Research Notes
Short, non-technical notes on my research and related work in political economy.
Short, non-technical notes on my research and related work in political economy.
Concentrating power can lead even parties committed to reducing inequality to offer less to the poor
September 12, 2026
"We're going for it all."' Argentina's vamos por todo slogan captured a familiar case for concentrating power: to transform an unequal society, a government elected by the majority needs room to act. According to this argument, institutional checks allow those who benefit from the existing order to block reforms that threaten their privileges. The majority votes for change, but others decide how far it can go. Removing those obstacles then appears to be a way to honour the democratic mandate and improve the lives of the less fortunate.
The argument has an obvious appeal. A reform that is never enacted can hardly help its intended beneficiaries. But it rests on an assumption worth examining: that the government's priorities will remain unchanged when the rules governing power change. Parties choose their platforms with electoral support in mind. If institutions change the rewards of victory, they may also change what parties are willing to offer to secure it.
A study by Dario Debowicz, Alejandro Saporiti and Yizhi Wang, published in Social Choice and Welfare in 2021, explores this possibility. Continue reading
Electoral competition can reward a party with office while drawing its policies towards those preferred by its rival.
3 November 2026
Labour returned to government in 1997 promising change. Yet it also promised not to increase the basic or top rate of income tax and to respect its predecessor's spending limits. The Conservatives lost office, but parts of the fiscal framework they had established remained the starting point for their successors.
Such episodes raise a question that election results alone cannot answer. How much has a party won if securing office requires it to adopt policies closer to those preferred by its opponents? And how much has its rival lost if some of its policy objectives survive the change of government?
A study by Michalis Drouvelis, Alejandro Saporiti and Nicolaas Vriend, published in Games and Economic Behavior in 2014, examines the distinction. Continue reading.