My research examines how societies build, sustain, and lose cooperation. I am interested in the social norms, reputational mechanisms, and political institutions that enable cooperation among individuals and groups, and in the conditions under which these mechanisms break down.
Across my work, I combine formal theory with empirical analysis to study cooperation in a variety of settings, including democratic politics, post-conflict societies, and long-run cultural change. Although these projects address different empirical questions, they are united by a common objective: understanding how norms and institutions interact to sustain cooperation, and how changes in one reshape the other.
My research develops this broader agenda along three complementary lines. The first examines cooperation across social divisions, asking how trust and cooperation emerge between groups separated by conflict, history, or cultural differences. The second studies democratic institutions as systems of cooperation and investigates why democratic norms sometimes erode. The third explores the foundations of cooperation itself, focusing on the evolution of reputation systems, punishment, retaliation, and social preferences.
Cooperation is often most difficult where societies are divided by ethnicity, historical conflict, migration, or incompatible social norms. My research in this area examines how cooperative norms emerge across such divisions, how intergroup trust can be rebuilt, and why interactions between groups sometimes foster cooperation but at other times generate conflict.
with Marcela Ibáñez
How can societies rebuild cooperation after violent conflict? This paper develops a formal theory of how leaders facilitate the emergence of cooperative norms when conflict has weakened both trust and informal enforcement mechanisms.
· Work in progress
with Vasiliki Fouka and Edith Zink
This paper studies how metanorms—norms governing responses to norm violations—are transmitted across group boundaries and how segregation limits this learning process.
· Work in progress
with Vasiliki Fouka
Groups can sustain cooperation through different reputation systems. While each works internally, incompatible systems generate misunderstanding and conflict across groups.
· [Working paper][NBER working paper][Extended Online Appendix]
with Elias Dinas and Vasiliki Fouka, Public Opinion Quarterly (2021)
Recognition of historical suffering can increase solidarity with contemporary outgroups by reshaping perceptions of collective victimhood.
with Elias Dinas and Vasiliki Fouka, Journal of Politics (2021)
Family histories of forced displacement continue to shape political attitudes toward refugees across generations.
· [10.1086/710016]
Democracy depends not only on elections and constitutions but also on norms of cooperation and institutional restraint. This research agenda examines why those norms erode and how citizens respond to authoritarian challenges.
A formal theory explaining why violations of democratic norms can increase electoral support by credibly signaling independence from distrusted elites.
· Work in progress
with Marcela Ibáñez
Exposure to Chinese development projects increases support for democracy rather than diffusing authoritarian preferences, particularly where democratic institutions are weaker.
· Work in progress
My third research agenda investigates the mechanisms that make cooperation possible. Rather than treating reputation, punishment, and preferences as given, I study how these mechanisms emerge and evolve.
Proceedings of the Royal Society B (2018)
Explains the endogenous emergence of reputation systems and why punishment-based reputation facilitates the initial transition to cooperation.
Evolution and Human Behavior (2025)
Shows that punishment of indiscriminate cooperators can stabilize cooperation under conditional cooperation.
· [10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2025.106655]
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2024)
Demonstrates how retaliation functions as an informal enforcement mechanism that complements formal institutions.
· [10.1016/j.jebo.2024.05.010 ]
with Vasiliki Fouka, Economic Journal (2020)
Historical agricultural conditions shaped work norms that persist through cultural transmission.
My earlier research focused on macroeconomic fluctuations, financial risk, and monetary policy.
Examines how unemployment risk influences precautionary savings and the transmission of monetary policy.
· [Working paper]
Studies how efforts to increase stability may reduce resilience to large shocks.
· [Working paper]
with Fabio Canova, Journal of Applied Econometrics (2015)
Examines whether regional integration increased business-cycle synchronization.
· [10.1002/jae.2364]