Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information (with R. Vijay Krishna and Oksana Leukhina)
[Online Appendix] [Extended Supplement] [Slides]
Econometrica, May 2025
How does the persistence of agents' private information influence the structure of optimal social insurance?
Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature (with S. Nageeb Ali, B. Douglas Bernheim, and Silvia Console Battilana)
American Economic Review, November 2023
Are agenda setters constrained by majority rule? (Spoiler in title.)
Modeling Information Acquisition via f-Divergence and Duality (with Tommaso Denti and Luciano Pomatto), October 2025
How to tractably model the stochastic choice behavior of rationally inattentive agents?
The Cost of Optimally Acquired Information (with Weijie Zhong), revised August 2024 (new draft coming soon)
[Slides] [Working paper with additional results: Bloedel and Zhong (2020)]
Which information cost functions can be "rationalized" by an underlying process of optimal sequential information acquisition?
The Proper (Scoring Rule) Approach to Incentivizing Information Acquisition (with Ilya Segal), draft coming soon
How to optimally incentivize the acquisition, elicitation, and aggregation of costly flexible information?
Persistent Private Information Revisited (with R. Vijay Krishna and Bruno Strulovici), revised April 2023
R&R (2nd round) at Econometrica
Revisits Williams' (2011, Econometrica) principal-agent model with persistent private information and continuous time. Reconsiders the analysis of incentive compatible and optimal contracts, the roles played by continuous time and persistence, and implications for the optimal social insurance and continuous-time contracting literatures.
Persuading a Rationally Inattentive Agent (with Ilya Segal), revised September 2021
How to communicate with an inattentive agent who will (rationally) ignore some of what you say?
On the Limits of Dynamic Screening under Permanent Shocks (with R. Vijay Krishna and Bruno Strulovici), draft in preparation
[Subsumes Theorem 6 and related analysis in the working paper Bloedel, Krishna, and Strulovici (2020)]
How much "useful information" can be elicited in dynamic contracting settings where the agent's private type isn't mean-reverting?
The Costly Wisdom of Inattentive Crowds (with Ilya Segal) [Slides]
How to optimally balance informational and allocative efficiency when information is costly and endogenous?