Aidan McGlynn - Publications

Books:

3. Epistemic Injustice: An Introduction (forthcoming), Routledge

2. The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology (2025), co-edited with Jennifer Lackey, Oxford University Press

1. Knowledge First? (2014), Palgrave Macmillan

Reviews: 

- Krista Lawlor in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

- Magdalena Balcerak Jackson in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Papers:

27. 'Epistemic Objectification in Pornography' (forthcoming), The Philosophical Quarterly.

26. 'Epistemic Injustice: Phenomena and Theories' (2025), in Jennifer Lackey and Aidan McGlynn (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press: 295-327.

25. 'Known Unknowns and the Limits of Knowledge' and 'Circumstantial Luck and Knowledge First Epistemology' (2024), in Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology Vol. 3, Wiley Blackwell. (These are my essays as part of a debate on knowledge first epistemology with Mona Simion.)

24. 'Making Life More Interesting: Trust, Trustworthiness, and Testimonial Injustice' (2024), Philosophical Psychology 37 (1): 126-147. (Part of a special issue on trust and trustworthiness dedicated to the memory of Katherine Hawley.)

23. 'Educating for Intellectual Virtue in a Vicious World' (2024), Inquiry 67 (2): 784-797. (This is a symposium piece on Alessandra Tanesini's The Mismeasure of the Self.)

22. 'Hidden Depths: Testimonial Injustice, Deep Disagreement, and Democratic Deliberation.' (2023), International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3): 361-81.  (Winner of the first runner-up PERITIA prize.)

21. 'Epistemic Rights Violations and Epistemic Injustice' (2023), Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (29): 1-14. (This was written as a symposium piece on Lani Watson's The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them.)

20. 'What Can Philosophy Contribute to 'Education to Address Pornography's Influence'?' (2022), Journal of Philosophy of Education 56 (5): 774-86.

19. 'Immunity to Wh-Misidentification' (2021), Synthese 199: 2293-2313.

18. 'Epistemic Objectification as the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice' (2021), Episteme 18 (2): 160-76.

17. 'Feminist Pornography As Feminist Propaganda, and Ideological Catch-22s' (2021), in Jennifer Lackey (ed),  Applied Epistemology, Oxford University Press: 283-301.

16. 'Blurred Lines: How Fictional is Pornography?' (2021), Philosophy Compass 16 (4): 1-13.

15. 'Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice' (2020), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23: 831-45.

14. 'Testimonial Injustice, Pornography, and Silencing' (2019), Analytic Philosophy 60: 405-17.

13. 'Redrawing the Map: Medina on Epistemic Vices and Skepticism' (2019), International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3): 261-83.  (Special issue on epistemic vices and varieties of skepticism.)

12. 'Suspicious Minds: Coliva on Moore's Paradox and Commitment' (2019), Philosophia 47: 313-22. (This is a symposium piece on Annalisa Coliva's The Varieties of Self-Knowledge.)

11. ''This is the Bad Case': What Brains-In-Vats Can Know' (2018), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92: 183-205. (This is a response to Ofra Magidor's 'How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether Or Not You are Envatted'.)

10. 'Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism' with Giada Fratantonio (2018), in Veli Mitova (ed), The Factive Turn in Epistemology, Cambridge University Press: 84-101.

9. 'Mindreading Knowledge' (2017), in Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, and Ben Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, Oxford University Press: 72-94.

8. 'Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem' (2017), Episteme 14: 89-102.

7. 'Propaganda and the Authority of Pornography' (2016), Theoria 31: 329-43. (Special issue on Jason Stanley's How Propaganda Works.)

6. 'Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought' (2016), in Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, Oxford University Press: 25-55.

5. 'On Epistemic Alchemy' (2014), in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press: 173-89.

4. 'Believing Things Unknown' (2013), Noûs 47: 385-407.

3. 'Justification as "Would-Be" Knowledge' (2012), Episteme 9: 359-74.

2. 'Interpretation and Knowledge Maximization' (2012), Philosophical Studies 160: 391-405.

1. 'The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals' (2012), Analysis 72: 276-85.

Reviews, Commentaries, and Surveys:

10. 'Pessimism and Optimism in Non-Ideal Inquiry Epistemology' (forthcoming), International Journal of Philosophical Studies. (This is a short symposium piece on Robin McKenna's Non-Ideal Epistemology.)

9. 'Review of Alessandra Tanesini, The Mismeasure of the Self, Oxford University Press', Mind 133 (531): 922-929.

8. 'Extreme Testimonial Injustice or Discursive Injustice? A Reply to Townsend and Townsend on Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System.' Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (4): 23-30.

7. 'Review of Jessica Brown, Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, Oxford University Press', Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

6. 'Postscript to Mark Sainsbury and Tim Williamson's 'Sorites'' (2017), in Bob Hale, Alex Miller, and Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Second Edition, second volume), Wiley Blackwell Publishing: 757-64.

5. 'Review of Simon Prosser and Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays, Cambridge University Press', Philosophy in Review.

4. 'Review of Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford University Press', Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

3. 'Review of S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge', International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3: 72-5.

2. 'Review of P. Carruthers, The Opacity of Mind, Oxford University Press', Philosophical Quarterly 62: 635-6.

1. 'Review of A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press', Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews