Research & Publications

Replication materials and online appendices are linked with publications below. I'm still finalizing materials for forthcoming pieces. If you're looking for data/code not listed (typically older work), I am happy to share anything that's not built on proprietary data. Just email me at  Thanks.

Publications (see citations on my Google Scholar page)

Abby K. Wood, Christopher Elmendorf, Douglas M. Spencer, and Nicolas Napolio. 2022. “Mind the (Participation) Gap: Vouchers, Voting, and Visibility”, American Politics Research 

Wood, Abby K. 2022. "Voters Learn from Campaign Finance Disclosure and Compliance Information". , Political Behavior.  Replication files here.

Aneja, Abhay, Jacob M. Grumbach, and Abby K. Wood. Forthcoming, 2022.  "Financial Inclusion in Politics".  NYU Law Review.

Feinstein, Brian, and Abby K. Wood. Forthcoming, 2022. "Divided Agencies". S. Cal. L. Rev. (lead article).

Wood, Abby and Christian Grose. 2021. Campaign Finance Transparency Affects Legislators' Election Outcomes and BehaviorAmerican Journal of Political Science, Replication files here.

Clouser McCann, Pamela J, Douglas M. Spencer, and Abby K. Wood. 2021. "Measuring State Capture."  Wisc. L. Rev.; online appendix (data and code coming soon)

Abby K. Wood. 2021.  “Learning from Campaign Finance Information.”  Emory Law Journal 70(5): 1091-1142

Abby K. Wood. 2020. “Facilitating Accountability for Online Political Advertisements.” Ohio State Technology Law Journal 16(2): 520-557.

Grose, Christian and Abby Wood. 2019. "Randomized experiments by government institutions and American political development." Public Choice 185, 401-413.

Stein, Robert, et al. 2019. "Waiting to Vote in the 2016 Presidential Election: Evidence from a Multi-jurisdiction Study.Political Research Quarterly, 73(2):439-453.

Stein, Robert, et al. 2019. “Polling Place Quality and Access” in The Future of Election Administration (Kathleen Hale and Bridgett  A. King, eds., Palgrave, 2019).

Abby K. Wood. 2018. “Campaign Finance Disclosure”. Annual Review of Law & Social Science 14(1): 11-27. 

Abby K. Wood and Ann M. Ravel. 2018. “Fool Me Once: Government Regulation of “Fake News” and other Online Political Advertising.” 91 Southern California Law Review 1223-1278.

Christopher S. Elmendorf & Abby K. Wood. 2018. "Elite Political Ignorance: Law, Data, and the Representation of (Mis)Perceived Electorates." 52 U.C. Davis Law Review 571-636 (lead article). 

Mann, Christopher B., et al. 2018. "Pedagogical Value of Polling Place Observation By Students." PS: Political Science & Politics (Oct) 831-837.

Wood, Abby K. and David E. Lewis. 2017. “Agency Performance Challenges and Agency PoliticizationJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 27(4): 581–595.   Supplemental appendix; data; code; codebook.

Michalski, Roger M. and Abby Wood. 2017. “Twombly and Iqbal at the State Level” (with Roger M. Michalski) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 14(2): 424-469.

Wood, Abby K. and Douglas M. Spencer. 2016. “In The Shadows of Sunlight: An Empirical Study of Campaign Finance Transparency” Election Law Journal 15(4): 302-329.

Jensenius, Francesca and Abby Wood. 2016. “Caught in the Act but not Punished: Why the Rule of Law is Key to Effective DeterrencePenn State Journal of Law & International Affairs. 686(4).

Spencer, Douglas M. and Abby K. Wood. 2014. “Citizens United, States Divided: Evidence of Elasticity in Independent Expenditures” Indiana Law Journal 89(1):315-372.

"Charm and Punishment: How the Philippines' leading man became its most famous prisoner", in Prosecuting Heads of State (Ellen Lutz and Caitlin Reiger, eds., Cambridge University, 2009)

Works In Progress

"Institutions, Risks, and Categories: The Political Economy of Essential Work" with Pamela Clouser McCann. 

Risk reduction is a key aspect of our political economy. Elected officials, voters, private industry actors, and organized labor all take risk into consideration when forming policy preferences. Any policy decision can reallocate risk in a population. Gubernatorial decisions made during states of emergency -- which exist because of a risk to the state -- are no different. COVID-19 gave us a recent example of how emergency policy decisions allocate risk. Statewide mandates regarding private and public sector closures typically involved exceptions for workers deemed critical to public health and the safety of the community, including those individuals providing basic essential services such as healthcare, power, water, and sanitation services. Notably, the timing and content of gubernatorial orders and declarations varied across states, as did the essential worker exceptions. In this study, we argue that such gubernatorial choices are associated with the health and economic risks of their electoral constituents, along with political and economic landscape of the state.  We leverage variation in occupational exemptions in the executive orders along with timing of the orders to analyze state governments’ pandemic response. We find that the state's political economy is associated with the governors' responses to the COVID epidemic in predictable ways. 

This is part of a larger project exploring risk, institutions, and political behavior.