Research Notes
Short, non-technical notes on my research and related work in political economy.
Short, non-technical notes on my research and related work in political economy.
Concentrating power can lead even parties committed to reducing inequality to offer less to the poor
September 12, 2026
"We're going for it all."' Argentina's vamos por todo slogan captured a familiar case for concentrating power: to transform an unequal society, a government elected by the majority needs room to act. According to this argument, institutional checks allow those who benefit from the existing order to block reforms that threaten their privileges. The majority votes for change, but others decide how far it can go. Removing those obstacles then appears to be a way to honour the democratic mandate and improve the lives of the less fortunate.
The argument has an obvious appeal. A reform that is never enacted can hardly help its intended beneficiaries. But it rests on an assumption worth examining: that the government's priorities will remain unchanged when the rules governing power change. Parties choose their platforms with electoral support in mind. If institutions change the rewards of victory, they may also change what parties are willing to offer to secure it.
A study by Dario Debowicz, Alejandro Saporiti and Yizhi Wang, published in Social Choice and Welfare in 2021, explores this possibility. Continue reading