Ahuva Mu'alem
אהובה מועלם
Contact Information:
Email: ahumu [-at-] yahoo.com
Cell: +972-(0)50-305-3706
Currently, I'm a senior lecturer at Holon Institute of Technology (HIT) in Israel.
Previously, I was a post-doc fellow at the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory (SISL), Caltech.
Research Interests: Theoretical and Experimental study of algorithms and pricing in strategic environments,
especially game-theoretical problems arising in the design of resource allocation scenarios such as auctions
with multiple goods and cloud computing.
Keywords:
Electronic Commerce, Cloud Computing, Online Advertising, Incentives, Fairness, Algorithmic Game Theory, Scheduling, Pricing, Optimization, Approximation Algorithms, Performance Evaluation, Simulations, Auctions, Budgets
More information: CV | Research Statement
Links: dblp | google.scholar
Journal Papers:
Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness.
Ahuva Mu'alem and
Michael Schapira.
Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 110, pp 174-193, 2018.
Fair by Design: Multidimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms,
Ahuva Mu'alem
Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 88, pp 29-46, 2014.
Two Simplified Proofs for Roberts' Theorem,
(slides)
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
Social Choice and Welfare, vol 32, pp 407-423, 2009.
Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted
Combinatorial Auctions.
(ps),
(slides),
(poster).
Full version: pdf.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 64, pp 612-631, 2008.
Weak Monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation.
S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan, and A. Sen.
Some supporting material.
Econometrica, vol. 74(4), pp. 1109-1132, July 2006.
On the Definition of "On-line" in Job Scheduling Problems.
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
SIGACT News 36(1),
pp. 122-131, March 2005.
Utilization, Predictability, Workloads, and User
Runtime Estimates in Scheduling the IBM SP2 with Backfilling (ps).
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
IEEE Trans. Parallel & Distributed Syst. 12(6),
pp. 529-543, Jun 2001.
Conference Papers:
Ginseng: Market-Driven Memory Allocation,
Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Eyal Posener, Muli Ben-Yehuda, Assaf Schuster, and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In VEE-14
Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets,
Ahuva Mu'alem.
In SAGT-14
The Effects of Untruthful Bids on User Utilities and Stability in Computing Markets (pdf),
.
Sergei Shudler, Lior Amar, Amnon Barak, and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In CCGRID-10
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders.
David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem and Mahyar Salek.
A slightly more detailed older version can be found
here
In WINE-09
On Multi-Dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms.
Ahuva Mu'alem.
In ADT-09
On the Importance of Migration for Fairness in Online Grid Markets.
Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser.
A short version appeared in
AAMAS-08
In GRID-08
The Power of Preemption in Economic Online Markets.
Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser. In
GECON-08,
LNCS
5206
Mechanism Design Over Discrete Domains.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira. In
EC-08.
(slides).
Also presented at the third world congress of the game theory society,
GAMES-08
Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness.
Ahuva Mu'alem and
Michael Schapira. In
Soda-07
On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for
Partially Informed Environments,
(slides).
Ahuva Mu'alem. In EC-05
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions.
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
("monotonicity" slides)
("full" slides). In FOCS-03
Bicriteria Scheduling for Parallel Jobs. (slides).
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In
MISTA-03
Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted
Combinatorial Auctions.
(slides),
(poster).
Full version: pdf.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
In
AAAI-02
Utilization and predictability
in scheduling the IBM SP2 with backfilling.
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In 12th Intl. Parallel Processing Symp., pp. 542-546, Apr 1998
Thesis:
Incentives and Computation: Combinatorial
Auctions and Networks (pdf). PhD Thesis.
Supervising Undergraduate Student Projects:
