Ahuva Mu'alem

ד"ר אהובה מועלם


Contact Information:


Email:   ahumu [-at-] yahoo.com 

Cell:     +972-(0)50-305-3706


Research Interests: Theoretical and Experimental study of algorithms and pricing in strategic environments, especially game-theoretical problems arising in the design of resource allocation scenarios such as auctions with multiple goods and cloud computing.


Keywords: Electronic Commerce, Cloud Computing, Online Advertising, Incentives, Fairness, Algorithmic Game Theory, Scheduling, Pricing, Optimization, Approximation Algorithms, Performance Evaluation,  Simulations, Auctions, Budgets

Currently, I'm a senior lecturer at Holon Institute of Technology (HIT) in Israel. Previously, I was a post-doc fellow at the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory (SISL), Caltech. 


More information: CV | Research Statement

Links:  dblp | google.scholar



Academic Service:

Conference Program Committees: EC-11, EC-14, EC-15, WINE-15


Recent Presentations:


Supervising Undergraduate Student Projects:


Working Papers:

Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets (slides)
Ahuva Mu'alem.

Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira.


Journal Papers:

Fair by Design: Multidimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms,
Ahuva Mu'alem
Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 88, pp 29-46, 2014.


Application of a K-Ladder Connectivity Algorithm for Clustering of Protein Evolutionary Network
Reshma Nibhani, Avi Soffer, Ahuva Mu'alem, Zeev Volkovich and Zakharia Frenkel

The 2nd Journal Conference on Modelling and Optimization (JCMO), vol. 4(5), pp. 367-374, 2014.



Two Simplified Proofs for Roberts' Theorem, (slides)
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
Social Choice and Welfare, vol 32, pp 407-423, 2009.


Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions. (ps), (slides), (poster). Full version: pdf.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.
Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 64, pp 612-631, 2008.

Weak Monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation.
S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan, and A. Sen. Some supporting material.
Econometrica, vol. 74(4), pp. 1109-1132, July 2006.


On the Definition of "On-line" in Job Scheduling Problems.
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
SIGACT News 36(1), pp. 122-131, March 2005.

Utilization, Predictability, Workloads, and User Runtime Estimates in Scheduling the IBM SP2 with Backfilling (ps).
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
IEEE Trans. Parallel & Distributed Syst. 12(6), pp. 529-543, Jun 2001.



Conference Papers:

Ginseng: Market-Driven Memory Allocation
Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Eyal Posener, Muli Ben-Yehuda, Assaf Schuster, and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In VEE-14


Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets
Ahuva Mu'alem.
(slides).
In SAGT-14


The Effects of Untruthful Bids on User Utilities and Stability in Computing Markets (pdf), .
Sergei Shudler, Lior Amar, Amnon Barak, and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In CCGRID-10


Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders.
David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem and Mahyar Salek.
A slightly more detailed older version can be found here
In WINE-09


On Multi-Dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms.
Ahuva Mu'alem.
In ADT-09

On the Importance of Migration for Fairness in Online Grid Markets.
Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser.
A short version appeared in AAMAS-08
In GRID-08

The Power of Preemption in Economic Online Markets.
Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser. In GECON-08, LNCS 5206

Mechanism Design Over Discrete Domains.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira. In EC-08. (slides).
Also presented at the third world congress of the game theory society, GAMES-08


Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness. (slides)
Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira. In Soda-07


On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially Informed Environments,
(slides). Ahuva Mu'alem. In EC-05


Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions.
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan. ("monotonicity" slides) ("full" slides). In FOCS-03

Bicriteria Scheduling for Parallel Jobs. (slides).
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem. In MISTA-03

Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions. (slides), (poster). Full version: pdf.
Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan. In AAAI-02


Utilization and predictability in scheduling the IBM SP2 with backfilling.
Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.
In 12th Intl. Parallel Processing Symp., pp. 542-546, Apr 1998




Thesis:

Incentives and Computation: Combinatorial Auctions and Networks (pdf). PhD Thesis.