Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information (with R. Vijay Krishna and Oksana Leukhina)
[Online Appendix] [Extended Supplement] [Slides]
Econometrica, May 2025
How does the persistence of agents' private information influence the structure of optimal social insurance?
Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature (with S. Nageeb Ali, B. Douglas Bernheim, and Silvia Console Battilana)
[Online Appendix] [Slides]
American Economic Review, November 2023
Are agenda setters constrained by majority rule? (Spoiler in title.)
The Cost of Optimally Acquired Information (with Weijie Zhong), revised November 2025
[Slides]
R&R at American Economic Review
Which information cost functions can be "rationalized" by an underlying process of optimal sequential information acquisition?
Related note: A Note on Applications of Generalized Learning Maps, January 2026
Includes extensions of the framework of Bloedel and Zhong (2025) to (i) settings without free disposal of information and (ii) settings with history-dependent direct costs.
Working paper with additional results: The Cost of Optimally Acquired Information, November 2020
Includes analyses of "simultaneous" learning-proofness and "unrestricted" learning-proofness that extend the framework of Bloedel and Zhong (2025).
Persistent Private Information Revisited (with R. Vijay Krishna and Bruno Strulovici), revised April 2023
[Slides]
R&R (2nd round) at Econometrica
Revisits Williams' (2011, Econometrica) principal-agent model with persistent private information and continuous time. Reconsiders the analysis of incentive compatible and optimal contracts, the roles played by continuous time and persistence, and implications for the optimal social insurance and continuous-time contracting literatures.
The Proper (Scoring Rule) Approach to Incentivizing Information Acquisition (with Ilya Segal), draft coming soon
[Slides]
How to optimally incentivize the acquisition, elicitation, and aggregation of costly flexible information?
Modeling Information Acquisition via f-Divergence and Duality (with Tommaso Denti and Luciano Pomatto), October 2025
[Slides]
How to tractably model the stochastic choice behavior of rationally inattentive agents?
Persuading a Rationally Inattentive Agent (with Ilya Segal), revised September 2021
[Slides]
How to communicate with an inattentive agent who will (rationally) ignore some of what you say?
The Costly Wisdom of Inattentive Crowds (with Ilya Segal)
[Slides]
How to optimally balance informational and allocative efficiency when information is costly and endogenous?
On the Limits of Dynamic Screening under Permanent Shocks (with R. Vijay Krishna and Bruno Strulovici)
[Subsumes Theorem 6 and related analysis in the working paper Bloedel, Krishna, and Strulovici (2020)]
How much "useful information" can be elicited in dynamic contracting settings where the agent's private type isn't mean-reverting?