A Theory of Front-line Management Joint with Daniel Bird, Management Science, accepted.
When Half a Boycott Makes a Winner: On Eurovision Voting Economics Letters 256, (2025), 112639 .
On Optimal Scheduling Joint with Kfir Eliaz and Daniel Fershtman, American Economic Journal: Microeconomic,16 (4) 2024: 475-522.
Toxic Types and Infectious Communication Breakdown joint with Kfir Eliaz, Games and Economic Behavior, 142 (2023): 718-729
Monotone Contracts, joint with Daniel Bird, Theoretical Economics, 17 (2022): 1041–1073.
Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks, joint with Daniel Bird, The Economic Journal 131 (2021): 1905-1918.
Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives, joint with Daniel Bird, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11 (2019): 111-150 .
Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission, Journal of Economic Theory, 177 (2018): 594-615.
Bilateral Trade with Strategic Gradual Learning , joint with Kfir Eliaz, Games and Economic Behavior 107 (2018): 380-395.
A Note on Optimal Cheap Talk Equilibria in a Discrete State Space. Games and Economic Behavior 99 (2016): 180–185.
Dynamic Cheap Talk with Static Informational Control. Economics Letters 143 (2016): 118-120.
A Manipulation-Proof Law of Large Numbers and the Scope of Belief Manipulation (Joint with Daniel Bird)
Abstract We study long-run learning when data are mediated by an informed agent with limited discretion over how samples are reported. We ask when strategic reporting can prevent learning and, when it can, how far long-run beliefs can be manipulated. We establish a Manipulation-Proof Law of Large Numbers that characterizes when the true state is learned regardless of the agent’s dynamic reporting strategy. We then introduce a notion of manipulability for sets of states that yields a simple characterization of the distributions of long-run beliefs that can be induced when the Manipulation-Proof Law of Large Numbers fails.
Clerks (Joint with Kfir Eliaz and Daniel Fershtman)
Abstract We study optimal dynamic scheduling of workers to tasks when task completion is privately observed —so that workers can delay the release of finished tasks — and idle time is the only available incentive instrument. We characterize a scheduling rule, and its induced equilibrium, that maximizes expected discounted output. Unless workers are inherently slow, production alternates between efficient phases and delays. Our analysis reveals a trade-off between the quality and the size of the workforce. We also present several extensions, illustrating the versatility of the framework.
On the Impossibility of Stability-Based Equilibria in Infinite Horizon: An Example (Joint with Malachy James Gavan)
Abstract This paper shows that stability-based equilibrium refinements may not be well defined when taken to the infinite horizon. To do so, we use a stable-set-style notion of the dynamically consistent partition, allowing for incomplete information. We provide a concrete example where, only via taking the game to the infinite horizon, the dynamically consistent partition of equilibria does not exist..
Keeping in the dark with hard evidence (Joint with Daniel Bird)
This paper has been superseded by subsequent research.
Abstract We present a dynamic learning setting in which the periodic data observed by a decision-maker are mediated by an agent. We study when, and to what extent, this mediation can distort the decision-maker’s long-run learning, even though the agent's reports are restricted to consist of verifiable hard evidence and must adhere to certain standards. We first illustrate the extent and mechanisms of manipulation in specific economic settings. We then derive a general manipulation-proof law of large numbers: when it holds, the decision-maker’s learning is guaranteed in the long run; when it fails, the scope for manipulation is essentially unrestricted.
Abstract The main insight of the literature on strategic information transmission is that even a small conflict of interest between a fully informed sender (e.g., a financial adviser) and an uninformed receiver (an investor) often poses considerable difficulties for effective communication. However, in many real-life situations, the sender is not fully informed at the outset but gradually studies the case before offering advice. The gradual arrival of information to the sender weakens the strategic barriers between the players and significantly improves communication.