Ahuva Mu'alem
אהובה מועלם

**Contact Information:**

Email: ahumu [-at-] yahoo.com
Cell: +972-(0)50-305-3706

**Research Interests:** Theoretical and Experimental study of algorithms and pricing in strategic environments,
especially game-theoretical problems arising in the design of resource allocation scenarios such as auctions
with multiple goods and cloud computing.

**Keywords:**
Electronic Commerce, Cloud Computing, Online Advertising, Incentives, Fairness, Algorithmic Game Theory, Scheduling, Pricing, Optimization, Approximation Algorithms, Performance Evaluation, Simulations, Auctions, Budgets

Currently, I'm a senior lecturer at Holon Institute of Technology (HIT) in Israel. Previously, I was a post-doc fellow at the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory (SISL), Caltech.

**More information:** CV | Research Statement

**Links:** dblp | google.scholar

__Academic Service:__

**Conference Program Committees:** EC-11,
EC-14, EC-15, WINE-15

__Recent Presentations:__

- From Game Theory to Cloud Computing: Theoretical and Experimental Perspectives (slides)
- eCommerce, Game Theory and Other Puzzles (slides in Hebrew)

__Supervising Undergraduate Student Projects:__

__Working Paper(s)__*:*

**Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness**.

Ahuva Mu'alem and
Michael Schapira*.*

**Revenues and Budgets: Selling Mechanisms for Financially Constrained Buyers**.

Juan Carlos Carbajal and Ahuva Mu'alem.

__Journal Papers:__

**Fair by Design: Multidimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms**,

Ahuva Mu'alem

Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 88, pp 29-46, 2014.

**Two Simplified Proofs for Roberts' Theorem**,
(slides)

Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.

Social Choice and Welfare, vol 32, pp 407-423, 2009.

**Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted
Combinatorial Auctions**.
(ps),
(slides),
(poster).
Full version: pdf.

Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.

Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 64, pp 612-631, 2008.

**Weak Monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation**.

S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan, and A. Sen.
Some supporting material.

Econometrica, vol. 74(4), pp. 1109-1132, July 2006.

**On the Definition of "On-line" in Job Scheduling Problems. **

Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.

*SIGACT News* **36(1)**,
pp. 122-131, March 2005.

**Utilization, Predictability, Workloads, and User
Runtime Estimates in Scheduling the IBM SP2 with Backfilling ** (ps).

Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.

*IEEE Trans. Parallel & Distributed Syst.* **12(6)**,
pp. 529-543, Jun 2001.

__Conference Papers:__

**Ginseng: Market-Driven Memory Allocation**,

Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Eyal Posener, Muli Ben-Yehuda, Assaf Schuster, and Ahuva Mu'alem.

In VEE-14

*Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets*,

Ahuva Mu'alem. (slides).

In SAGT-14

**The Effects of Untruthful Bids on User Utilities and Stability in Computing Markets ** (pdf),
.

Sergei Shudler, Lior Amar, Amnon Barak, and Ahuva Mu'alem.

In CCGRID-10

**Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders**.

David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem and Mahyar Salek.

A slightly more detailed older version can be found
here

In WINE-09

**On Multi-Dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms**.

Ahuva Mu'alem.

In ADT-09

**On the Importance of Migration for Fairness in Online Grid Markets**.

Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser.

A short version appeared in
AAMAS-08

In GRID-08

**The Power of Preemption in Economic Online Markets**.

Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser. In
GECON-08,
LNCS
5206

**Mechanism Design Over Discrete Domains**.

Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira. In
EC-08.
(slides).

Also presented at the third world congress of the game theory society,
GAMES-08

**Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness**. (slides)

Ahuva Mu'alem and
Michael Schapira. In
Soda-07

**On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for
Partially Informed Environments**,

(slides).
Ahuva Mu'alem. In EC-05

**Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions**.

Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
("monotonicity" slides)
("full" slides). In FOCS-03

**Bicriteria Scheduling for Parallel Jobs**. (slides).

Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In
MISTA-03

**Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted
Combinatorial Auctions**.
(slides),
(poster).
Full version: pdf.

Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
In
AAAI-02

**Utilization and predictability
in scheduling the IBM SP2 with backfilling**.

Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.

*In 12th **Intl. Parallel Processing Symp.*, pp. 542-546, Apr 1998

**Thesis:**

Incentives and Computation: Combinatorial
Auctions and Networks (pdf). PhD Thesis.