Aidan McGlynn - Research

For my Google Scholar Citations page, please click here.

Published Work


1. Knowledge First? (2014), Palgrave Macmillian for Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy



10. 'Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism' with Giada Fratantonio (forthcoming 2018), in Veli Mitova (ed), The Factive Turn in Epistemology, Cambridge University Press: 84-101.

9. 'Mindreading Knowledge' (2017), in Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, and Ben Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, Oxford University Press: 72-94.

8. 'Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem' (2017), Episteme 14: 89-102.

7. 'Propaganda and the Authority of Pornography' (2016), Theoria 31: 329-43.

6. 'Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought' (2016), in Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, Oxford University Press: 25-55.

5. 'On Epistemic Alchemy' (2014), in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press: 173-89.

4. 'Believing Things Unknown' (2013), Noûs 47: 385-407.

3. 'Justification as "Would-Be" Knowledge' (2012), Episteme 9: 359-74.

2. 'Interpretation and Knowledge Maximization' (2012), Philosophical Studies 160: 391-405.

1. 'The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals' (2012), Analysis 72: 276-85.

Reviews and Surveys:

6. 'Postscript to Mark Sainsbury and Tim Williamson's 'Sorites'' (2017), in Bob Hale, Alex Miller, and Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Second Edition, second volume), Wiley Blackwell Publishing: 757-64.

5. 'Review of Simon Prosser and Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays, Cambridge University Press', Philosophy in Review.

4. 'Review of Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford University Press'Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

3. 'Review of S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge', International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3: 72-5. 

(Note: I've come to think that the criticism of Goldberg in this review isn't quite right. It now seems to me that he's making a distinction between 'internal' perception models and 'inner' perception models. Since this slight difference is never highlighted or explained, I do still think the presentation is rather misleading - indeed, I was misled by it.)

2. 'Review of P. Carruthers, The Opacity of Mind, Oxford University Press', Philosophical Quarterly 62: 635-6.

1. 'Review of A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press'Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Work in Progress

Feminist pornography as feminist propaganda

Reply to Ofra Magidor on brains in vats

Commentary on Annalisa Coliva's The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

Aidan McGlynn,
Feb 12, 2013, 5:52 AM