Ahuva Mu'alem

אהובה מועלם


Contact Information:

Email:   ahumu [-at-] yahoo.com 

Cell:     +972-(0)50-305-3706

Research Interests: Theoretical and Experimental study of algorithms and pricing in strategic environments, especially game-theoretical problems arising in the design of resource allocation scenarios such as auctions with multiple goods and cloud computing.


Keywords: Electronic Commerce, Cloud Computing, Online Advertising, Incentives, Fairness, Algorithmic Game Theory, Scheduling, Pricing, Optimization, Approximation Algorithms, Performance Evaluation,  Simulations, Auctions, Budgets

Currently, I'm a senior lecturer at Holon Institute of Technology (HIT) in Israel. Previously, I was a post-doc fellow at the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory (SISL), Caltech. 


More information: CV | Research Statement

Links:  dblp | google.scholar



Academic Service:

 Conference Program Committees: EC-11, EC-14, EC-15, WINE-15


Recent Presentations:

  • From Game Theory to Cloud Computing: Theoretical and Experimental Perspectives (slides)
  • eCommerce, Game Theory and Other Puzzles (slides in Hebrew)

 Supervising Undergraduate Student Projects:


Working Paper(s):

Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira.


Revenues and Budgets: Selling Mechanisms for Financially Constrained Buyers.
Juan Carlos Carbajal and Ahuva Mu'alem.

Journal Papers:

Fair by Design: Multidimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms,
Ahuva Mu'alem
Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 88, pp 29-46, 2014.



Two Simplified Proofs for Roberts' Theorem, (slides)
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
 Social Choice and Welfare, vol 32, pp 407-423, 2009.

Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions. (ps), (slides), (poster). Full version: pdf.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 64, pp 612-631, 2008.

Weak Monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation.
S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan, and A. Sen. Some supporting material.
 Econometrica, vol. 74(4), pp. 1109-1132, July 2006.


On the Definition of "On-line" in Job Scheduling Problems.
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
SIGACT News 36(1), pp. 122-131, March 2005.

Utilization, Predictability, Workloads, and User Runtime Estimates in Scheduling the IBM SP2 with Backfilling (ps).
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
IEEE Trans. Parallel & Distributed Syst. 12(6), pp. 529-543, Jun 2001.



Conference Papers:

Ginseng: Market-Driven Memory Allocation, 
Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Eyal Posener, Muli Ben-Yehuda, Assaf Schuster, and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In VEE-14


Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets, 
Ahuva Mu'alem. (slides).
In SAGT-14


The Effects of Untruthful Bids on User Utilities and Stability in Computing Markets (pdf), .
Sergei Shudler, Lior Amar, Amnon Barak, and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In CCGRID-10


Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders.
David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem and Mahyar Salek.
A slightly more detailed older version can be found here
In WINE-09

On Multi-Dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms.
Ahuva Mu'alem.
In ADT-09

On the Importance of Migration for Fairness in Online Grid Markets.
Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser.
A short version appeared in AAMAS-08
In GRID-08

The Power of Preemption in Economic Online Markets.
Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser. In GECON-08, LNCS 5206

Mechanism Design Over Discrete Domains.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira. In EC-08. (slides).
Also presented at the third world congress of the game theory society, GAMES-08


Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness. (slides)
Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira. In Soda-07


On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially Informed Environments,
(slides). Ahuva Mu'alem. In EC-05


Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions.
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan. ("monotonicity" slides) ("full" slides). In FOCS-03

Bicriteria Scheduling for Parallel Jobs. (slides).
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem. In MISTA-03

Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions. (slides), (poster). Full version: pdf.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan. In AAAI-02


Utilization and predictability in scheduling the IBM SP2 with backfilling.
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In 12th Intl. Parallel Processing Symp., pp. 542-546, Apr 1998




Thesis:

Incentives and Computation: Combinatorial Auctions and Networks (pdf). PhD Thesis.