s dynamically consistent partition to allow for incomplete information. We provide a concrete example where in the infinite horizon the set of dynamically consistent equilibria is not well defined.
Abstract The main insight of the literature on strategic information transmission is that even a small conflict of interest between a fully informed sender (e.g., a financial adviser) and an uninformed receiver (an investor) often poses considerable difficulties for effective communication. However, in many real-life situations, the sender is not fully informed at the outset but gradually studies the case before offering advice. The gradual arrival of information to the sender weakens the strategic barriers between the players and significantly improves communication.